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What is China’s place in the global food system? This thesis provides an analytical lens to 
explain the factors behind the structure of China’s national seed industry and recent global 
agribusiness expansion. Scholars of Global Political Economy and critical food studies have 
begun to assess the (re)emergence of actors from China in global markets replete with 
powerful agribusiness from the global North. However, these scholars have thus far paid 
less attention to the domestic, normative origins and dynamics that explain China’s place in 
the global food system. For example, though the global grain seed industry is highly 
concentrated, China’s domestic grain seed market does not share the same characteristics. 
To explain this discrepancy and shed light on the place of China in the global food system, I 
develop the concept of securitized foodways.  
Securitized foodways is built on a power framework that incorporates both positive 
and negative forms of power. Three dimensions of power (ideational, material, and 
autonomy) correspond to three factors that have shaped China’s grain seed industry, its 
place in the global food system, and its broader economy. The first factor is the Party-state’s 
ideational priority of self-reliance, particularly in the context of grain security. In contrast to 
other large Southern countries (e.g., India and the Philippines), the historical priority for 
China to be self-reliant has led to a distinct conception of national food security focused on 
national ownership over each segment of the grain supply chain and particularly seed 
resources. The second factor is the Party-state’s control over its domestic agrifood system 
through law and regulation limiting the participation of foreign seed companies. More 
recently, the Party-state’s power over its domestic grain seed markets has shifted into 
nascent material power in the global food system. This expansion of Chinese agribusiness in 
the name of national food security occurs through a combination of overseas seed extension 
projects as well as through the acquisition of foreign agribusinesses including Syngenta, 
Noble, and Nidera. The third factor is China’s historical autonomy from the U.S. food regime 
(1950s to 1970s). China remained independent of the agrifood networks developed under 
the U.S.-led green revolution and food aid architecture, instead establishing its own 
domestic research networks and extension system. This autonomy provided the Party-state 
with the power necessary to retain domestic policy space, develop a home-grown seed 
industry, and challenge the dominance of Northern agribusiness firms in the global food 
system. 
 Combined, the three factors explain China’s domestic grain seed market structure 
(ideational priority of self-reliant national food security, material power over the domestic 
food system, and historical autonomy from the U.S. food regime). Further, these factors 
serve to explain and interpret the recently expanded presence of actors from the PRC in 
global grain and grain seed markets. Despite pressure from MNCs and other states, national 
agribusinesses continue to hold market share in China’s domestic grain seed market 
 
 v 
demonstrating both the continued normative commitment of Party-state actors to support 
national industry and the material power to maintain control over national markets in the 
context of economic globalization. These national Chinese agribusinesses (with the help of 
financial actors) have also rapidly increased their presence abroad to compete in both 
domestic and global markets.  
However, despite the exercise of material power in the global food system, actors 
from China have not yet displaced the incumbent agribusiness power of MNCs 
headquartered in the global North. Further, there are challenges and impacts related to the 
pursuit of national food security through domestically owned industrial agriculture. Given 
MNC ownership of patents, the potential introduction of genetically modified (GM) grain 
seeds to the domestic Chinese market presents a challenge to the Party-state’s continued 
control over the PRC’s seed industry. Further, the growing commercial seed system and 
discourse of national food security has placed pressure on, but also provided limited space 
for, alternative food movements within China. These food movements share similar 
ideational concerns to the Party-state vis-à-vis global agribusiness concentration, but 
promote a path to food security rooted in local food systems. As agribusinesses from China, 
with strong connections to the Party-state, expand their global grain and seed networks, 
both GM seeds and food alternatives are domestic sources of contention for the Party-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Research problem and context 
Actors from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are becoming key players in global 
agrifood markets, an outcome motivated in large part by the Chinese Party-state’s 
normative commitment to national food security. Over the last decade, scholars have 
become increasingly focused on the PRC’s place in a shifting world order. To assess the 
parameters of these shifts as they pertain to China, most attention is given to 
traditionally powerful areas of the global economy, including international currencies, 
high finance, and heavy industry. However, the global food system is a significant part of 
the global political economy and is likewise experiencing shifting power dynamics in 
relation to China. This dissertation develops argumentation and theory to explain and 
interpret the changing place of the PRC in the global food system and broader global 
political economy. 
For more than a century, states, institutes, and agribusinesses based in Europe 
and North America have had a dominant influence in global food and agricultural 
development. These actors play a central role in managing demand and supply, diffusing 
agricultural input technologies including genetically modified (GM) seeds, shipping 
commodities across the globe, and designing the rules under which food systems 
operate (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; McMichael, 2009). However, the interaction between 
actors from the PRC with the global food economy of Western agribusiness has only 
expanded over the last several decades. The PRC now imports 63% of internationally 
traded soybean, while also importing several million tons of rice, wheat, and corn; 
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further, agribusinesses from the PRC are investing abroad in multiple sectors (USDA, 
2018). Though much of the soybean that China imports is GM, no GM grain seeds have 
yet been approved for commercial planting in the country (Zhang, 2018). On one hand, 
China’s domestic production, agricultural markets, environment, and alternative food 
movements are changing (Si, Schumilas, & Scott, 2015; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). On 
the other hand, agribusiness investment from the PRC is expanding overseas (Schneider, 
2017; Yan, Chen, & Bun, 2016). What do these trends mean for the power structures of 
the global food system and economy? 
The place of actors from China within the contemporary global food system is 
complex and poorly understood. For example, scholars analysing the global land grab 
initially pointed to PRC agribusiness as a main contributor to global land dispossession, 
but have since been corrected (Brautigam, 2015; Lawther, 2017; Oliveira, 2017). 
Scholars of Global Political Economy (GPE) are increasingly pointing to the changing 
power-dynamics held by BRICS countries at the expense of actors traditionally 
prominent in food regimes (Hopewell, 2014).1 Food regime theorists, who argue that the 
current food system has its roots in the post-WWII period of United States pre-
eminence, are faced with difficulty interpreting potential new food regimes since the 
acceleration of economic globalization in the 1980s (Burch & Lawrence, 2009; Pritchard, 
2009). The presence of state and commercial actors originating from China is clearly 
becoming more significant in the agrifood sector (Schneider, 2017). However, 
contemporary analysts often take an ahistorical approach to the PRC, using existing 
                                                        
1 I use the capitalized term Global Political Economy (GPE) to denote the diverse field of scholarship, whereas the non-
capitalized term “global political economy” refers to the empirical context of global economics and politics. 
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frameworks that emerged from hegemony based in the United States and Europe (see 
McMichael, 2013).  
Chinese state and agribusiness experience in the global food system prior to 
engaging with economic globalization in the 1980s is often overlooked and has bearing 
on the shape of the Party-state’s current power in the global food system. Meanwhile, 
power dynamics in the global food system are intimately related to the broader place of 
the PRC in the global political economy. The term “Party-state” is used throughout this 
dissertation to refer to the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Zhōngguó gòngchǎndǎng, 
中国共产党) and the collection of state and business actors within the PRC that enact 
CPC policy. The CPC is at the center of these actors through its integrated relationship to 
state organs, national regulations, and state-owned enterprises, and also is 
correspondingly central to shaping ideological frameworks for national priorities 
(Pearson, 2005, 2015). Despite the CPC’s centrality to Chinese politics, its economic and 
political openness has varied over time and issue areas (Shambaugh, 2018). While some 
see the Party-state as increasingly fragmented in its mobilization of actors and 
institutions towards national objectives, this is less the case in the context of key 
strategic industries for national security and economic importance (Chin, 2010; Hsueh, 
2011; Pearson, 2015). The grain seed and grain trade industries are key sectors from the 
Party-state’s perspective of national food grain security, and public opinion is highly 
attuned to food security and safety as seen in the rise of alternative food movements in 
China (Dickson, 2016; Pei et al., 2011; Si, Schumilas, & Scott, 2015; Zhang, 2018). 
This dissertation uses a contemporary puzzle, and an answer that reaches into 
history, to explain the reasons, mechanisms, and trajectory of China’s changing position 
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in the global food system. The central puzzle that drives this dissertation relates to the 
comparative structure of the global grain seed industry vis-à-vis the particular context 
of the PRC. A high level of corporate concentration characterizes the global grain sector 
from seed to table. A handful of agribusiness multinationals account for the majority of 
the world’s commercial grain and seed sales, including Monsanto, DuPont-Pioneer, 
Syngenta, ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus (Murphy, Burch, & Clapp, 2012); these 
companies are usually headquartered in Northern countries, and particularly in the 
United States, western Europe, and Japan. A similar oligopolistic pattern is replicated 
throughout most industrialized countries and many large developing countries (Clapp & 
Fuchs, 2009). However, the PRC’s domestic grain seed industry is highly fragmented, 
with these top multinational corporations (MNCs) typically accounting for less than 20% 
of market share combined (CCM 2015g; Hicks, 2014). In contrast, more than 50% of the 
PRC’s vegetable seed market is occupied by MNCs (CCM, 2015c, 31). This begs the 
question: What explains the low concentration of the dominant agribusiness 
multinationals in the PRC’s commercial grain seed market, and what is the 
relationship between the PRC’s grain seed industry structure and the overall place 
of China in the global food system?  In responding to this question, this dissertation 
establishes a concrete basis for understanding key motivations of the Chinese Party-
state’s engagement in the global food system, and global political economy, through the 




The place of actors from China in the global food system is heavily contested. Scholars of 
global political economy and critical food studies have observed a broad consolidation of 
global capital that extends to China (ETC Group, 2013; Nolan, 2012); yet actors from the 
PRC are often presented as outsiders to, or challengers of this system (Belesky & 
Lawrence, 2018). The truth lies uncomfortably in the middle of these two extremes. In 
response to the research question posed above, my central argument is laid out in three 
steps: 
 
1) The Party-state, through networks of nationally-owned agribusiness and financial 
actors, seeks to retain and expand control over domestic and international grain and 
seed markets, 
2) The pursuit of control over agricultural markets is driven by the Party-state’s national 
food security objective, which relies on control over international flows of grain and 
grain seed in the context of economic globalization, and 
3) The Party-state’s ability to define and carry out its national food security objective was 
made possible by the PRC’s historical experience with and autonomy from the U.S.-led 
food system of the mid-20th century.  
 
The central concept of this dissertation is securitized foodways, a form of national food 
security based on self-reliance attained through controlled engagement of global supply 
chains. I develop the concept of securitized foodways to explain China’s state-
agribusiness partnerships and controlled competition in global agribusiness. It is both 
an explanatory framework for China’s contemporary place in the global food system and 
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a heuristic to understand future motivations and actions of the Party-state within the 
global political economy of food. The concept is built on an adapted power framework 
using forms and dimensions of power developed in GPE and International Relations. I 
focus on two forms of power: positive and negative. Within these forms, I focus on three 
key dimensions of power identified in the literature: 1) ideational, 2) material, and 3) 
autonomy (Barnett & Duval, 2005; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Cohen & Chiu, 2014). Ideational 
and material dimensions are positive forms of power. Ideational power relates to 
national norms regarding food security and self-reliance and material power relates to 
influence over actors and the ability to shape the parameters under which other actors 
must operate. Conversely, the autonomy dimension is a negative form of power 
referring to the ability to withstand the influence of others. Positive and negative forms 
of power, their respective dimensions, and corresponding framework are elaborated in 
depth in Chapter 3. 
Why is this line of argumentation important? As noted above, imports of grains to 
China have surged since the 1990s, including GM grains, drawing wide attention. Other 
scholars have covered these broad dynamics in detail (Cui & Shoemaker, 2018; Smil, 
2004; Zhang, 2018). The PRC’s urbanizing population continues to grow, reaching 1.37 
billion in 2016, but is expected to stabilize at or decrease from 1.42 billion after 2025 
(Cui & Shoemaker, 2018). However, meat consumption in the PRC accelerated since the 
1980s, with annual per capita consumption of meat increasing significantly from 4kg in 
1961 to 61kg in 2010 (Weis, 2013). This increase fuelled domestic consumption of grain 
for direct consumption, animal feed, and further processing (Cui & Shoemaker, 2018). At 
US$9 billion in 2012, the PRC’s commercial seed market was the second largest in the 
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world next to the U.S. and larger than France (McNabb, 2013). As shown in Figure 1.1, 
the PRC’s domestic seed market is larger than the next 5 biggest commercial seed 
markets combined (Brazil, Canada, India, Japan, and Germany).  
The future of grain demand in China remains unclear in terms of the production, 
consumption, and imports of both grain and meat, with estimates pointing in different 
directions (Cui & Shoemaker, 2018; Zhang, 2018). Nevertheless, significant attention is 
paid to these dynamics in the media. Journalistic pieces are trying to make sense of the 
recent presence of actors from the PRC in the global food system, with the Wall Street 
Journal publishing an article titled China Seeks to Develop Global Seed Power and CNN 
asking Why is China Buying the World’s Seeds (Petroff, 2017; Tsang, 2017; Yap, 2015). 
The PRC is seen as an increasingly significant player in the global food system. Given 
China’s sheer size, increased economic growth, and position in the broader global 
political economy, it is crucial to understand the underlying motivations and strategy of 
the Party-state in terms of grain security. The arguments above, and the concept of 
securitized foodways, seek to both explain and provide a sense of order to the barrage of 
information on the subject. 
 




Source: McNabb, 2013 
 
At this point, it is important to identify what this dissertation is and is not. This 
dissertation is not about the PRC’s domestic resource requirements, nor is it about neo-
Malthusian arguments of global resource scarcity (see Brown, 1995; Ma & Adams, 2013; 
Smil, 2016). The issues that concern neo-Malthusian perspectives are often lurking in 
the background and may at times even have an influence on the motivations of 
policymakers. They do not, however, explain why the PRC has been able to maintain 
control over its seed industry, nor why outward investment from the PRC (including 
land grabs) has not resulted in increased shipments of grain back to the PRC (Brautigam 
& Zhang, 2013; Lawther, 2017). Further, this dissertation does not account for the entire 
PRC agricultural economy. There are many sectors beyond grain and grain seed that are 
important and may have distinct dynamics in the context of the PRC and the global food 
system, for example aquaculture, livestock (meat and dairy), and processed foods 
(Schneider, 2017; Zhang, 2018). In addition, despite focusing on the PRC’s engagement 





















about the PRC being integrated into a liberal international economic order or the 
corporate food regime (Ikenberry, 2008; McMichael, 2012). Liberal and food regime 
perspectives do not account for the normative priority for the Party-state to exert 
ownership and control in the global economy. Rather, liberals assume the pursuit of 
market benefits, and food regime scholars focus on corporate hegemony within a 
capitalist food system. 
This dissertation is about the formation of ideas regarding national food security and 
the material structures required to act on these ideas. I draw on constructivist insights 
and an economic nationalist lens to illustrate how political priorities are established and 
change over time, and the ways in which these ideas interact with economic actors in 
domestic and international markets (Abdelal, 2001; Abdelal, Blyth, & Parsons, 2015). In 
doing so, I adapt a mix of theoretical backgrounds from critical GPE and food studies. I 
take a meso-level perspective of the PRC’s grain and grain seed sectors, concentrating 
specifically on the identified key food grains in the PRC, in particular rice, corn, soybean, 
and wheat. Generally, I focus on theoretical traditions in GPE that, “turn liberalism on its 
head and mak[e] politics the premise of economics” (Paul & Amawi, 2013, 183). It is 
these political priorities formulated by the Party-state that shape a national security 
strategy to securitize foodways through the exercise of power in the global food 
economy. I do not, however, conceive of ideas as being the singular determinant of 
outcomes. Rather, I acknowledge that material and historical factors interact with and 
help to both shape ideas and make it possible to act on them. 
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1.3. Contributions and thesis structure 
In developing the arguments in this dissertation, I make three types of contributions: 1) 
empirical contributions to the existing literature on the historical and contemporary 
development of China’s seed and agribusiness industries; 2) analytical contributions to 
food studies and GPE by interpreting the PRC’s approach to power in the global political 
economy; and 3) theoretical contributions to situate the PRC relative to the global food 
regime heuristic and study of the global food system. 
1.3.1. Empirical contributions: the development of China’s seed industry 
This dissertation contributes layers of empirical information that piece together the 
structure of China’s seed industry and global agribusiness. It does so both over time and 
space, with a focus on global connections and disjunctures. This work provides historical 
detail, tracing the linkages between Republican China’s (1920-1949) international 
agricultural partnerships and their relationship to the green revolution in India and the 
Philippines (1950s-1970s). The green revolution refers to the period, beginning in the 
1950s, when U.S. actors promoted the diffusion of agricultural technologies throughout 
the global South, particularly grain seed and agrochemical inputs (Cullather, 2010). It 
compares these linkages with the PRC’s separation from international agricultural 
actors that once spread throughout Mainland China. The historical treatment in this 
dissertation’s early chapters brings together, compares, and contrasts events in a novel 
approach, emphasizing the shadow history of the green revolution in Asia. Most 
importantly, it makes the case that the PRC was purposefully disconnected in specific 
ways from the precursor to contemporary global agribusiness expansion, the green 
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revolution. In doing so, I contribute to literature on the politics of the green revolution, 
and specifically China’s place in, and in contrast with, the green revolution (Cullather, 
2010; Perkins, 1997; Schmalzer, 2016) 
Building on the above historical contributions, I subsequently develop a 
contemporary account of the PRC’s domestic seed industry, its connections to 
multinational agribusiness enterprises, and assess the place of alternative food 
movements in the PRC. I illustrate the structure of China’s domestic grain seed industry 
and trace the development of seed enterprises, controlled inclusion of foreign 
germplasm and technological resources, and the entry of major foreign agribusiness into 
China’s seed market. I also offer a detailed case example of the complexities surrounding 
GM rice seed (Bt rice), and the interconnection between domestic research institutes, 
Chinese seed companies, and the proprietary technologies of MNCs. To my knowledge, it 
is one of the first discussions of such dynamics in English-language academic literature 
(for an exception, see Zhang, 2018). Illustrating seed industry development and 
expansion in the PRC will contribute both to literature on China’s domestic agricultural 
systems (Veeck & Shui, 2011; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008) and to GPE scholarship on 
corporate concentration and power (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Murphy, 2008). 
I also present empirical detail on outward agribusiness acquisitions by Chinese 
firms, and interactions between the PRC and other states in the global food system. 
These details offer empirical investigation of the changing footprint of the PRC’s global 
agricultural commodity infrastructure, and its relationship to dominant global 
agribusinesses. More specifically, I provide detailed examples of outward investment by 
Chinese grain and seed companies in South/Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
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(SSA), as well as the acquisition of major global agribusinesses by state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) investors. The latter example brings forward the recent interactions 
between dominant global agribusiness and actors from the PRC: the PRC’s rejection of 
Syngenta’s GM corn in 2014/15, COFCO’s (Zhōngguó liángyóu shípǐn yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 中国
粮油食品有限公司) acquisition of Noble and Nidera in 2015/16, and the acquisition of 
Syngenta by ChemChina (Zhōngguó huàgōng jítuán gōngsī, 中国化工集团公司) in 
2016/17. By bringing together the networks of international resources held by 
agribusiness from the PRC (much of which is technically owned by the Party-state), I 
bring new information to GPE scholarship, particularly in the context of the global food 
system and food regimes, as well as to the land grab literature (Belesky & Lawrence, 
2018; Cotula, 2013; McMichael, 2013). 
Finally, I examine the activities of alternative food movements in China, 
juxtaposing the discourse of the Party-state and agribusiness actors with that of nascent 
food sovereignty activists. This comparison reveals striking similarities regarding views 
and priorities between each, providing discursive openings for cooperation. Both state-
corporate actors and food sovereignty activists point to global agribusiness 
concentration as an issue, however each offers a very different approach to defining 
desirable food systems. This distinction is important as the PRC’s dominant industrial 
food system has led to increased pollution, whereas alternative food movements 
advocate more sustainable solutions (Si, Koberinski, & Scott, forthcoming). Further, I 
report on the undertakings of seed activists in China, and their efforts to shape state 
policy to retain space for farmer seed-saving practices. To my knowledge, much of this 
information has not been previously discussed in academic research, and contributes to 
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literature on alternative food movements and food sovereignty in the PRC (Schumilas, 
2014; Si et al., 2015). However, I also question assertions that the PRC is a participant in 
the food sovereignty movement by pointing to the policy priorities within national food 
grain security that promote industrial forms of commercial agriculture (see Zhang, 
2018). 
1.3.2. Analytical contributions: interpreting China’s agribusiness power 
The above empirical contributions are intimately tied to the analytical objective of 
interpreting China’s agribusiness power – particularly in the grain and seed industries. 
Current studies that address agribusiness power writ large typically focus on 
multinational agribusiness based in high-income countries (Lang & Heasman, 2015). 
The approach is most often used to assess the power of agribusiness to set private rules 
and influence states (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). Given their global reach, these entities are 
often seen as existing separate from their home states. The analysis presented in this 
dissertation provides an alternative perspective, demonstrating the close (though not 
linear) relationship between the Party-State and agribusiness based in China. In this 
analysis, state power is intimately connected to corporate power, in terms of ownership 
over physical infrastructure and technology, the creation of parameters that shape 
behaviour, and through acting on national goals. Key to this perspective on power is the 
differentiation between power as an active form of influence versus a reactive assertion 
of autonomy from influence within the global political economy.  
Building on these concepts, I offer an explanation for the patterns and 
motivations behind the engagement of the Party-state and agribusiness in the global 
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food system. The analysis reveals that China’s agribusiness power is intricately tied to 
the Party-state’s normative priority of ensuring national food security through 
controlling powerful global agribusiness actors in the domestic market and competing 
with these actors in international markets. In other words, to achieve normative goals in 
the context of global integration, the Party-state seeks to achieve self-reliance in food 
security through defining its own terms of global agribusiness engagement. This analysis 
offers a counterpoint to scholarship that privileges transnational capitalist classes over 
Party-state priorities (see Oliveira, 2017). Further, the analysis unmasks the previously 
“hidden” state-corporate relationships in countries beyond China. The empirical 
treatment of two events related to Syngenta (Chapter 6) reveal the continued 
relationship between the American state, its domestic agribusiness, and dominant 
MNCs.  
The normative priorities of state or corporate actors are seldom accounted for in 
studies of power as a driver of change in the global political economy. As such, the 
combination of ideational and material dimensions of power to explain the Party-state’s 
emerging agribusiness networks contributes specifically to studies of power in the 
global food system (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Hopewell, 2014; McMichael, 2000), and more 
generally to conceptual literature on power in the GPE (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Cohen & 
Chiu, 2013; Fuchs & Lederer, 2007). In turn, understanding the place of the PRC in the 




1.3.3. Theoretical contributions: China and the food regime  
The empirical study, theoretical framework, and key concept of securitized foodways 
(see Chapter 3) each contribute to an alternative and historically grounded view of the 
PRC in relation to food regimes. This dissertation challenges researchers of food regimes 
and of power in the global political economy to take on a more dynamic approach by 
accounting for longer historical time-periods and broader geographic scope in their 
treatment of China. Though the conceptual grounding of food regimes is intended to be 
historical in nature, the attempt at creating continuity between the second food regime 
and any future regime is ill fated without accounting for the unique historical 
development of agribusiness in the PRC. China is conspicuously absent from food regime 
scholars’ treatment of the second (United States) food regime, yet it is drawn into 
contemporary analysis of potential third food regimes. For example, Schneider (2017) 
argues that China’s agribusiness enterprises are beginning to challenge the power of 
some MNCs, but it is not clear what conditions have led to power being taken from the 
powerful. 
I provide the empirical and conceptual grounding to engage food regime 
scholarship regarding the absence of the PRC in the second food regime, and 
contemporary place in the global food system (Zhang, 2018). This alternative 
explanation of China’s place in the global food system, based on the Party-state’s 
economic nationalist orientation, expressed through the creation of securitized 
foodways, challenges the notion that the PRC acts simply to extend surplus agricultural 
capital abroad. The concept of securitized foodways also moves away from existing land-
centric concepts in critical food studies such as control-grabbing (Borras, Franco, 
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Gómez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012) and security mercantilism (McMichael, 2013), to include a 
fuller picture of the technological and trade infrastructure at the centre of China’s food 
self-reliance in the global political economy. 
1.4. Outline of the chapters to follow 
The following chapters elaborate and weave together the primary argument of this 
dissertation: that China’s securitized foodways are an expression of grain self-reliance 
within the global economy and politics of agribusiness. Chapter 2 offers a literature 
review aimed at laying the contextual groundwork for the theoretical framework briefly 
introduced above. I review a broad range of literature in the fields of GPE and power, 
food studies, and Chinese political economy. The review is aimed at elaborating key 
debates in economic globalization, the global food system, and normative dimensions of 
food security. In addition, I provide a review of research related to China’s grain sector, 
state priorities, and international interactions. In Chapter 3, I introduce conceptual 
literature on power in the global political economy. This literature is incorporated into 
the concept of securitized foodways and a related power framework that I utilize in this 
dissertation. Finally, I discuss my methodological approach, including the key 
explanatory variables in my arguments, and introduce the materials used to evaluate 
and support these arguments. 
Chapter 4 reaches into history to define a key period of disjuncture between 
China and the global seed industry. I argue that China’s absence from a key period of 
agricultural globalization, sometimes called the “second food regime”, kept the country 
separate from the early development of global agribusiness. I show that prior to 1949, 
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Republican China was on the path to becoming a major player in the green revolution. 
However, from the 1950s to the 1970s, China diverged from the experiences of U.S.-led 
green revolution countries (particularly the Philippines and India). The divergence 
occurred in the circumstances under which high-yield varieties (HYVs) of seeds were 
developed and the use of the fertilizers required by HYVs increased. Though increased 
production and the attainment of self-sufficiency in production remained common 
objectives in both cases, the level of foreign engagement allowed by each path differs 
significantly. Looking forward, the domestic particularities of the seed breeding and 
extension system in the PRC during this period had devastating effects on farm-saved 
grain seed varieties, and set the stage for the PRC’s future seed enterprises. 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 move forward to examine more contemporary global-
national dynamics of the grain-seed system in the PRC. Chapter 5 demonstrates why and 
how the structure of China’s grain seed industry does not conform to global trends of 
MNC consolidation. Building on the previous chapter, I show how the PRC’s seed system 
transformed into thousands of seed enterprises in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
transformation happened on the back of Mao-era seed-stations as the Party-state 
implemented regulations limiting inward MNC agribusiness investment. This process 
shaped a diffuse industry structure that did not readily allow MNC entry or acquisition 
as occurred in other countries. The chapter presents a first pivot in the way that the 
PRC’s concept of self-reliance interacts with economic globalization. No longer is self-
reliance exclusively about using homegrown breeding technology or producing 
everything domestically and with domestic resources. Instead it is about ensuring 
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national ownership of enterprises and technology within the industry, a first step 
toward securitized foodways. 
Chapter 6 shifts perspective to address outward connections of China’s 
agribusiness enterprises over the last two decades. As the PRC joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, state conceptions of self-reliance were challenged by 
increased interaction with the structural power of global agribusiness. I demonstrate 
that China sourced imported grains from the entrenched, foreign-owned, global 
agribusiness networks of the seed and grain trade industry. To act on securitized 
foodways, and ensure control over domestic networks and institutions, the Party-state 
has encouraged overseas investment and trade, expanding its global seed and grain 
trade network. This strategy led to recent acquisitions of foreign agribusiness such as 
Noble, Nidera, and Syngenta. Now, rather than referring solely to domestic production 
and national ownership of domestic resources, self-reliance extends beyond borders. 
The outward orientation of self-reliance serves to create secure supply chain networks 
in the input and grain trade sectors that compete internationally, owned by the PRC 
state or proxies of the state. 
Chapter 7 expands on the initial puzzle to ask: does China’s unique seed industry 
structure leave an opening for domestic seed alternatives? Alongside the rise of 
agribusiness globally and within China, worldwide food movements now advocate for 
sustainable alternatives to industrial agriculture. A growing body of research points to 
domestically led alternative food organizations, as well as transnational peasant 
movements like La Via Campesina, advocating and acting for change in Mainland China. I 
argue that there is a distinct overlap in agribusiness/alternative discourses within the 
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PRC. Arguments made by Chinese state/corporate actors and those of actors from 
alternative food movements focus on achieving autonomy and contesting foreign-owned 
agricultural capital. These commonalities reveal a discursive battleground in China that 
creates unique constraints (and opportunities) for food activists to shape Party-state 
priorities and retain their own space in the PRC. The comparison also helps to make 
explicit the shortcomings of securitized foodways as a practice in terms of sustainability. 
Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the previous empirical chapters to offer a full-
picture analysis of the PRC’s emerging place in the global food system. I put forward and 
compare the findings of the previous chapters in the context of research on the global 
food systems (particularly food regimes), and GPE more broadly. In addition, the chapter 
establishes the broader importance of securitized foodways as a heuristic to understand 
the trajectory of the PRC within the global food system, at the level of states, enterprises, 
and alternative food organizations. The concept of negative power is identified as 
particularly useful in the context of transitional periods and in situations of 




Chapter 2: Power, Food Security, and China in 
the Global Political Economy 
2.1. Introduction  
How can we characterize power in the global food system? This chapter reviews existing 
debates about the global political economy of food and the meaning of food security, 
with a particular focus on the PRC. Though the concept of power permeates discussion 
of the global food system, the concept remains relatively static in its application. As the 
broader global political economy undergoes change, particularly with the economic and 
political rise of BRICS countries, dynamic questions are increasingly central: how do 
states or businesses or other actors gain power? How do power dynamics shift over 
time? These questions of change or transition in power are crucial to understanding the 
contemporary global political economy and food system. Not only do they help 
understand the nature and implication of these changes, but they also help to anticipate 
future trajectories and intentions of key states and agribusiness actors.  
This chapter is structured in several sections, designed to lay the scene for the 
myriad moving parts that make up the GPE of food and the evolving context of the PRC. 
First, I introduce broad discussions of power in the global political economy, and 
particularly in the global political economy of food and agriculture. In doing so, I draw 
on a variety of theoretical and ontological traditions, examining a spectrum of realist, 
liberal, constructivist, and Marxist approaches to food studies and introducing differing 
units of analysis from states, to corporations, to food activist networks. Second, I break 
down the concept of food security and related ideas. I treat food security as a normative 
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term rather than an objective measure of wellbeing, and likewise point to the ideational 
underpinnings of the term and its different interpretations. This section brings in key 
ideational elements of the global food system. Third, I focus on existing research related 
to the PRC’s agriculture and agrifood system, domestic policies, and land tenure. These 
areas of literature will each contribute to developing the concept of securitized 
foodways and its underlying power framework. 
2.2. Power, food security norms, and China’s food system 
2.2.1. Power, the Party-state, and the global political economy of food 
The (re)emergence of China as a powerful state is a central point of interest regarding 
the future of global state-market relationships and the potential implications for food 
systems at large. There is disagreement among scholars, both within and between 
different schools of thought, regarding the extent to which China is integrating into the 
broader global economy, and on what terms. Some argue that China’s power in the 
global political economy has increased (Arrighi, 2007; Layne, 2012), and has even 
helped to shape the outcome of trade negotiations (Hopewell, 2014). Others point to the 
continued importance of the United States in creating the rules and norms that govern 
markets (Ikenberry, 2008; Saull, 2012), in its comparative economic and military 
resources (Beckley, 2018), and the dominance of Western businesses in global 
production chains (Nolan, 2012). Since the rise of Chinese president Xi Jinping (Xí 
jìnpíng, 习近平), scholars of Chinese politics continue to be divided about the 
sustainability of China’s political system with some predicting probable decline of the 
CPC due to internal division and an alienated bureaucracy (Pei, 2016) and others 
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arguing that the public support necessary for the CPC to maintain power exists (Dickson, 
2016).   
Within the broader GPE literature, there are multiple areas of interest concerning 
the extent of China’s changing place within global political economy. A primary aspect of 
U.S. power is the adoption of its currency for commerce, investment, and global reserves 
(Chey, 2012). As such, the renminbi (Renminbi, 人民币) now receives much attention to 
gauge the position of the PRC compared to the U.S. and Europe, though the U.S. dollar is 
typically considered the primary global currency with a place for the renminbi in 
regional markets (Chey, 2012; Eichengreen, 2013). Similarly, the relationship between 
the PRC and the U.S. is tied up in financial transactions where the U.S. national debt is in 
part held by China, which in turn recycles trade surpluses into foreign investment in the 
U.S. (Drezner, 2009). While some scholars argue that this dynamic means that China is 
dependent on the U.S. in regards to PRC holdings of U.S. treasury bills (Panitch & Gindin, 
2012, 300), others argue that the PRC is in fact slowly diverting its trade surplus into 
other currencies and assets (Beeson, 2009). Still others argue that the U.S.’s expansive 
military, domestic economic wealth, and global production networks owned by U.S. 
corporations are now key indicators reflecting power relationships in the global political 
economy (Nolan, 2012; Starrs, 2013; Beckley, 2018). The vast majority of scholarship 
pertaining to the GPE of China focuses on these types of areas without much 
consideration of their links to food and agriculture.  
Another area of differentiation between the PRC and most other key actors in the 
global political economy is the relationship between the CPC, the state, and business in 
China. It is clear that the relationship between the CPC, the state, and business in China, 
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whether state-owned enterprise or private, is distinct in the context of increased 
interdependence. For most of the latter half of the 20th century, the CPC was viewed as 
the primary actor in Chinese politics; however, since the 1970s, the control of the CPC 
over the national economy was reduced with the dismantling of many small and 
medium state-owned enterprise, decentralization of authority, and the rise the of home 
grown private business and foreign investment (Brødsgaard, 2016; Lieberthal & 
Oksenberg, 1990). In many sectors, the Party-state is seen as increasingly fragmented 
due to the multiplicity of actors and institutions that impact decision-making and 
outcomes (Brødsgaard, 2016; Hameiri & Jones 2018). In the realm of domestic 
environmental governance, conflict exists between SOEs and state regulators given that 
SOEs are significant polluters in defiance of Party policy and state regulation (Eaton & 
Kostka, 2017). The diversity of actors and interests within the Party-state exist in other 
spheres as well. For example, Chinese sovereign wealth funds are, by definition, owned 
by the state but nevertheless engage in controlled competition in the pursuit of 
international investments (Eaton & Ming, 2010). Also in the financial sector, factions of 
the Party-state have called for controlled opening of the PRC’s capital account, and have 
been met with vigorous debate from both state and private financial actors in the 
process (Lombardi & Malkin, 2017). There are therefore competing interests between 
the actors and organizations that make up the Party-state.  
In the context of international development finance (IDF) several ministries (with 
competing interests) are involved in deploying development projects, along with 
numerous state-owned and private enterprises in the infrastructure and construction 
sectors (Hameiri & Jones 2018, 580). In the development sphere, Party-state policy is 
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seen as lacking coherence, resulting in “ample opportunities for Chinese companies to 
manoeuvre IDF to suit their commercial interests” (Hameiri & Jones, 2018, 582). 
Similarly, Oliveira (2017) finds that Chinese agribusiness investments in Brazil are more 
influenced by and advantageous to agribusiness executives than either the Brazilian or 
Chinese state. In a study of Chinese state-business relationship in Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, Gu et al. (2016) show that there is a diversity of state-business relationships, 
with both commercial and state-political interests involved in outcomes. These studies 
however, typically focus on a broad range development projects from agricultural to 
industrial, and not specifically on grain seeds from the PRC. 
An underlying question in the above studies is the level of control and 
coordination exhibited by the CPC over the state and business (and vice-versa). While 
the multiplicity of Party-state actors is recognized, the centrality of the CPC in the PRC is 
particularly applicable in the context of strategic industries (Chin 2010; Pearson, 2015). 
For example, in the development of the auto sector, the Party-state has played an active 
role in courting international investment from the largest carmakers while 
simultaneously requiring ownership and local content thresholds (Chin, 2010). Some 
call this process the “liberalization two-step” where the economy is opened to 
investment but strategic industries are controlled through regulatory restrictions, 
enabling the simultaneous retention of control and transfer of technology (Hsueh, 
2011).  
More centrally, these dynamics require a level of cooperation between business, 
the state, and the CPC in China, though the relationship is not homogenous among all 
business actors or sectors (Ngo, 2018). Pearson (2015, 33-34) argues that in sectors 
 
 25 
important to national security the Party-state retains control over large SOEs, 
encourages consolidation, and continues to appoint executives to these companies’ 
boards. While the survival of these SOEs is not guaranteed, the Party-state also has 
regulatory controls to assist enterprise development in key sectors and oversight 
functions through the state bodies including the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) (Guójiā fāzhǎn hé gǎigé wěiyuánhuì, 国家发展和改革委员会) and 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (Guóyǒu 
zīchǎn jiāndū guǎnlǐ wěiyuánhuì, 国有资产监督管理委员会) (Pearson, 2015). In the 
agrifood sector, recent studies point to a strong level of coordination between 
agribusiness actors (both state-owned and private) and the state (Belesky & Lawrence, 
2018; Schneider, 2017; Zhan, 2017). An infrastructure therefore exists for the Party-
state to devise policy and coordinate its execution, though not always successfully. 
In this dissertation, I argue that grain and grain seed, ultimately used to feed the 
population, are in fact strategic industries for the Party-state and are intimately linked 
to national food security (see Hsueh, 2011; Pearson, 2015; Zhang, 2018). In this context, 
the Party-state devises policy priorities and SOEs have a key role in developing and 
maintaining control over key markets. Importantly, the view of a strong CPC does not 
discount fragmentation or diversity of opinions within the CPC that go into 
policymaking. Further, there is not always a direct, instrumental, link between the 
construction of a policy, the issuance a policy directive, and a specific outcome. Rather, 
the diffusion of power away from single actors exercising top-down influence to 
influence through a plurality of actors can be understood through different conceptions 
of power, as discussed in Chapter 3. In this dissertation, I do not assume that the Party-
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state is a singular monolithic actor. I use CPC and state policy documents to infer policy 
positions adopted by the Party-state and their change over time, rather than focusing on 
the bureaucratic politics of policy development in given moments. 
These macro-level debates take a wide view of various arenas in which changes 
in power can be seen. However, a fruitful study of power dynamics must temper broad 
structural arguments by studying specific empirical subjects (Falkner, 2008, 24-25). The 
specific empirical subject of this dissertation is the global food system (and particularly 
grains) as it pertains to the PRC. This critical sector, in relation to the PRC, has not 
received significant attention from scholarship in GPE. However, in the broader global 
political economy of food and agriculture, the landscape of power has changed 
dramatically over the last 30 years. One recognized feature of the contemporary global 
food system is corporate concentration along the entire supply chain. Multiple scholars 
have analysed the level of concentration within the seed/input, trade/processing and 
food/drink industries (Howard, 2016; Lang & Heasman, 2004; Murphy et al., 2012). 
Concentration in these links in the food supply chain include: 
• Seed industry: in 2014, over 57% of global seed industry sales was made up of 
four companies: Monsanto, DuPont Pioneer, Syngenta, and Vilmorin (Limagraine) 
(IPES-Food, 2017, 22),  
• Agrochemical industry: in 2014, over 60% of global agrochemical sales were 
made up of four companies: Syngenta, Bayer, BASF, Dow AgroSciences (IPES-Food, 
2017, 23),  
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• Grain trade: In 2012, four grain trade companies handled up to 90% of the global 
grain trade: Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus 
(Murphy et al., 2012), 
• Food and beverage processing: in 2017, ten companies made up approximately 
37.5% of the market share of top 100 food companies, including Anheuser-Busch 
InBev, Nestlé, PepsiCo, JBS, and Coca-Cola (Mooney & ETC Group, 2018). 
In recent years, many of these sectors have further consolidated, increasing the level of 
market concentration, while others have faced competition from other emerging 
companies (IPES-Food, 2017). The companies listed in these categories, among many 
others, have global research facilities and infrastructure, and have developed markets 
across countries and continents. The control they possess is argued to impact the 
decisions of farmers and consumers, the environment, and human health (Clapp, 2015a; 
Howard, 2016; Lang, 2003).  
It is important to note that at the national scale, the mix of actors and levels of 
concentration varies compared to the lists of largest global companies. The national 
distribution of global agribusiness takes shape for a variety of reasons, some of which 
are discussed in this dissertation. The largest companies in most of these sectors are 
headquartered in the United States and Western Europe, with some exceptions. Given 
the significant private business interests in the global food system, it is not surprising 
that the power of corporations is a focal point of both scholarship and activism. For 
example, as the point of contact for consumers, food retailers have the power to create 
private international standards that can influence farmer livelihoods, the environment, 
and consumer choices (Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2010). Seed and input companies also 
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influence state priorities and influence international rules on issues like intellectual 
property rights over seed varieties (Sell, 2009). For grain traders, on the other hand, 
influence can mean the ability to acquire land in the face of state regulations preventing 
such an action (Salerno, 2018), or acquire capital assets across the globe to expand 
access to crops largely without touching land itself (Hall, forthcoming). Still others focus 
on alternatives to the dominant global food system. Most prominently, a broad coalition 
of peasants, small farmers, activists, and scholars have created a food sovereignty 
movement opposing global agribusiness and industrial farming (Wittman, Desmarais, & 
Wiebe, 2010). Studies of food sovereignty, and other forms of alternative food systems 
(Schumilas, 2014), often focus on non-state actors beyond agribusiness in their efforts at 
shaping global, national, and local food systems (Boyer, 2010; Clark, 2015; McKeon, 
2015).    
These studies directly or indirectly engage debates about the role and power of the 
state in relation to the proliferation of large-scale, internationally connected 
agribusiness. In these debates, the role of the state is seen as changing in a period of 
global economic integration, facilitated by international trade agreements and extensive 
global production networks (Clapp, 2006; Gereffi, 2014; Strange, 1996). As the 
establishment of trade agreements and the physical trade of goods accelerates, one 
effect is the declining ability of states to choose policies, or the “shrinking of 
development space” (Wade, 2003). Greater economic integration demands 
standardization of rules, which creates room to subsume national regulatory 
frameworks to the global, including rules governing agricultural materials (Falkner & 
Gupta, 2009). In turn, MNCs acquire new forms of power as their reach and integration 
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expand across national boundaries. Scholarship sways between reconsidering the 
relationship between businesses and the state (Strange, 1996), and assigning a 
continued pre-eminence to state power (Krasner, 2001). 
In the context of China, the relationship between state and corporate actors in food 
and agriculture is distinct. Schneider (2017) argues that China’s domestic firms and 
processors in the pork (and feed) market are a locus for the “domestic-global, state-
private trajectory” where Chinese state enterprises are “beginning to challenge the 
power of leading North Atlantic agrifood TNCs [transnational corporations].” Relatedly, 
the Party-state has various mechanisms to exert strong control over the economy, 
including SOEs, private companies with ties to the state, control over financial 
institutions, and industrial policy (Belesky & Lawrence, 2018, 8). Further, Chinese state-
led capitalism is linked with economic nationalism, and specifically protecting domestic 
markets while expanding trade and investment internationally (Belesky & Lawrence, 
2018; McMichael, 2013). Others argue that international agribusinesses actors from the 
PRC have mixed results in their pursuit of Brazilian markets, and that a specific class of 
agribusiness professionals in China and Brazil have relatively independent interests 
from the Party-state (Oliveira, 2017). Overall, these scholars correctly argue that the 
PRC is different from, yet integrated in some way with, dominant actors in the global 
food system. A key distinction is in the relationship between state and private actors. 
Many studies focused outside the PRC (including some cited above) point to either an 
adversarial relationship between business and the state or a situation where 
regulatory/interest groups have captured the state (Falkner, 2008; Hopewell, 2013; 
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Tourangeau, 2017). As discussed in the sections below, the state-corporate dynamic is 
different in the PRC, particularly in the food and agricultural sector. 
2.2.2. China and the food regime  
Unfortunately, few studies situate the perceived new power of actors from China within 
a historical context. Oliveira (2017) provides an exception in his treatment of China-
Brazil relations since the 19th century up to recent agribusiness and farmland 
investments (for another exception see Arrighi, 2007). Arguably, one of the reasons that 
China garners so much recent interest is its relative absence from the global food system 
described above until the turn of the 21st century. The food regime heuristic was born 
from a tradition of examining time-horizons that spanned decades and is a central 
analytical tool used in critical food studies. This makes the absence of analysis regarding 
China’s historical trajectory somewhat surprising.  
The first food regime, based in British trade with settler nation-states beginning 
in the late 1800s, served to expand agricultural markets, to underwrite urban British 
wage labour through cheap food imports, and to develop national economic territories 
(Friedmann & McMichael, 1989). Though Imperial China was also a source of many 
agricultural products supporting British trade, it is not formally discussed in the 
foundational food regime publication beyond occasional reference (see Friedmann & 
McMichael, 1989). However, during this period, the urban residents of Imperial China 
were interacting with the first food regime in seldom-reported and intriguing ways. In 
the years prior to the rise of the first food regime in the late 19th century, the Qing 
Dynasty (Qīngcháo, 清朝) fought two pivotal colonial wars with Britain centred on 
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opening China’s markets to international trade of opium in exchange for silver and 
agricultural products like silk, cotton and tea (Arrighi, 2007, 340). The Opium Wars 
forced open the ports of Hong Kong and other coastal trading cities. Imperial China 
subsequently saw an influx of foreign grains during the first food regime as businesses 
from the U.S. west coast began shipping flour and other products to Chinese urban 
centres (Meissner, 1997). The surge in wheat imports spurred Chinese national 
resistance, as seen in the success of domestic Chinese flour mills in overcoming U.S. 
import competition after the turn of the 20th century (Meissner, 2005). There is a case to 
be made that the first food regime had unique contemporaneous interactions with 
Imperial China, including successful opposition to foreign control of markets. While I do 
not have sufficient space to fully assess the place of the Qing Dynasty in the first food 
regime, it is sufficient to say that China’s relationship to this period of international food 
trade has gone under the radar despite relevant and contentious dynamics. 
Of more central importance to this dissertation is the period during which the 
United States rose to power in the mid-20th century. For food regime scholars, this 
period is characterized as the second food regime, and saw an extension of U.S. influence 
during state formation of post-colonial countries and the transnational consolidation of 
agricultural capital, focused particularly on soy, corn, and meat (Friedmann & 
McMichael, 1989). The ways in which the U.S. extended (or attempted to extend) 
influence through food and agriculture are well documented. Beginning in the 1950s, the 
United States instituted food aid programs that saw the international shipment of 
surplus U.S. grains, via U.S. flagged ships, across the world (Barrett, 2006). Friedmann 
(1982, 251) points explicitly to the domestic need for the U.S. to find markets for its 
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farmers in order to “dispose” of surplus production through international aid, and allow 
transnational businesses to establish themselves in developing countries. Possessing 
cheap grain as a resource allowed the U.S. to use food aid as “a carrot and a stick” when 
trying to influence the domestic policies of recipient countries on a wide range of Cold 
War issue areas (Clapp, 2015b, 3 and 19). Significantly, the U.S. accounted for the vast 
majority of global food aid during this period, and U.S. grain trading companies 
benefited from government policy. For example, in the context of famine in India in the 
mid-1960s, an industry insider stated that “[t]he unusual demand for food grains 
militated by the Indian famine afforded great opportunity for the grain trading 
companies. The effects of this exciting new business milieu were pronounced at Cargill” 
(Broehl, 1998, 99).  
International food aid was not the only defining pattern of the post-war global 
food system. A critical, and contradictory, source of American power during the Cold 
War came through networks of American plant breeders that extended technology 
through state-supported grain breeding programs (Perkins, 1997). More specifically, 
Perkins argues that the green revolution’s attempt to increase Southern grain 
production reflected U.S. efforts to protect its national security from the perceived 
threat of overpopulation in developing countries (Perkins, 1997, 260). Cullather (2010) 
similarly points to U.S. involvement in the green revolution as being guided by strategic 
political considerations, often at the expense of those targeted for relief. Though 
promoting seeds and other input technologies were at the heart of attempts to exert 
power through agriculture, they were not always successful or fully controlled. For 
example, a U.S.-promoted hybrid rice variety introduced to South Vietnam ended up 
 
 33 
making its way into the communist North (Cullather, 2010). Like food aid, the push to 
extend high-yield seeds and agrochemical inputs across the globe also served as a source 
of power for states and seed companies from North America and Europe (Kloppenburg, 
2005, 170). Though these dynamics were primarily in place from the 1950s to the 
1970s, the uneven outcomes of the U.S.-led green revolution on environment and 
biodiversity, farmer health and welfare, are still debated today (Harwood, 2013; Pingali, 
2012). Likewise, the shipment of food aid is also criticized for undercutting local 
markets and simultaneously subsidizing U.S. agriculture (Clapp, 2015b; Lentz, Passarelli, 
& Barrett, 2013). This period laid the groundwork for the expansion of global agrifood 
businesses (Kloppenburg, 2005).  
West-centred political-economic drivers are the focus of the many political 
analyses of the post-war food system, whereas the PRC is often only mentioned in its 
position as a foil to U.S. efforts in other developing countries (Cullather, 2010; Perkins, 
1997). As with the first food regime, the PRC is not mentioned in the foundational texts 
for the second food regime (see Friedmann, 1982; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). 
While it is possible that the absence of China is because the country was not seen as 
central to either the British or U.S. capital accumulation strategies, the PRC’s position in 
these dynamics still helped to shape the norms of prominent political actors over time. 
In current food regime literature, China still remains largely absent from discussion of 
the second, U.S.-centred, food regime. However, it is precisely the absence of the PRC 
that make this period significant. Agricultural development in the PRC during the Mao 
period actually took the form of its own green revolution, with some transnational 
influences but notably different domestic dynamics (Schmalzer, 2016). The PRC’s 
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experience during this time serves as a critical juncture, a break from key aspects of the 
path taken by its peers. The historical trajectory that the PRC followed, particularly from 
the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s, caused China to develop a domestic grain economy 
largely divorced from active international engagement and transnational capital. This 
disjuncture is the focus of Chapter 4.  
The post-war period is an important precursor to the contemporary global food 
system, further highlighting the importance of the absence of the PRC from previous 
food regime heuristics. As mentioned above, the largest global agribusinesses are 
typically headquartered in North America and Europe. Many of these companies (or 
their predecessors of mergers past) owe their global presence in part to production 
methods and networks laid out by the green revolution (Kloppenburg, 2005, 15). 
However, understanding today’s global food system from a food regime perspective is 
elusive. It is clear that agribusiness has grown in size and reach, creating powerful new 
actors within the food system. Food regime scholars currently focus on the role of 
agribusiness, pointing to a potential new corporate food regime (McMichael, 2005). For 
McMichael (2005, 298), the integration of corporate entities (including with global 
finance), the capture of the state by private interests, and the exploitation of farm labour 
characterize the corporate food regime. However, discord continues in the study of food 
regimes. Others argue that a neoliberal free market in agriculture via the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture does not currently exist, and as a result there is no current 
defined food regime (Pritchard, 2009). Still others refer to a transition or restructuring 
from one regime to another, though the form that this takes is not well defined (Dixon, 
2009; Dixon, 2014; Otero, 2012). In each of these views the essence is the extension of a 
 
 35 
capitalist-led industrial food system led by key state and private actors. Still others point 
to undercurrents in the global food system, including alternative food movements such 
as the food sovereignty movement, certification and organic schemes, and other forms of 
food advocacy (Akram-Lodhi, 2015; Wittman et al., 2010). Many of these alternative 
movements run in opposition to the dominant global food system, and focus their 
critiques on corporate concentration and industrial agriculture, while promoting 
alternative ways to structure agricultural systems. Aspects of their relationship to China 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, the PRC remains substantively absent from the 
focus of contemporary food regime scholarship.2 
An additional challenge for food regime scholarship is that it tends to focus on 
relatively stable and defined periods. McMichael conceives of food regimes as a lens 
through which to see “geo-political ordering, forms of accumulation, and…vectors of 
power” (McMichael, 2005, 276). Importantly, such a regime is defined as: 
 
stable periods of capital accumulation associated with particular configurations of 
geopolitical power, conditioned by forms of agricultural production and 
consumption relations within and across national spaces. Contradictory relations 
within food regimes produce crisis, transformation, and transition to successor 
regimes. 
 
This conceptualization makes it difficult to determine when one regime ends and 
another begins. More specifically, it assumes that geopolitical power is determined by 
the way in which agricultural products are produced and consumed across the world. 
                                                        
2 The work of both Belesky & Lawrence (2018), Schneider (2017), and Zhang (2018) are important exceptions. 
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The concept of the corporate food regime itself “carries the legacies of the first two 
regimes” (McMichael, 2005), and in doing so, tends to see the crystallization of the food 
regime’s geopolitical power within the capitalist economic systems most familiar to its 
history (U.S., Europe, and their businesses). However, it is impossible to ignore China. As 
a result, some new voices are arguing that the PRC’s state-led capitalism is “…reshaping 
relations of power in the global political economy of food” (Belesky & Lawrence, 2018). 
They, and others, refer to a more diffuse power structure within the global food system, 
with an increased role for the state, but maintain a materialist explanation for the 
emergence of a more polycentric global food system, with corporate power still at the 
centre (Belesky & Lawrence, 2018; Borras, McMichael, & Scoones, 2010; Pritchard, 
Dixon, Hull, & Choithani, 2016). Importantly, these explanations also continue to focus 
on a relatively static, contemporary context to explain the place of the PRC in the global 
food system. 
These strictly materialist interpretations do not leave much room for normative 
or historical-structural factors in explaining change in the global food system, 
particularly in the context of an emerging power like the PRC. Though these studies 
usually acknowledge the concept of food security in the context of the PRC, it is often 
treated as either disingenuous or simply employed as a corollary to the underlying 
dynamics of capital accumulation (Belesky & Lawrence, 2018; McMichael, 2013; 
Schneider, 2014a). Further, there is little acknowledgement of the historical legacy of 
such concepts within Chinese history and potential interactions with previous food 
regime dynamics.  
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2.2.3. Food security and national norms 
Much of the above discussion focuses on the material dimension of power in the global 
food system. However, key normative dimensions of power are at play when it comes to 
food and agriculture, economic globalization, and nation states. Indeed, national norms 
have been shown to be important for influencing security outcomes (Berger, 1996; 
Johnston, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996) and broader economic policy (Abdelal, 2001; 
D’Costa, 2009; Hall, 2004; Wegren, 2011). The topics discussed above, including 
corporate concentration in the global food system and U.S. primacy during the second 
food regime, act as important patterns that contribute to the Party-state’s development 
of the normative goals that underpin securitized foodways. Normative drivers can be 
influential by virtue of being defined against an “other” (Abdelal, 2001). Abdelal (2001, 
27) argues that nationalism, for example, is “inherently relational” in that it requires 
interaction with and/or opposition to other phenomena in the international system. For 
the PRC, this “other” is the historically foreign-controlled global food system, 
particularly since the 20th century. 
This dissertation highlights normative terms including food security, self-
sufficiency, and self-reliance, each of which contributes to defining the contours of the 
Party-state’s policy goals. In academic and policy literature, each term has several 
attached meanings. Further, as will become evident in chapters 4-7, meanings can have 
subtle changes over time. Food security is most often expressed through the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) definition. In this formulation, food security exists 
“when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe 
and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
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and healthy life” (FAO, 2015b). This iteration of the term is descriptive (Clapp, 2014), 
and is often used as a basis for the measurement of the supply, distribution, and access 
to food in a specific context (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). However, this definition does 
little to prescribe how the stated goals are to be achieved. Critics point to the term food 
sovereignty as a challenge to the FAO-derived concept of food security (McMichael, 
2005; Fairbairn, 2012). For them, the term food security implicitly adopts the industrial 
agriculture and trade-based solutions of the dominant global food system, with negative 
environmental and social impacts (Schanbacher, 2010). In contrast to food security, they 
argue that food sovereignty provides normative direction focused on peasant and small-
farmer rights in a local and environmentally sustainable food system (Akram-Lodhi, 
2015). In turn, food sovereignty has been criticized for idealizing a notion of strict self-
sufficiency that is not practical in many circumstances where trade is required (Burnett 
& Murphy, 2014).  
The divide between food security vs. food sovereignty itself has been critiqued as 
a false binary, given FAO-defined food security’s descriptive and food sovereignty’s 
normative positions (Clapp, 2014). Maxwell (1996) pointed out that there were over 
200 definitions of food security, reflecting diversity of interpretation but also causing 
policy confusion due to their contradictions. Lang & Barling (2012) further categorize 
the various meanings of “food security”, where different meanings draw on a range of 
ideas to inform their content. Among these ideas are food nationalism, autarky, food 
sovereignty, and food sustainability (Lang & Barling, 2012). Similarly, Pinstrup-
Andersen (2009) points out that food security has had different meanings over time, 
including two different variations: national food security and national food sovereignty, 
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where national food security implies self-sufficiency and national food sovereignty 
implies availability regardless of origin. Both Lang and Barling and Pinstrup-Andersen’s 
term food sovereignty is not to be confused with the food sovereignty movement. 
Rather, the term “sovereignty” is employed to mean national sovereignty. Food self-
sufficiency is often conceived of as a desire to produce all of the food a country eats. 
However, like food security, there exist alternative interpretations of self-sufficiency. 
Clapp (2017) argues that self-sufficiency is not a binary between autarky and complete 
trade dependence, rather it should be seen as a relative concept aimed at national 
objectives to “carve out policy space” in the global food-trade system. In this sense, self-
sufficiency becomes more of a goal related to policy autonomy than a goal related to 
production targets. 
In this dissertation, these two important points (national food security and the 
definition of self-sufficiency) converge. Food security is not used in terms of measuring 
and addressing the issue of global hunger. Rather, state and corporate actors also invoke 
food security as a motivation or justification for actions in the context of national (food) 
security. Food and agriculture can be securitized in the sense that they become the object 
of security concerns and gain political priority due to being framed as an existential 
threat (Buzan, Wæver, Wæver, & De Wilde, 1998, 26). Food security therefore comes to 
be imbued with specific values and imperatives to mitigate real or perceived negative 
consequences for the nation-state. What does this have to do with power? Some scholars 
define power in a narrow sense as influence through interest group politics, to be 
differentiated from “soft cultural influence” (see Paarlberg, 2013, 7). However, when it 
comes to national norms related to food security, cultural influences and normative 
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priorities are indeed factors to be accounted for. I argue that these concepts provide the 
normative underpinnings for how (and why) China engages with the global food system, 
both with dominant forces and alternative food movements. 
In China, norms regarding the meaning of national food security are being 
redefined, serving as a driver of economic policy and reshaping the structure of the 
global food system (Zhang, 2018). In Chinese language, food security is known as grain 
security (Liángshí ānquán, 粮食安全) and term differs from the FAO term food security, 
which is not often used in the PRC’s domestic policy discourse and has little historical 
context within the country (Schneider, 2014a). However, food grain security in China is 
associated with strong norms related to self-sufficiency, legitimacy of rulers, and 
protection of the national economy, particularly in relation to grain (McBeath & 
McBeath, 2010; Wong & Huang, 2012; Zhang, 2018). These associations have been 
present over centuries, from late imperial dynasties (Li, 2007; Will et al. 1991), to the 
early 20th century Republican period (Lee, 2011) to present day (Wong & Huang, 2012). 
More recently, Schneider (2014a) questioned the PRC’s national policy of grain “self-
sufficiency” through domestic production given the country’s increased reliance on 
global grain/oilseed imports for animal feed. Economic growth and local preferences in 
China since the early 1980s led to widespread increases in meat consumption, which in 
turn resulted in significant increases in demand for feed crops such as soy and corn. Soy 
imports to China increased in the late 1990s, which now represent more than 50% of 
globally traded soy (Sharma, 2014). Simultaneously, the Party-state continues to 
articulate formulations of national grain self-sufficiency targets, aiming to produce 95% 
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of cereals domestically though not achieving these targets (McBeath & McBeath, 2010; 
Zhang, 2018).  
However, the reality of this situation is far more complex. As Schneider (2014a) 
argues, the terms used by Chinese media and state planning agencies often obfuscate 
how the strict interpretation of self-sufficiency is measured; the actual content of the 
term “self-sufficiency” can be redefined. For example, whereas self-sufficiency in grain 
production used to be measured in terms of rice, wheat, and corn, priority grains making 
up the 95% self-sufficiency target have recently been reduced to only rice and wheat. 
Further, the interaction between national food security and power-holders in global 
markets is central to the Party-state’s national policy priorities. Indeed, the arrival of 
agribusiness from countries in the global South is often precipitated by national food 
security concerns, blurring the lines between state and corporate interests (Margulis, 
2014). Zhang (2018, 35-36) makes an important contribution by pointing to the role of 
state food security norms and the role of the global food system dynamics in the recent 
shift away from strict self-sufficiency in production. He particularly notes the 
contemporary Party-state’s distrust of international grain markets due to their 
concentration, comparatively small size relative to Chinese consumption, and the 
internationalization pressure placed on the state by state-owned agribusiness (Zhang, 
2018, 43). Zhang (2018, 56) correctly argues that, 
 
The country’s sensitivity associated with food self-sufficiency is both a domestic 
construct, which is deeply rooted in its unique cultural, political, and economic 
structures, and shaped by Chinese leaders’ interpretation of the global food market 




Zhang takes a broad perspective including many food types and recognizes a “paradigm 
shift” in national food security policy beginning in 2013, based on the official acceptance 
of “moderate imports” (Zhang, 2018, 48). However, this perspective is less focused on 
the specific mechanics of controlling the global pathways of grain and grain seed at 
different segments of the supply chain both within China and abroad. Further, Zhang’s 
(2018, 288) conclusion is that China is reforming the corporate food regime “to achieve 
the fundamental goals championed by food sovereignty.” This argument is problematic 
in terms of the substantially different priorities of the Party-state and the food 
sovereignty movement, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. In contrast, though Belesky 
and Lawrence (2018, 4) downplay the normative drivers of the PRC in the global food 
system, they accurately argue that,  
 
[i]n securing global agrifood supply and value chains, the Chinese government is 
reconfiguring relations of power in the global food system, and pragmatically 
reducing its reliance on thinly traded global agri-food markets and large 
transnational companies (TNCs) in the Global North that have historically held 
dominant trading positions in these markets.  
 
Finally, Zhang does not explain how and why the PRC is able to act on these priorities 
when peer countries like India, the Philippines, and Brazil, have not had the same 
priorities and/or room to manoeuvre. Like other scholars, he invokes food regimes but 
does not place significant emphasis on China’s interaction with previous food regimes as 
a key historical variable in his explanation.  
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I characterise the normative priority attached to food and agriculture by the 
Chinese Party-state through the concept of self-reliance (Zìlìgēngshēng, 自力更生 ). Self-
reliance literally translates to “regeneration by one’s own efforts”, and has had 
importance as a normative framework for state policy in China (Kerr, 2007). Since the 
PRC’s reform and opening in the late 1970s, scholars from outside China have debated 
whether the country will retain “self-reliance or interdependence” (Terrill, 1977). Some 
scholars continue to explore the concept of self-reliance and its contemporary 
applicability. Kerr (2007, 100) argues that the PRC’s global integration “has not entailed 
an abandoning of the principles of [self-reliance] but represents a conditional 
accommodation that allows China to gain the things it needs to build its own national 
strength.” However, global intellectual property rights over industrial products and 
processes (including seeds) mean that, in high-technology sectors, self-reliance can be 
difficult to maintain without significant national investment or illegally borrowing (Kerr, 
2007, 93). As such, self-reliance, like self-sufficiency, is not to be understood as a “policy 
of autarky” or strict self-sufficiency, rather it can accommodate controlled international 
exchange (Kerr, 2007). However self-reliance in this context does not go as far as the 
FAO’s usage of the term, which equates the term to reliance on international markets 
through comparative advantage (FAO, 2003, section 1.5). Rather, for the Party-state, the 
focus is on building a national economy under various international economic 
conditions and through various mechanisms designed to retain national control. Studies 
of economic nationalism have grappled with similar debates, where economic 
nationalism is often conceived of as a focus on the domestic economy, but the actual 
economic policies derived from economic nationalism are highly varied (Helleiner, 
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2002). However, by including a plurality of economic policies to achieve national 
economic goals, it is important to be wary of “redefining almost all behaviour as 
nationalist” or self-reliant (Hall, 2004, 82). In the following chapters, I will explore the 
content of self-reliant national food grain security priorities in the PRC as well as the 
circumstances that have shaped its ability to act on these objectives. 
2.2.4. China’s agrifood system 
As seen above, the place of actors from China in the global food system is often difficult 
to grasp due to the focus of both food studies and GPE on state and corporate actors 
from the United States and Europe. Recently, the most often cited dynamics related to 
China are as an importer of soy and corn (Huang & Rozelle, 2004; Oliveira & Schneider, 
2016) and China as a land grabber (Ayers, 2013; Muldavin, 2012). Both subjects focus 
on the PRC’s outward trajectory in the global food system from the perspective of 
acquiring land and agricultural goods from abroad in order to serve domestic markets. 
Scholars in China point to import dependence on agricultural products as “weak points” 
that must be protected from international volatility, a reflection of national security 
concerns (Zha & Zhang, 2013).  
Caveats have been added to these trends, adding nuance to the analysis of the 
bulk flows of grain and capital crossing borders. The role of private and state-owned 
agribusiness from the PRC is increasingly recognized in carrying out these transactions. 
In the corn and soybean trade, control of the grain trade is shifting, with state-owned 
Chinese companies acquiring foreign businesses and infrastructure (Oliveira & 
Schneider, 2016; Yan et al., 2016). The Japanese sogo shosha grain traders have also 
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revised their business strategy by orienting their businesses to serve Chinese markets as 
a method of sustaining the volumes required to serve smaller Japanese markets (Hall, 
forthcoming). Restructuring is taking place in the seed and input sectors as companies 
tied to the Party-state look to acquire foreign agribusiness like Syngenta (Belesky & 
Lawrence, 2018). In the case of land grabs, the role of actors from the PRC relative to 
other countries was initially overstated, though the overall land grab phenomenon has 
received much (negative) attention (Ayers, 2013; Oliveira, 2017). In fact, actors from the 
PRC have engaged in foreign agricultural aid and investment since the 1950s, and there 
is a long-standing norm of South-South interactions (Brautigam & Zhang, 2013). 
Schneider (2014a) situates China’s role in the global land grab as based on meat 
consumption, both through imports of meats but also through livestock feed which is 
used as a method to accumulate capital in Chinese agribusiness. However, van der Ploeg 
and Ye (2016b, 6) caution that the PRC’s participation in land grabs typically result in 
commodities sold in host countries and should not be taken as a sign that the PRC’s 
domestic agriculture is failing. These dynamics will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
While the trend of the PRC’s increased presence in global agricultural markets is 
clear, there is a key discrepancy between political perspectives and neoclassical 
economic perspectives. Agricultural economists call for the removal of restrictions on 
foreign investment in agriculture and see efficiencies to be gained by relying on cheap 
food imports (Fan et al. 2006, 59). In other words, “China has not revised its food 
security policy to take into consideration agricultural comparative advantages in the 
international economy”, and should begin importing land- and water-intensive crops in 
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which it is less competitive (McBeath & McBeath, 2010, 277). This strictly economic 
analysis discounts normative policy objectives while political analysis often overlooks 
the costs of pursuing political priorities and broader power dynamics of the global 
political economy. Further, it does not explain why the Party-state has not fully adopted 
a liberalized trade environment in key grain products. Though food security is a 
“legitimate goal for China”, the Party-state expends significant resources to build 
agribusinesses, sometimes at the expense of farmers (Zhan, 2017, 160).  
Contemporary agribusiness development in China has a wide scholarship, usually 
focused on domestic events and broad government agricultural support. Contemporary 
agriculture in the PRC is partly dependent on a web of policies tailored to increasing the 
production of specific food-types. Veeck and Shui (2011) provide an overview of the 
policy basket employed by central and provincial governments in the PRC, including 
input subsidies, tax relief, machinery promotion, and the creation of farm associations. 
An important recent shift in policy practice is the reduction of agricultural taxes 
beginning at the turn of the 21st century after acceding to the WTO. Whereas taxes on 
agricultural producers had been used to subsidize urban development since the early 
1980s (and indeed earlier during Mao’s industrial drives) the state has shifted towards 
not only removing taxes but providing subsidies to farmers (Augustin-Jean & Wang, 
2015). Most subsidies apply specifically to grain farmers, and include a key subsidy to 
reduce the costs of inputs and encourage the use of high-yield seed varieties provided by 
specific companies (Gale, 2013). The connections between these policies are sometimes 
conflicting. These inconsistencies have been referred to as a “policy trilemma”, where 
grain self-sufficiency, promotion of farm incomes, and adhering to international trade 
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reforms cannot be simultaneously achieved (Veeck & Shui, 2011, 244-245). Du and King 
(2018) further point out the fiscal cost of staple grain purchases and sales at the 
interface between state monopoly purchase price from farmers and sale price to food 
processors and retailers. The tension between the priority of promoting the domestic 
agricultural economy and pursing greater international engagement will reoccur 
throughout the following chapters.  
 One of the ways in which we can better understand this domestic-global 
interaction is by focusing on the structure of markets. In other words, rather than 
focusing on state policy to promote production or on bulk flows of commodities, it is 
beneficial to examine policy, regulations, and activities related to industry organization. 
Augustin-Jean and Alpermann (2014, 8) draw on economic sociology to conceive of the 
market as “social and political, while the development of rules and regulations and their 
stabilization…reflect the power relationships among actors in that market.” Their 
framework for analysis provides agency to both states and businesses, both domestic 
and international. For example, in the 1990s the central government placed 
responsibility for grain supply (including seed and fertilizer availability) and demand in 
the hands of provinces (“governors grain bag system”) (Mǐ dàizi shěngzhǎng fùzé zhì , 米
袋子省长负责制) with a mix of both state and private internal grain trading companies 
(Zhou, 2010). As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Chinese state also used 
biotechnology and foreign investment regulation to ensure that domestic state-owned 
enterprises could compete against Monsanto in the domestic cotton industry 
(Alpermann, 2014, 204). Importantly, these types of studies typically focus solely on 
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materially derived sources of interests, whereas I argue that there are deep-seated 
normative priorities that serve as impetus to shape markets to certain ends.  
Today, agribusiness markets in China remain largely diffuse in terms of corporate 
concentration, but vary by product type and sector. The domestic seed industry has less 
than 5000 companies following recent consolidation from over 10,000 registered 
companies a decade ago, with several dozen emerging at the head of the industry (USDA, 
2017, 2). The most important of domestic seed businesses will be discussed in Chapter 
5. Grain and oilseed processing companies are more concentrated, however they are still 
relatively fractured given that there were 110,000 “dragonhead enterprise” (Lóngtóu 
qǐyè, 龙头企业) agribusinesses in China (Schneider & Sharma, 2014). In China, the term 
“dragonhead enterprise” is applied to leading companies in many different industries, 
and also refers to formal local, provincial, and national government lists of companies 
eligible for tax relief and other incentives. In the grain seed sector, designated 
dragonhead enterprises are typically state-owned. This usage differs from Oliveira 
(2017) who labels dragonhead enterprises as successful outward agribusiness ventures 
and paper tigers as unsuccessful investments focus on land.  
As Schneider and Sharma (2014, 27) demonstrate, processing sectors by product are 
almost entirely made up of national firms except for soybean oil processing and soybean 
meal exporting (see also Yan et al., 2016). However, even the structure of the soybean 
sector is volatile. Fifteen years ago, global agribusiness giants including Wilmar, Cargill, 
Bunge, and Louis Dreyfus controlled over 70% of the Chinese domestic processing 
market, but this number has dropped lower than 40% since foreign investment 
restrictions came into effect in 2007 (Sharma, 2014, 9). The data is not clear, however, 
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and others argue that foreign grain trade and processing presence remains significant 
within the PRC (Yan et al., 2016). In the retail sector, concentration remains below the 
global average, but is relatively more consolidated than other links in the supply chain. 
By 2012, four companies shared over 35% of Chinese retail sales: Walmart, Carrefour, 
RT-Mart, and China Resource Enterprises (Michelson et al., 2013). 
Land in the PRC is farmed at a relatively small scale. The average farm size in China 
remains very small, at around half a hectare per farm, though figures vary (see van der 
Ploeg & Ye, 2016). There is regional variation in farm size, with the north east of the 
country tending towards larger scale industrial farms with much of the rest of the 
country tending towards smaller farms. Rural land is owned by collectives rather than 
by individuals, and individual households have the right to use a portion of land owned 
by their collective. In an effort to increase the scale of farming beyond individual 
households, various tiers of the Party-state in China have attempted to consolidate land 
size while avoiding land reform (Zhang & Donaldson, 2013). The primary technique to 
create larger-scale commodity farming is through contract farming between groups of 
farmers and agribusinesses (Zhang, 2012). To a lesser extent, cooperatives have also 
been developed by grouping farmers as a bargaining unit to connect to agrifood supply 
chains (Chen & Scott, 2014). Beyond mainstream food production, alternative food 
movements are gaining traction throughout the country. These nascent movements have 
grown quickly over the last decade and often focus on organic and local food, including 
the use of traditional seed varieties (where possible), ecological production, and local 
production/distribution (Scott, Si, Schumilas, & Chen, 2014). In addition, these 
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movements often employ the terms food security and food sovereignty to their 
advantage, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
As seen in the paragraphs above, there are an increasing number of inward and 
outward connections between China and the global food system. Belesky and Lawrence 
(2018, 16) argue that the rise of Chinese SOEs focused on outward investment of food 
and agriculture is “challenging the historical dominance of TNCs from the global North, 
as they gain increasingly powerful positions in global value chains for agri-food, feed 
and biofuel.” But how is the PRC able to exercise power in a realm dominated by already 
powerful actors? And why does the Party-state choose food and agriculture as a sector 
of focus in terms of both foreign and domestic investment? International relations 
scholars argue that the PRC’s normative priority of food security is based in both 
historical memory of famine and the Party-state’s understanding of the international 
food system (Zha & Zhang, 2013). However, historical memory in and of itself does not 
explain the PRC’s ability to exercise agrifood power, nor does it conceptualize food 
security priorities as leading to specific economic policies. In other words, more 
attention must be paid to the “normative dimension of China’s integration” with the 
global political economy (Shambaugh, 2013, 315). Further, attention must be paid to 
these normative dimensions over time to understand how power has developed along 
with the normative framework through which power is applied in terms of policy. For 
now, the concept of power is not well defined in the context of the PRC’s place in the 
global food system. Further, the normative dimension of the PRC’s engagement with the 
global food system is seldom invoked in the context of changing power relationships 
(see Zhang, 2018 as an exception). To draw the two together, I introduce the term 
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“securitized foodways” as an analytical lens for application to the Party-state’s changing 




Chapter 3: Securitized Foodways: 
Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
 
This chapter develops China’s “securitized foodways” and introduces the materials and 
methods used to assess the concept. Securitized foodways provides a conceptual 
framework that explains power dynamics in relation to China’s place in the global food 
system. To advance this framework I draw on conceptual literature primarily from 
international relations, GPE, and food studies, focusing on the concept of power (Barnett 
& Duvall, 2005; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Cohen & Chiu, 2013). This framework is important 
given the absence of an existing explanation of how and why actors from the PRC are 
able to gain power in the global food system despite the existence of incumbent 
powerful states and global agribusiness. This chapter subsequently discusses the 
qualitative research methods used to evaluate the arguments underlying securitized 
foodways and the material I draw upon to support my conceptual framework. I take 
three steps to advance my conceptual framework and methodological approach. First, I 
review existing power frameworks to identify the ways in which the concept has been 
employed, including its various dimensions. In particular, I differentiate between 
positive and negative forms of power, a distinction that helps to understand changes in 
power dynamics over time. Second, I introduce the concept of securitized foodways, 
drawing on concepts of power and on the literature identified in Chapter 2. Finally, I 
elaborate my methodological approach and the research materials used to evaluate and 
support the central arguments presented in Chapter 1.  
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3.1. Power and securitized foodways 
3.1.1. The Concept of Power 
Power is a concept that is difficult to conceptualize. In the discussions laid out in Chapter 
2, power is central and mentioned frequently in analyses of the global political economy 
and of global food systems. Before getting into more detail about forms and dimensions 
of power relevant to this study, it is useful to ask a fundamental question: who can hold 
power? In the studies discussed in Chapter 2, a wide variety of actors are identified as 
holding power or having power exercised upon them.  
Dahl (1957, 203) cast a broad net when he identified “individuals, groups, roles, 
offices, governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates” as potential holders of 
power. Other “human aggregates” have also been identified as potential power holders, 
including businesses, non-profit NGOs, and international organizations.  If such a broad 
range of actors can hold power, then what is power? In much realist international 
relations, power is tied to economic and military might in the realm of states. Many 
arguments related to China’s rising power in the world continue to refer specifically to 
these factors, invoking military size and expenditure, along with macroeconomic 
indicators such as GDP size and growth rate as proxies (see Beckley, 2018; Layne, 2012; 
Wohlforth, 2012). Though these and other studies frequently use the term power, the 
concept is often not explicitly defined (see Belesky & Lawrence, 2018; Hopewell, 2016; 
Schneider, 2017). Instead, authors who invoke the word “power” acknowledge a 
difference between its economic and political usages, but do not delve more deeply into 
its manifestation and operationalization. A recent exception is Beckley (2018), who, 
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while focused only on material sources of power, creates an accounting framework for 
economic and material power that goes beyond the simple size of U.S.-China militaries 
and economies. This simple distinction between economic and political power is often 
critiqued as is the implicit assumption that there is a one-for-one relationship between 
economic/military size and power, particularly in the case of China (Hopewell, 2014; 
Strange, 1998, 25-27).  
Where power is treated more formally, it is variously defined and applied in 
multiple different social science sub-disciplines and subject areas. Dahl (1957) defined 
power as relations between actors (i.e., people, businesses, states etc.), and specifically 
the power of one actor over another actor. For Dahl (1957, 203), the power of A over B is 
a starting point to understand the resources behind power, including the source, means 
to exercise, amount, and scope of power. As such, his full definition includes the exertion 
of direct influence through relations between actors via the use of defined resources. 
Though the inquiry into sources, means, and scope of power is important, this definition 
remains limited due to its focus on the exercise of direct influence between specific 
actors (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). A less direct formulation of power 
is introduced by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) who argue that it is also exhibited when a 
person or group can constrain the participation of another person or group in a given 
activity. Again, power is conceived of as a social relationship; however the relationship 
may not be through direct interaction, but rather through the institutionalization of 
values and rules that affect specific actors (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). Finally, definitions 
of power have also been expanded to include constitutive elements where “social 
relations define who the actors are and what capacities and practices they are socially 
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empowered to undertake” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, 46). Said differently, constitutive 
forms of power can contribute to the creation of “legitimate social purpose…to project 
political authority into the international system” (Ruggie, 1998, 65).  
As seen in these varying definitions, contemporary scholarship has established 
multiple dimensions to the study of power. To accommodate these dimensions, Barnett 
and Duval (2005, 42) provide an encompassing definition, where power is “the 
production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors 
to determine their circumstances and fate.” This formulation allows for their taxonomy 
of four types of power focused on differences in how power works 
(material/constitution) and the specificity of power’s effects (direct/diffuse). The first 
type of power is “compulsory power” and mirrors the definition offered by Dahl. The 
second type of power is “institutional power” and mirrors the definition offered by 
Bachrach and Baratz. The third type of power is a specific form of “structural power”, 
based in social relations of constitution where one actor’s position in a structure will 
“shape self-understanding and subject self-interests” (Barnett and Duval, 2005, 53). 
Barnett and Duval’s fourth type of power, “productive power”, works through social 
relations of constitution and is diffuse in nature; however, it is not discussed here. These 
dimensions of power are not mutually exclusive; each type of power has the potential to 
exist simultaneously or to interact. 
Drawing in part on Barnett and Duval, Clapp and Fuchs developed a power 
framework for application in the context of agribusiness power. This framework 
identifies three similar dimensions: instrumental, structural, and discursive, drawing on 
both material and ideational sources of power (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). Instrumental 
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power refers to the influence of A over B. Structural power refers both to the indirect 
“agenda setting power” as well as the “positions in material structures and 
organizational networks [which may] endow actors with direct rule-setting power” 
(Fuchs & Lederer, 2007). Finally, discursive power shapes interests through the ability 
to frame broader norms, underpinned by political legitimacy and trust (Clapp & Fuchs, 
2009). Like Barnett and Duvall’s formulation, these three forms of power are not 
mutually exclusive, and often reinforce one another.  
Structural power is a particularly important concept. For Clapp and Fuchs (2009, 
9), structural power exists as the nexus of “economic and institutional structures, 
processes, and interdependencies” Structural power allows corporate and state actors to 
shape the rules of the game through state laws and regulations, corporate resource 
networks, private rules such as certification schemes, and other mechanisms to 
constrain behaviour such as production and investment decisions (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009, 
9). Strange (1988) argues that there are four broad and interacting power structures 
employed by power-holders: security (military), production, finance (credit), and 
knowledge (beliefs and ideas). Like Clapp and Fuchs, the structures introduced by 
Strange’s framework allow an actor to influence, more or less directly, the options 
available to others (Strange, 1998, 31). Strange emphasises a key geographic angle 
implicit in the concept of networks where, “territorial boundaries of states no longer 
coincide with the extent or the limits of political authority over economy and society” 
(Strange, 1996b, ix). Thus military, production, finance, and knowledge structures are 
seen to not only spill across national boundaries, but also implicate non-state actors.  
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Other perspectives have attempted to grapple with power in the context of 
economic globalization and the spread of actors across borders. Kahler (2009) and his 
colleagues have begun to take a network-centric view of power. For Kahler, network 
power is broken into structures and actors  “ties or links among actors (nodes) create a 
structure (a persistent pattern of relations) that in turn serves to constrain actors or 
provide opportunities for action” (Kahler, 2009, 5). However, in Kahler’s formulation, 
individual actors do not purposefully create networks, rather networks are taken as 
given. This need not be so. The active creation of networks, within social and geographic 
space, is central to the development of powerful structures.  
While frameworks in the GPE of food are largely interested in “the powerful” and 
how they exercise influence, power can also be understood as autonomy. In this 
formulation, “power does not mean influencing others; rather, it means not allowing 
others to influence you -- others letting you have your way” (Cohen, 2008). This less-
discussed dimension of power can also be conceived of as “autonomy” or the ability to 
create “policy space” or “policy independence” (Cohen & Chiu, 2013, 3). A similar 
conception of “negative power” or the ability to say “no” has been used in the study of 
American politics and the institutionalized veto power of the president (Cameron, 2000, 
3). In the context of studies on the global food system the negative conception of power, 
in contrast to the positive forms of power discussed previously, has not been formally 
applied, to my knowledge. This absence is intriguing given the focus on both the idea of 
policy space in developing countries and also the spread of alternative food systems. 
GPE scholars regularly discuss the development of policy space in the context of 
restrictive international agreements through the WTO (Clapp, 2017; Wade, 2003). 
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Similarly, food sovereignty scholars examine resistance to powerful agribusiness and 
trade rules, including the development of community practices and state policies that 
insulate peasants and small farms from powerful market actors. This includes calls for 
policy space beyond the current norm (Akram-Lodhi, 2015) and protections from trade 
(Burnett & Murphy, 2014). Despite the striking parallels, the view of autonomy as a 
formal dimension of power is not typically elaborated. 
The inclusion of autonomy as power is a crucial component of power models as it 
creates room for change. The idea that power can be developed despite the presence of 
existing power holders makes changing power dynamics possible. It acknowledges not 
just that there are areas that the powerful do not reach, but also that the less powerful 
can avoid influence. Further, in terms of the ideational dimension of power, the ability to 
resist influence has implications for the way that subjective self-interests may form in 
opposition to the actor attempting to exert power. For example, Chapter 4 and 5 will 
discuss U.S. power in the mid-20th century and its contribution to the PRC government’s 
social purpose in the context of national food security.   
Given the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, definitions of the various forms, 
dimensions, and types of power it is useful to briefly highlight the definitions that I will 
use in developing securitized foodways as a conceptual framework. Table 3.1 lists the 
forms, dimensions, and types of power used to build securitized foodways while 
specifying their usage and lineage within the existing literature on power. The forms, 
dimensions, and types of power summarized in Table 3.1 are discussed further in the 
context of their application in securitized foodways. Importantly, there are both positive 
and negative forms of power, with ideational and material dimensions. Further, like 
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other dimensions of power the additional dimension of autonomy is inherently 
relational in the sense that an actor can only be deemed autonomous relative to their 
interaction with other actors. These concepts are developed below. 
 
  Table 3.1: Definitions of power 
Form Dimension Type Definition 
Positive Ideational Normative The ability to shape norms, but taken a step further 
to understand the social construction of these ideas 
and norms as they underpin national priorities 
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). 
Material Instrumental The power of A to directly influence B (Dahl, 1957). 
Structural Constraint over options, both formally through 
state and non-state institutions and/or informally 
through corporate resource networks (Clapp & 
Fuchs 2009; Strange, 1998). 
Negative Autonomy The power to “go it alone” when faced with outside influence. The 
autonomy dimension of power is relational in the sense that the 
ability of an actor to go it alone is conditioned by the dimensions of 
positive power being exerted on it (Cohen & Chiu, 2013, 3). 
 
3.1.2. Securitized foodways: a framework for power 
Drawing on the above literature and theory, I develop the concept of securitized 
foodways to explain and interpret the place of the PRC within the global food system. 
The concept of securitized foodways brings together the above dynamics to 
conceptualize how Party-state actors exercise positive and negative forms of power over 
time with the effect of exercising control over China’s food system. In terms of negative 
power, the Party-state historically retained autonomy from power-holders in the global 
food system. In terms of positive power, the Party-state has constructed a normative 
purpose regarding national food security and increasingly has established and exercised 
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material power in the global food system. I begin by breaking the term down securitized 
foodways.  
The term “securitized foodways” marries two words with somewhat separate 
traditions. The word foodways refers to a research approach that deals with analysing 
“the material and social factors [a]ffecting the production, distribution, and consumption 
of foods” (Edwards, 2011). Studies that employ a foodways approach are often 
concerned with the cultural significance of history and customs surrounding food, 
including the relationship between food, politics, and economics. I appropriate this term 
and employ it in the context of securitization. As stated above, to securitize is to make 
something the object of security concerns. In this sense, securitized foodways refers to 
the manner in which the production and distribution of food, in particular grain and 
grain seed, becomes the object of security concerns that pose a perceived existential 
threat to the nation, or a national security concern. In other words, the concept provides 
the principle behind which the Party-state (and other actors) approach self-reliance in 
grain and grain seed technology and production in interaction with the global political 
economy. The concept is also embedded in the context of the PRC’s historical interaction 
with the global food system and the accompanying power dynamics within food regimes 
as they pertain to national food security.  
Despite the significant presence of the U.S. state and agribusiness in the global 
political economy since the mid-20th century, major U.S. and European-based 
agribusiness actors in the grain seed and trade sectors have not gained control over 
PRC’s agriculture. In order to operationalize the concept of securitized foodways, I adopt 
a framework that combines positive and negative forms of power to provide an 
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interrelated explanation of: 1) the construction of the Party-state’s social purpose/self-
interest in terms of national food (grain) security, 2) the Party-state’s historical ability to 
retain autonomy in the domestic grain seed industry, and 3) its capacity to build positive 
power within the global food system. As seen in Figure 3.1, I use a three-dimensional 
approach to power: ideational, material, and autonomy.3 These dimensions of power 
represent an ideal-type and in practice there is interaction between them; they also 
correspond to the set of explanatory variables introduced below in the discussion of 
methodology. The first two dimensions provide analytical tools capable of identifying 
both ideational and material dimensions of power, which I identify as positive forms of 
power. The additional third dimension of autonomy runs parallel as a negative form of 
power: the ability to withstand or avoid the positive power of other actors.  
 
        Figure 3.1: Framework of power 
 
 
These dimensions not only correspond to the explanatory variables in this dissertation, 
they also serve as tools to identify dimensions of power within my analytical framework 
                                                        
3 This power framework draws on different dimensions of power, but does not serve as an exhaustive framework for 
all possible types of power. Rather, it serves as a lens to illustrate and explain the particular dimensions at play to 
understand China’s recent historical and contemporary activities in the global food system. 
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presented below. As an analytical tool, this power framework helps to interpret how the 
Party-state’s interests and national priorities are shaped as well as the ways in which 
actors act on these priorities over time. The PRC’s early negative power to “go it alone” 
in the face of a global political economy with incumbent powerful actors provided the 
needed autonomy to later act on national food security priorities and develop structural 
power both nationally and in the global food system. Each dimension of power is based 
on a reconfiguration of existing power concepts, drawing mainly from existing 
frameworks of power, particularly Barnett and Duvall (2005), Clapp and Fuchs (2009), 
and Cohen and Chiu (2013). 
 
Positive power 
Modifying the language of Barnett and Duval (2005, 42) I define positive power as an 
active form of power in that it reflects efforts of an actor or set of actors to “shape the 
capacities” of others “to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett and Duval, 
2005, 42). In this sense, positive power represents the concept of “power over”, while 
negative power discussed below is the “power to” – both of which are necessary for a 
complete concept of power (Pansardi, 2012; Cohen & Chiu, 2013). I group the positive 
form of power into two dimensions, ideational and material.  
 
Ideational dimension of power 
My use of ideational power draws on constructivist insights and existing normative 
types of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). In this formulation, the 
self-interest of actors is formed through the construction of subjective self-interest and 
national goals. Ideational power takes a soft constructivist stance in that national 
 
 63 
identities and social purposes have primarily social roots (i.e., culture, values, 
relationships) but are also influenced by material factors. In this sense, ideational power 
works to shape the norms and values of actors, and correspondingly provide the 
legitimacy and social purpose necessary to carry out activities (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). It 
also refers to normative interaction in the vein of Abdelal's (2001) view of the dynamics 
of nationalism where norms are defined in relation or opposition to those of another 
actor (or set of actors). Ultimately, ideational power serves to legitimate the actions and 
priorities of an actor in contrast to others and create acceptance of these priorities. 
Measuring ideational power involves first determining the qualitative content of the 
normative drivers of the actor in question, and subsequently following the successful 
reception of these priorities to others (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009, 11). In the context of 
securitized foodways, this implies: 1) understanding the meaning of food security 
through the policies and statements of CPC and Chinese state actors; and 2) 
subsequently following these policy frames through to their broad adoption (or 
rejection) by state organizations, SOEs, NGOs, and private actors. This dimension of 
power will serve as the cornerstone for the Party-state’s national food security priority 
over time.  
 
Material dimension of power (instrumental and structural) 
I employ a material dimension of power that has two types: instrumental and structural. 
Instrumental power follows the above definitions where actor A has power over actor B.  
While much of the analysis to follow deals mostly with structural power, there are 
moments in which instrumental power is invoked. Instrumental power appears in the 
lobby activities undertaken by government, corporate, and NGO actors where an actor is 
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attempting to achieve a specific outcome over another. The relationship between the 
Party-state and the PRC’s agribusiness involves some application of instrumental power 
to the extent that the Party-state is able to exercise influence over individuals and 
organizations. However, as noted in chapter 2, the Party-state’s authority has dispersed 
since the 1980s and more akin to a structural form of power.  
Where instrumental power is typically seen in a one-on-one relationship, 
structural power is more diffuse in nature (Barnett & Duval, 2005). I employ structural 
power to focus jointly on the place of an actor within networks that span geographic 
space and the ability of an actor to constrain the options available to others (Clapp & 
Fuchs, 2009). This use of structural power recognizes the range of domains in which 
structural power can exist: including financial, production, and security networks 
(Strange, 1998). For example, the Party-state now exercises influence over the domestic 
market through laws, regulations, oversight bodies, and Party representation in 
companies through their executive boards and within their organizational structures 
(Hsieh, 2011; Pearson, 2015). The approach taken here is specifically interested in 
networks of material resources controlled by states, corporations, and NGOs. This builds 
on Clapp and Fuchs’ (2009, 9) observation that “corporate actors have control over 
pivotal networks and resources.” By virtue of controlling networks even beyond 
borders, actors can influence physical and social infrastructure along with the 
corresponding flows of objects and information. In doing so, actors gain power over the 
allocation of resources and can influence both formal and informal rules in the global 
food system. For example, Murphy (2008) argues that the vertical integration of 
agribusiness across the globe facilitates the ability to set prices and control products 
 
 65 
that reach market. My use of networks in structural power differs from Kahler (2009) 
and his colleagues in the important respect that networks are not taken as given, but can 
be consciously created by actors over time.  
 The networks inherent in structural power are linked to the concept of agenda-
setting power or “the imposition of limits on the range of choices given to actors” (Clapp 
and Fuchs, 2009, 8). Actors, or a network of actors, can influence formal or informal 
rules that constrain others’ ability to act (Barnett and Duvall's, 2005). To date, structural 
power is most often employed by states and corporations to influence formal 
institutions, for example state regulations, international standards, or creating private 
governance standards (Falkner, 2008; Fuchs & Kalfagianni, 2010). However, structural 
power can also be found in less formalized forms based in the networks of material 
resources controlled by state and corporate actors. As used in this dissertation, both 
formal and informal structural power will come into play; to achieve normative 
priorities Party-state actors can influence the choices available to other actors through 
control over domestic regulations, and through influence over the flow of resources 
created by the distribution of corporate networks. This type of power can be observed 
by identifying institutional configurations (i.e., laws and regulations) established by 
Party-state actors and by corporate networks and ownership in the agribusiness sector 
that respond (at least in part) to Party-state actors. An assumption is that the spread of 
networks will proportionally affect the scope of influence over rules and resources.  
 As mentioned above, positive dimensions of power are not mutually exclusive, 
rather they are mutually reinforcing. For example, the construction and articulation of 
normative priorities using ideational power can impact the exercise of material power 
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by guiding the application of instrumental power or building institutions/network 
structures required of structural power. The collection of laws, regulations, directives, 
policy measures, and ownership over SOEs provide Party-state actors with significant 
resources upon which to draw in order to exercise various dimensions of power both at 
home and abroad. Of course not all attempts to exert power are successful, and are in 
part dependent on the interests and power of other actors. The PRC’s historical 
disconnect from the interests and power of other powerful state and agribusiness actors 




Again modifying the language of Barnett and Duval (2005, 42) I define negative power 
as a reactive form of power in that it reflects efforts of an actor or set of actors to avoid 
having their own capacity to “determine their circumstances and fate” to be shaped by 
others. Negative power is defined in terms of an actor’s ability to pursue their own self-
determination despite the efforts of others to exert power over them (Cohen & Chiu, 
2013). In the context of securitized foodways, I identify negative power as autonomy.  
 
Autonomy as power 
The power of autonomy provides a gateway into understanding changes in power 
structures over time. This parallel, negative form of power does not include the ability to 
influence; rather, it does include the ability to avoid the influence of powerful actors. In 
essence, where actors attempt to produce effects to shape the capacities of others, 
whether through ideational or material means, the power of autonomy is exercised by 
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resisting these efforts or conditions. Such resistance can manifest in taking the opposite 
action or position than what is desired, not complying with the requested action or 
norm, or taking an alternative path. The fact of being able to go a different way points to 
the limits of powerful actors vis-à-vis those who can exercise autonomy. These limits 
provide the opportunity for autonomous actors to develop power opposite the powerful 
and potentially contribute to changing power structures over time.  
In this way, the power of autonomy exists as a mirror to the positive dimensions 
of power. For example, ideational power holds that a powerful actor can shape the self-
understanding of another to meet its own form. However the power to be autonomous 
allows for the construction of independent self-interest in reaction to the social 
relationship at hand, outside of the form intended by the powerful actor. Structural 
power involves an actor’s geographic expansion and corresponding control of resources 
and shaping the options available to other actors; however, the power of autonomy 
implies withstanding the extension of networks and the rules laid out within a power 
structure (or at least not following them exactly).    
A key assumption in this framework is that there is interaction between these 
different forms of power (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). For example, ideational power can 
promote the exercise of negative power or the pursuit of structural power. Further, the 
various actors involved in power dynamics each have the potential to draw on different 
types of power as a result of their relationships and interactions. The inclusion of 
autonomy provides an opportunity for change from established power relationships.   
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3.2. Methodology and research materials 
3.2.1. Securitized foodways and explanation 
To develop the concept of securitized foodways and build understanding of the PRC’s 
place in the global food system, I use a largely interpretive approach that borrows from 
a range of qualitative research methods in the social sciences. As described by the puzzle 
statement in Chapter 1, I am interested in a particular outcome: the relative absence of 
foreign actors with the PRC’s commercial grain seed sector and the increased power of 
the PRC within the global food system. To explain this current context, I examine the 
causes that lead to this outcome (Mahoney, Kimball, & Koivu, 2009). As described in the 
argument above, three major variables make the Party-state’s pursuit of securitized 
foodways possible: 1) a normative priority to control the national grain supply; 2) 
control over the material structure of agricultural technology and production; and 3) 
historical autonomy from the incumbent powerful global agrifood actors. These three 
variables form a set of factors that are individually insufficient, but when brought 
together are sufficient to bring about the PRC’s place in the global food system 
(Mahoney, 2008). As shown in Figure 3.2, the explanatory concept of securitized 
foodways is depicted as existing in the PRC at the convergence of these three factors, 
which corresponds to three dimensions of power. 






            Figure 3.2: Securitized foodways and explanation 
 
 
Within this set are both ideational and material variables. By drawing on ideational 
dimensions of power and corresponding explanation, I engage with constructivist 
traditions (Abdelal, Blyth & Parsons, 2015). These traditions offer an interpretive 
understanding of the world, and acknowledge that “there is radical diversity across 
cultures concerning the way in which social life is conceptualized” (Little, 1991, 74-75). 
However, my analytical and explanatory framework also draws on the material 
elements such as infrastructure, state regulation, and commercial networks that make 
social practices possible (i.e., pursuit of a national food security priority). The use of 
interpretive methods helps to illustrate the relationship between ideational and 
material sources of power, where each is not complete without the other. Put differently, 
positive qualitative research methodologists often invoke the metaphor of the detective 
seeking to explain a murder, where the detective knows the outcome they seek to 
explain and go about uncovering and weighing evidence to solve the crime (Mahoney, 
2010; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). However, these scholars are often in the business of 
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pointing to material evidence to explain their outcomes in question. By dealing with 
both material and ideational factors, I seek to provide causes that include not only 
physical evidence but also the motives behind the PRC’s newfound place in the global 
food system. This effort builds an alternative heuristic to understand current food 
system dynamics. 
The normative priority of national food security is long-held by the Party-state in 
regards to control over the production chain related to grain and grain seed (Wong & 
Huang, 2012). This constructed self-interest has specific parameters that define how the 
CPC and agribusiness in China perceive the grain seed industry as a strategic national 
security sector. Material capability refers to the networks of resources and rules of the 
game within which agribusiness actors must operate both within the PRC and abroad. 
Control over these structures translates, at least in part, to the capacity to control flows 
of agricultural products, technologies, and governing rules in the service of national food 
security. Finally, autonomy is the variable that allows the PRC a historical separation 
from dominant agribusiness actors from the U.S. and Europe, lending to the existence of 
domestic policy space. These variables work together over time to produce the current 
place of China in the global food system. 
To evaluate these variables’ contribution to the PRC’s control over its domestic 
grain seed industry and increasing presence in the global grain and grain seed sectors, I 
predominantly use within-case analysis in addition to loose cross-case comparisons 
(George & Bennett, 2005). Beginning in Chapter 4, I use a loose comparative approach to 
trace the development of the three variables of concern during the mid-20th century. The 
chapter traces the roots of food nationalism in both Republican and Communist China, 
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the creation of grain seed breeding programs in the PRC, and the separation of the PRC 
from U.S.-led green revolution activities. To gain analytical leverage, I draw comparison 
to countries impacted by the U.S.-led green revolution, particularly India and the 
Philippines. The comparative approach reveals key differences between the PRC and 
green revolution countries, from differing content of normative priorities, to differing 
material networks, and crucially to different levels of autonomy from the positive power 
of the U.S.-led global food system. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I turn to within-case analysis to trace the development of the 
three variables that make up securitized foodways, and examine the key components of 
this explanatory framework. Chapter 5 lays out the structure of the PRC’s domestic seed 
market from the 1980s to present. Building on the analysis of Chapter 4, I use 
contemporaneous statements by Party-state and corporate actors as well as PRC laws 
and regulations to show that national food security remained a normative priority but 
with a shifted meaning away from strict self-sufficiency in the context of economic 
globalization. Further, I draw on those laws and regulations in contrast with the 
situation in other Southern countries at the time to show that the Party-state retained 
the policy space necessary to develop market controls vis-à-vis global agribusiness. 
Finally, various market reports provide evidence that the domestic PRC seed industry 
expanded via a regulatory regime that privileges domestically controlled research and 
agribusiness facilities. These market controls under a re-defined vision of national food 
security allows for global agribusiness investment in seed technology, but draws 
boundaries to limit global seed company expansion in the domestic market. Chapter 6 
focuses on the Party-state’s more recent exertion of positive power through the global 
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expansion of PRC-owned grain and seed companies. Again, I collect statements from 
central Party-state actors as well as from foreign corporations and governments to 
demonstrate that the normative priority to achieve national food security remains 
paramount in the PRC while self-reliance is pursued through control over material 
resources beyond the territorial borders of the nation-state. Further, I draw on extensive 
market research to map a broad corporate network of businesses from the PRC in 
countries across the world. The combination of policy statements, regulations, and 
physical infrastructure maps demonstrate continued market presence in terms of grain 
imports, which allows me to draw inferences regarding the Party-state increasing 
structural power over the global food system. 
Finally, Chapter 7 returns to a domestic focus to provide a within-case analysis of 
alternative food movements in the PRC. In this chapter, I again draw on the statements 
of Party-state and corporate actors and contrast this Party-state driven national food 
security discourse with statements and interviews with alternative food movements. 
Whereas the Party-state and industrial agribusiness in the PRC benefit by acting on 
securitized foodways, local food movements in the PRC are more circumscribed. By 
comparing the discourses of each group, I demonstrate that alternative food movements 
in the PRC share common food nationalism with the Party-state, but lack material 
networks and resources (now devoted to industrial agriculture). However, their ability 
to exert negative power vis-à-vis the Party-state’s promotion of industrial agriculture 
continues to allow space for seed alternatives in China, as shown through interviews and 
media reporting on changes to the new Seed Law (Zhǒngzǐ fǎ, 种子法). This mix of 
comparative and within case studies allows me to establish and assess the factors of 
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concern to explain the place of China in the global political economy of food. The concept 
of securitized foodways can also be used as a heuristic to understand the future 
motivations and actions of the Party-state in terms of its position in global grain and 
grain seed markets.  
3.2.1. Research materials and their application 
In this sub-section, I will first review the types of materials I have collected and then 
explain how I employ this evidence to support and evaluate my argument. I have drawn 
on a wide variety of sources to assist in piecing together the ideational, material, and 
autonomous forms of power that shape securitized foodways as they travel across the 
three major periods covered by this dissertation: 1) 1930s-1970s; 2) 1980s-1990s; and 
3) 2000s onward. In 2015, I conducted fieldwork at various institutions across China, 
first in June, and then from September to December. I spent the majority of my time at 
Nanjing University (Nánjīng dàxué, 南京大学), as well as Yunnan Agricultural University 
(Yúnnán nóngyè dàxué, 云南农业大学) and China Agricultural University (Zhōngguó 
nóngyè dàxué, 中国农业大学). During this time I collected 430 academic publications 
from Chinese language academic journals and professional magazines including over 
100 historical Chinese journal articles from the 1920s to the 1970s. These publications 
focus on 1) historical seed breeding and extension, 2) seed industry development and 
national policy, 3) seed company research and policy prescription, and 4) international 
extension activities and policy. In addition, I collected corporate reports and Chinese 
securities filings, as well as speeches and policy documents from government ministers, 
members of the CPC, business representatives, and activists. The vast majority of these 
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works have not been cited in English language scholarship, to my knowledge. These 
documents were complemented by grey literature from various food and agriculture 
focused NGOs in the country. Many of these documents are not readily available online, 
and required library, database, and/or institutional access. 
In addition, I conducted a dozen interviews with seed industry representatives, 
activists, and policy makers, along with many more informal conversations. These 
interviews were arranged both through direct outreach and through introductions from 
university colleagues in China and Canada. Interview materials provided supporting 
context regarding agricultural policy in China, seed industry structure and seed 
research, and alternative food movement activities. My intention was to conduct a 
greater number of interviews with representatives from seed companies; however, 
responses to my inquiries were not typically forthcoming despite introductions from 
intermediaries. It is possible that given government focus on the industry as well as 
recent atmosphere in the PRC, such connections were more difficult to establish. 
However, the primary material in the form of articles (academic or magazine) written in 
Chinese publications by company or government authors provided more than enough 
information. In fact, there is significant benefit in sourcing information from Chinese-
language publications intended for a domestic audience in the PRC, rather than to an 
international readership. My position at the universities above also allowed me to 
discuss these issues with students and faculty familiar with food system issues. 
I also draw on archival resources and historical reports from a number of 
institutions. I have consulted documents from numerous digital archives to help frame 
the role of green revolution actors in China, including the Rockefeller Archives (digital), 
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the Henry Wallace Collection (digital), US Congress (digital), and Chinese reports 
published by the Nationalist Government (Guelph University archives, Nanjing 
University). In terms of historical reports, I have particularly drawn on pre-2001 
publications from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), the FAO, the World 
Bank, and the Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). Included in World Bank 
reports are oral histories of senior country-officials in China, India, and South/Southeast 
Asia. Finally, I draw on English language market publications such as corporate reports, 
market intelligence publications, and financial press. These publications provide 
additional detail on merger and acquisitions, company profiles, and infrastructure 
networks. As shown in Table 3.2, I assemble these materials at different moments in this 
dissertation as they apply to each chapter in this dissertation. 
 
Table 3.2: Research materials 
 Primary Secondary 
Chapter 4 • Archival documents (government, philanthropic) 
• Historical reports (IRRI, CIMMYT) 








• NGO reports 
 
• News reports 
 
• Financial Press 
Chapter 5 • Historical reports (IRRI, CIMMYT, World Bank, FAO) 
• English and Chinese industry/market intelligence 
• Corporate reports 
• Interviews (seed industry, NGOs) 
Chapter 6 • English and Chinese language market intelligence 
• Chinese research studies 
• Chinese language press 
• Corporate reports 
Chapter 7 • English and Chinese language market intelligence 
• Chinese language press 
• Chinese government reports and policies 




I use the materials listed above to illustrate and evaluate the three key dimensions of 
power (ideational, material, and autonomy) within my analytical framework. To uncover 
ideational power at different points in time I introduce statements by key state and CPC 
actors as found in legal and policy documents, academic publications, news reports, and 
grey literature to determine the qualitative nature normative priorities and perceived 
national self-interest regarding the concept of food security. The normative priorities 
within Party-state policy as inferred from these texts are subsequently triangulated 
through comparison with the approach of foreign government and corporate actors, as 
determined through counterstatements and differential policy approaches.  
For example, in Chapter 4, I use archival documents, historical reports, and 
contemporaneous academic publications to compare grain seed development between 
the PRC and green revolution countries. Archival documents from the Chinese 
Republican government, U.S. foreign policy sphere, and PRC university publications are 
contrasted to interpret the ways in which national self-interest in relation to food grain 
security is constructed within the Nationalist and Mao governments. Statements and 
policies revealed by the documents serve to contrast approaches to national food 
security and provide evidence of differing ideational lineages within successive 
Mainland Chinese governments. In later chapters I use this initial ideational 
differentiation to trace the evolution of Party-state policy over time by drawing on 
subsequent statements by key officials, scientists, agribusinesses, and policy documents 
to demonstrate continuity and change with the normative underpinnings of national 
food security as found in the early history of the PRC. Again, these normative 
underpinnings are triangulated and contrasted using institutional reports (i.e., IRRI, 
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CIMMYT, World Bank), interviews with policy advocates and alternative food 
movements, and public statements by foreign governments and global agribusiness. 
Overall, I use written, first hand statements focused on key words and themes to draw 
out normative commitments, and triangulate these statements based on repetition from 
various corners and places in time. 
 
Material power forms the second dimension of power and is a causal variable at 
play in the central argument of this dissertation. Material power includes both 
instrumental and structural components, which demand different forms of evidence to 
substantiate their presence. Instrumental power is more often employed in Chapter 4 
under the Mao period, given the significant political influence of Mao’s CPC at the time. 
For example, I draw on policy directives from Mao regarding seed policy in the mid-20th 
century, which are often assumed to be directly influence those carrying out the 
directives in the regions (though on the ground implementation may vary). In addition, 
later chapters refer to lobby activities of actors from the U.S., agribusinesses, and 
alternative food movements as found in material gathered through interviews, 
government publications, and seed industry publications. These activities draw out 
instrumental power dynamics between actors, though the degree of influence varies by 
case. 
Within material power, the focus of this dissertation is on structural power in 
order to highlight the diffuse but systemic relationships between state and corporate 
actors and the resource networks of global agribusiness. To illustrate the structural 
power of Party-state actors I draw on a combination of government documents (laws, 
policy statements), industry and market analysis, corporate reports and websites, 
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financial press, and stock exchange filings. These documents reveal legal/regulatory 
frameworks institutionalized by the Party-state, derived from the ideological 
underpinnings of national food security policy, which set the rules for both domestic and 
foreign participants in the PRC’s grain and seed industry.  Further, I use corporate 
reports, the financial press, and Chinese-language scholarship to uncover the ownership 
and industry structure within the grain and grain seed industries. Ownership and 
industry structure illustrate the relationship between laws and regulations and their 
effect on the power of other actors that must operate within the frameworks set by 
Party-state policy. For example, in Chapter 5, I use information collected through these 
financial press and corporate reports to illustrate the effect of investment limits (and 
other factors) on the ownership structure of seed companies within Mainland China. In 
Chapter 6, I draw on trade data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to 
illustrate changing flows of agricultural commodities that shape the material 
relationships between the PRC and other countries in terms of grain trade. I also use 
financial press and corporate reports to map a broad network of nationally owned 
businesses in the PRC and throughout the world, demonstrating the material resources 
in the hands of actors that ultimate report to central state organs. 
Given that autonomy is a negative form of power, related to both ideational and 
material dimensions, I use much of the same materials or types of materials and case 
comparisons described above. Ideational forms of power, and particularly the normative 
priorities of the Party-state regarding national food security, are central to providing a 
reason for the Party-state undertaking certain actions over time. To demonstrate 
autonomy as power in Chapter 4, I draw on the materials described above and in Table 
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3.2 to present the very different ideational and material trajectories of the seed breeding 
activities in the PRC and in green revolution countries. I use the statements and 
activities of Republican actors, Mao-era political actors, and institutional actors of the 
green revolution to demonstrate that though Mainland China was targeted to be 
included in the green revolution the Party-state created largely independent notions of 
national food security and domestic agribusiness networks in comparison with the U.S.-
led global food regime. Similarly, in Chapter 7, I draw on corporate statements, key 
informant interviews, and institutional publications to draw out differences between the 
priorities within Party-state policy and the activities of alternative food movements. The 
areas of normative overlap and differentiation highlight the limits food movement 
autonomy within the PRC’s industrial food system.   
Within each of these variables, I also employ a vast amount of secondary 
academic literature that addresses broader issues of agricultural development both in 
China and globally. I have reviewed many academic studies, each of which contributes 
pieces of the overall puzzle in terms of self-sufficiency discourse, food-system change, 
and seed industries. My extensive use of secondary literature is a contribution in itself, 
as I bring together material from numerous existing academic studies in order to tell a 
new story. This previously disparate literature is drawn together into a comprehensive 
analysis, adding value to its content.   
3.3. Operationalizing securitized foodways 
The central argument of this dissertation employs and builds on the above power 
framework. The dimensions of power within China’s securitized foodways operate 
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together over time in the following way: the Party-state uses ideational power, gained 
through social experiences related to food, famine, and international interaction to 
shape and legitimate the concept of national food security. To attain national food 
security, the Party-state deploys network power through national control over domestic 
and international networks of grain seed (and grain trade) companies and their 
infrastructure. National control over agrifood networks then feeds the Party-state’s 
structural power to constrain the participation of other state and market actors as the 
PRC further engages the global agrifood system. The consequences of the power held by 
state and corporate actors in the PRC is the beginning of a reconfiguration of power 
dynamics within the global food system, from the United States and Europe to the 
emergence of the Party-state’s networks of securitized foodways. 
Importantly, the Party-state has the ability to exercise agrifood power (within 
limits) as a result of a historical disjuncture from the dominant global food system; the 
PRC did not participate in the U.S.-led food regime of the mid-20th century and kept 
distance from the major emerging global agrifood businesses for most of the latter half 
of the 20th century. This disjuncture meant that the PRC’s food system was less 
influenced by the power of the United States and multinational agribusiness actors at 
key moments in the development of the dominant global food system. As a result, the 
Party-state gained a degree of autonomy from the ideational, network, and structural 
power of key actors in the global food system. In this sense, negative and positive 
powers have a dynamic relationship, where negative power is itself conditioned by the 
attempted exercise of positive power. An actor with the capacity for negative power 
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through autonomy can build power internally, leading in turn to positive power. These 
dynamics are laid out in the upcoming four chapters. 
In the next chapter, I begin by explaining the historical disjuncture in the global 
political economy and global food system that enabled the PRC to develop autonomy 
from the emerging global food system. The focus on mid-20th century China traces the 
path of the country’s domestic agricultural pursuits in comparison with the 
development of the U.S.-led food system, particularly the green revolution. This 
juxtaposition both highlights the nascent positive power held by the American state, 
both ideational and structural, as well as the elaboration of the PRC’s own concept of 
national food security in opposition to this power. Though the dynamics began almost a 
century ago, they retain significance for more recent events covered in subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter 5 builds on the foundation for power as autonomy laid out in chapter 4. 
Here, the PRC’s relative divorce from the structural power and networks in the global 
food system of the 1980s allowed the Party-state to reshape and expand its own 
domestic agribusiness networks and legal structures in the grain seed industry. 
However, the chapter also introduces a key paradox in terms of national food security 
and the shifting concept of self-reliance in the context of economic globalization. 
Whereas the ideational imperative during the Mao period was to focus on domestic 
grain production, increased interaction with the global economy allowed for a reframing 
of the concept to comply with greater economic exchange and integration. The central 
concept of control over networks remains, but engagement with the global food system 
accelerates. Chapter 6 also focuses on structural power, but with an outward orientation 
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beyond the territorial boundaries of the PRC. With the reframed concept of self-reliance 
in the context of economic globalization, the PRC now pursues securitized foodways 
globally by establishing positive power abroad via the international extension of grain 
seed, acquisition of global grain seed and agrochemical companies, and acquisition of 
global grain trade companies. The expansion of positive power serves to increase the 
PRC’s structural power through greater influence on the application of rules related to 
the trade of GM grain.  
Finally, Chapter 7 examines the national and sub-national scale to examine the 
effects of securitized foodways on alternative food systems in the PRC. With the 
expansion of domestically controlled agribusiness networks throughout the country, 
and the national security priority to compete with global agribusiness, the room for local 
food movements appears to be constrained. This chapter pushes the concept of 
autonomy as power further to examine the role of autonomy from state and 
agribusiness networks in the context of alternative food movement in China. With an eye 
to the future, the chapter focuses on discursive battles between the language of 
securitized foodways and alternative food movements, and the material implications of 
this contest on the development of national legal frameworks within the PRC.  
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Chapter 4: Self Reliant Food Security in China 
and Green Revolution in Asia  
4.1. Introduction 
The PRC is largely absent from literature on the U.S.-led food regime in the early post-
WWII period. However, this absence is itself significant. This chapter situates the place 
of grain seeds in China within the historical context of the second food regime 
(Friedmann & McMichael, 1989). Using the analytical framework laid out in Chapter 3, 
this chapter focuses on the construction of the Party-state’s early national food security 
priority and the development of national autonomy from the U.S.-led food regime. 
Further, it establishes the context for the development of nationally owned, though 
highly fragmented, seed businesses within the PRC. Together these variables lay the 
foundation for the securitization of China’s foodways through the development of a 
distinct conception of national food security through self-reliance and the exertion of 
national control over domestic grain seed networks. 
More specifically, it focuses on a major transformation in global agricultural 
development: the green revolution of the 1950s to 1970s. Though China’s communist 
revolution is often treated as a catalyst motivating the U.S.-led green revolution, the 
relationship between the two has not been explored in detail. This chapter proceeds in 
three principal parts: 1) understanding the place of U.S. agricultural influence under 
China’s Nationalist government (1920s to 1940s), 2) exploring the comparison cases of 
green revolution in India and the Philippines (1950s to 1970s), and 3) presenting the 
experience of Mao-era grain seed research and extension during the green revolution 
 
 84 
period. The three sections of this chapter come together to argue that the PRC’s own 
agricultural experimentation was largely independent of the U.S.-led food regime’s 
structural power to shape national agricultural development through exporting grain, 
green revolution technologies, development finance, and agribusiness enterprises. This 
independence led to a distinct domestic seed research and extension system unlike 
many other developing countries at the time: a path important for the development of 
securitized foodways and corresponding power dynamics at the heart of this 
dissertation.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the lasting impacts of the green revolution’s 
agricultural transformations have been hotly contested in terms of changes in yields and 
production, environment and health, as well as income and land redistribution. The 
place of the green revolution within U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War is an equally 
contentious issue (Perkins, 1997). In effect, U.S. state and private foundation support for 
the activities of the International Maize and Wheat Research Institute (CIMMYT) and 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) was heavily embedded in modernist notions 
of development aimed at containing a communist revolution – to varying degrees of 
“success” (Cullather, 2010). Some authors point to agrarian revolution in China as being 
the impetus for United States food and agricultural assistance programs (Cullather, 
2010; Perkins, 1997); others mention Maoist China’s agricultural development as a 
“counterpoint” to India’s green revolution experience in this same context (Schmalzer, 
2016). U.S. scholars of the period also framed China’s domestic experiences through the 
lens of the green revolution (Stavis, 1974). However, contemporary studies and reports 
often gloss over the divide between the international efforts of the U.S. and the PRC’s 
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own domestic seed breeding program, making no mention of the historical context in 
which China’s own seed system emerged (see Hargrove & Coffman, 2006; Tang, Li, & 
Bonjean, 2010).4  
The difference between these paths is crucial to understanding more recent 
power dynamics in the global food system and the development of the transnational 
seed and input industries. This chapter uncovers historical antecedents to the green 
revolution in China, and contrasts concepts of self-sufficiency and seed market 
development between the PRC and green revolution countries. The comparative paths 
contribute to very different networks of seed research and extension creating a 
necessary base upon which later seed industry developments depended. The first 
section of this chapter places grain seed research during the Nationalist Government 
period (1920s-1940s) firmly on the path of internationalization through partnership 
with actors from the United States including universities, private foundations, and the 
U.S. government. The section concludes by presenting a counterfactual - had the 
international cooperation established in Nationalist China continued after 1949, would 
the PRC have become the model for the U.S.-led green revolution of the post-war period? 
The second section briefly introduces the research and extension systems of key green 
revolution countries (India and the Philippines) and their partnership with global 
agricultural and financial actors during the second food regime including IRRI, CIMMYT, 
and the World Bank. It contrasts the normative content of national self-sufficiency 
priorities promoted by leaders and economic planners in each country with the means 
                                                        
4 It is often difficult to trace the specific geography and movement over time associated with plant cultivars. However, 
in many publications care is taken to ascribe a nationality to specific cultivars, and this nationality changes over time 
in correlation with international political economy. What was once a Taiwanese variety is now a Chinese variety, 
blurring the important geopolitical distinction. 
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taken to achieve these stated objectives, offering a basis for comparison with the case of 
the PRC. The third section highlights the construction of the Party-state’s national self-
interest in terms of Mao-era notions of national food security. It illustrates the 
development of the PRC’s system of grain seed research and extension autonomous 
from global agricultural capital leading up to the late 1970s.  
In summary, this chapter tells the story of differing interpretations and 
constraints pertaining to how grain self-sufficiency was to be achieved in China. As we 
will see, the key divergence between India and the Philippines vs. China is a focus on 
national ownership over germplasm resources and restrictions on the use of foreign 
capital. Though the issue of domestic production of staple grains was declared 
paramount to achieving self-sufficiency in both cases, the PRC relied on domestically 
developed varieties while green revolution countries were integrated into a global 
agricultural system. The sections below will develop this comparison further. 
4.2. The United States in Nationalist China’s seed research 
4.2.1. U.S. seed-aid partnerships in Nationalist China 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, China was viewed internationally as the “land of 
famine”, struggling to meet the needs of the population (Lee, 2011; Li, 2007; Mallory, 
1926). With the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, there was an opening for increased 
international interactions. The handful of missionary universities in the country 
expanded with agriculture emerging as a key field of study (Stross, 1986). Between 1909 
and 1949, over 500 students from Mainland China went abroad to study agronomy, 
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mainly to the United States (Zhao & Zhou, 2013).5 Many of these students returned to 
China and occupied prominent positions in the newly developing university and political 
system bringing with them agronomic practices, including modern seed breeding, as 
well as networks with prominent foreign academics (Schmalzer, 2016; Zhao & Zhou, 
2013). Though this period predates communist China and the U.S. food regime, it 
provides crucial context to understand the important role of actors from the United 
States at the time, and future diverging paths. 
Successive United States governments had attempted to become involved in 
China’s agricultural sectors in order to expand markets and address humanitarian issues 
including famine and hunger; however, few lasting engagements had been made.6 By 
1920, crop failure in northeast China again led to extreme hunger and the death of 
hundreds of thousands of people drawing worldwide response. The Red Cross 
undertook international humanitarian assistance, collecting donations and conducting 
on-the-ground relief efforts including the distribution of grain. U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson himself put together a famine relief fund collecting over US$17 million (Li, 2007). 
The first major state-level inroads in seed breeding between the United States and China 
began out of the remainder of these funds. The American Famine Fund Committee, 
which included Cornell University President Livingston Farrand among its membership, 
was left with nearly one million dollars after the famine abated. By early 1923, both 
                                                        
5 Funding opportunities existed to study in the United States resulting from an indemnity fund paid by the Chinese 
Government for damages to foreigners during the Boxer Rebellion. Japan was also a frequent destination for overseas 
students of agronomy. Zhao and Zhou (2013) found records of 518 overseas students, of which 263 studied in the 
United States (primarily Cornell and University of Minnesota) and 173 students in Japan, mostly at Tokyo Imperial 
University.  
6 See letter from US diplomat Paul Reinsch (Sun, 1922, 253-255). Also, Stross (1986, chapter 1) for a review of early 
USDA efforts to expand exports to China, and Meissner (1997) for a review of flour exports from California to China’s 
coastal cities in the later half of the 1800s.  
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Cornell University and the American Red Cross had determined that the best way 
forward was to,  
 
establish[] in China a work of University extension of ultimately nation-wide scope, 
located at Nanking and affiliated with Nanking University…We recommend that it 
begin with agricultural extension and that as soon as possible thereafter, it add 
engineering extension, in order through both of these departments to contribute to 
the solution of the problems of food production and famine prevention. (The Cornell 
Daily Sun, 1923) 
 
In this early initiative, state, university, and philanthropic actors from the United States 
sought to share public seeds along with cultivation methods while building institutions 
within the PRC, in the name of global hunger. As the project moved forward into 1924, it 
was recognized that more funding would be needed to accommodate the scope of the 
program. Cornell turned to John D. Rockefeller’s International Education Board (IEB), a 
philanthropic organization created in 1923 that would later become the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Albert Mann, the Dean of Agriculture at Cornell was serving as the Director 
of Agriculture for the IEB, and was able to secure up to a decade’s worth of funding 
(Love & Reisner, 2012). Shen Zonghan (Shěn zōnghàn, 沈宗瀚), a Cornell doctoral 
graduate, led the program at Nanjing, having previously lobbied the government for a 
national agricultural program (Geng, 2015). Shen would play a major role in designing 
the agricultural college’s, “ubiquitous concern with ‘plant improvement’” (Schneider, 
2005). Faculty from Cornell went to work at Nanjing University in the fields of 
agricultural economics and agronomy, encouraging the exchange of graduate students, 
and developing a small network of experimentation stations. Though the Cornell-
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Nanjing program represented a large seed breeding and extension program in 
Republican China, it totalled only 13 stations, mostly in the east of the country 
throughout Anhui, Henan, and Jiangsu provinces. Wheat was its primary focus, with 
experiments also including barley, corn, sorghum, cotton, rice, soybean and millet (Love 
& Reisner, 2012). 
Nearing the end of the project, Shen Zonghan and advisors from the United States 
lobbied the Guomindang (Guómíndǎng, 国民党), the Nationalist Party government, to 
scale up efforts at Nanjing University and develop a national-scale extension system to 
improve seed breeding and overall agronomy.7 The Nationalist Government’s National 
Agricultural Research Bureau (NARB) (Zhōngyāng nóngyè shíyàn suǒ, 中央农业实验所) 
began its work in 1931, drawing on the experience of Nanjing University and other 
agricultural colleges throughout the country. Collections of grains from Europe and 
North America were made available to researchers. Raymond Moyer, a Cornell Graduate 
and professor at Oberlin College, worked in Shanxi province beginning in the 1920s and 
brought thousands of species for testing to central China (Shen, 2004). Roy Wiggans, a 
member of the Cornell-Nanjing project, also visited Yanjing University (Yānjīng Dàxué, 
燕京大学) in Beijing with samples for experimentation stations in the area. An 
additional collection of wheat breeds was obtained from Reading University, adding to 
the other foreign varieties (He, Xia, & Bonjean, 2011). Given the importation of these 
many thousands of seed varieties from the U.S., United Kingdom, Japan, and other 
                                                        
7 The Guomindang is the often-used Mandarin spelling for the Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek, which held the seat 
of government in the Republic of China. The Guomindang was also known as Kuomintang or KMT using Wade-Giles 
Romanization. I use Guomindang, Nationalist Party, and Republican Government interchangeably. 
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countries, the Nationalist Government had no qualms about using foreign technologies 
in the service of national food security. 
The concept of the NARB was to extend new varieties and techniques to farmers, 
with a view to increasing production.8 The Ministry of Industries (1934, 12) described 
the process as such, 
 
This extension work will consist of demonstration and instruction. The 
demonstrations will show the farmers the advantage of the new ideas, and the 
instruction will teach the farmers how to make use of them…In this way, the results 
of research will be of practical benefit to the agriculture and rural life of the Nation. 
(Ministry of Industries, National Government of the Republic of China, 1934) 
 
The Nationalist Government perceived foreign seed and production technologies as 
being for the national good, integrating foreign partnerships into their agricultural 
planning. There was also wide support within the Nationalist government to promote 
self-sufficiency. Lee (2011) provides excellent examples of both Guomindang officials 
and popular opinions from the period arguing that national food security ought to be a 
priority given insufficiency at home, increased imports, and the hostility of Japan. One 
official, Chen Bozhuang (Chén bózhuāng, 陈伯荘), with the support of the Republican 
government and financed partly by Great Britain, unsuccessfully attempted to abate 
Guangdong’s rice imports by creating a new domestic railway to ship surplus Hunan rice 
through mountainous terrain to get to Guangzhou (Lee, 2011, 185-187). In the North, 
                                                        
8 Despite Shen’s focus on plant breeding and extensive foreign partnerships, he was unable to move his experiments 




too, government ministers saw grain imports as a crisis of self-sufficiency (Li, 2007), and 
set about designing policy to increase production (Chang, 1931).  
The concern was addressed in part by expanding plant breeding programs. Shen 
Zonghan, now working as a key official in the Republican Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, spearheaded several initiatives. Achieving self-sufficiency by creating crops 
with increased yield and pest resistance was a key component of these programs. Shen 
(1936, 17) indicated that, “[a]s the Government has recently established the National 
Rice and Wheat Improvement Institute for China’s self-sufficiency of these two crops, 
the fund for wheat breeding has been greatly increased, and a co-ordinated plan of 
wheat breeding on a national basis is needed.” To this end, he employed germplasm 
resources left by the legacy of the Cornell-Nanjing program, and expanded extension 
stations. Breeding programs were developed in the South of the country as well. In 
Guangdong province, Ding Ying (Dīng yǐng, 丁颖), Dean of Sun Yat Sen University 
(Zhongshan College) (Zhōngshān dàxué, 中山大学) had returned from study at Tokyo 
Imperial University to restructure the institution’s approach to agronomy. To combat 
foreign rice imports he trumpeted scientific breeding over “peasant experience” as he 
sought to develop new varieties of rice as a means to achieve self-sufficiency (Lee, 2011, 
132). Later joining the Communist Party, his 1933 work on wild rice germplasm in 
Guangdong province would prove important to breeding programs during the Mao 
period (Sun, 1987; World Scientific, 1981). 
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4.2.2. The U.S. state and food security assistance in the Nationalist 
period 
By the early 1930s, the Cornell-Nanjing program had dissipated in formal terms. 
However, Rockefeller Foundation officials saw Nanjing University as the preeminent 
agricultural research institution in China and maintained a continued presence through 
funding other rural development initiatives. They were particularly encouraged by the 
relationship between the Rural Reconstruction Movement of James Yen (Yàn yángchū, 
晏阳初) and their previous investment in Nanjing University’s agriculture program 
(Gunn, 1934). The foundation provided some support to Yen in 1928, and, by the 1930s, 
began to support Yen’s Rural Reconstruction movement in its combined activities in 
rural education, public health, and agriculture. Yen was educated in the United States 
(Yale and Princeton) and looked to Western institutions for funding toward his goals in 
rural improvement. He saw a need to modernize rural China believing that, “the 
fundamental problem of the Chinese nation, which caused her lagging behind in the 
modern world, was fourfold. This fourfold problem is ‘ignorance, poverty, disease and 
selfishness’” (Hsieh, 1944). Yen tried to use foreign funding in order to move towards 
local self-sufficiency, creating an integrated rural economy by increasing agricultural 
productivity, education, healthcare, and local industry. The focus complemented central 
government priorities by working at the local level in China’s predominantly rural areas 




 There were, however, multiple Rural Reconstruction experiments at the time 
(Day, 2008; Yan & Chen, 2013). James Yen’s rural reconstruction work in Hebei province 
is often juxtaposed with that of Liang Shuming (Liáng shùmíng, 梁漱溟), a domestically 
educated scholar with an experimental site in neighbouring Shandong province. Liang 
focused on a “third way” between the Nationalists and Communists, focusing on Chinese 
culture and renewed Confucianism to rebuild the countryside. In 1936, a prominent left-
wing intellectual, Li Zixiang (Lǐ zǐxiáng, 李紫翔), argued that, “the main difference 
[between the old school of Liang Shuming and new school supported by James Yen] is 
that the new school relies on 'international' material and human aid, while the old 
school is comparatively conservative and, up to now at least, has not welcomed foreign 
influence or foreign participation in its rural reconstruction movement” (Alitto, 1976). 
There were, in other words, multiple approaches being employed during this time in 
terms of achieving self-sufficiency in production and improving agricultural livelihoods, 
with some (including the Republican government) drawing on foreign partnership and 
others largely relying on local resources and ideational lineages. However, in terms of 
strategy to increase domestic production, those most closely connected to the 
Guomindang government favoured an internationalist approach.9 
Though the Rockefeller, Cornell, and Nationalist projects were put on hold at the 
time of Japanese occupation in the late 1930s,10 it was clear towards the war’s end that 
the Guomindang and its supporters were keen to continue agricultural cooperation with 
the United States. In June 1944, Henry Wallace, Vice President and co-founder of the Hi-
                                                        
9 The views of the Communist Party will be introduced in section 4.4, below. 
10 The work of the NARB and Nanjing University continued in Chongqing and Sichuan Province after the Nationalist 
Government relocated in 1937, but with minimal resources given the outbreak of war. 
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Bred Corn Company (later, Pioneer Hi-Bred), visited China’s displaced Nationalist 
government in Chongqing. Before leaving for China, he made arrangements to lunch 
with several Chinese dignitaries, including James Yen. When word got out that he was 
visiting, Wallace’s office received multiple requests for meetings with various 
agricultural societies. Wallace himself put in a request to Chinese Ambassador Wei 
Taoming (Wèi dàomíng, 魏道明) to acquire samples of corn grown in the mountainous 
regions of southern China (Wallace, 1944). One letter received by Wallace was signed by 
hundreds of faculty and students from the encampment of National Yunnan University 
in Kunming, where many of China’s top universities had relocated after the fall of the 
eastern coast. The letter stated, 
 
Mr. Wallace…What you can bring to China is not only compassionate understanding, not 
only the seeds of valuable plants, but also the necessary recognition of facts and 
something which will encourage the growth of those seeds of democracy which will bear 
the fruit of “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” These seeds 
were sown by our Dr. Sun Yat-Sen with his own hands and later watered with the sweat, 
tears, and blood of the Chinese people, especially of the young. (Students of NSW 
University, 1944) 
 
For the students and faculty members at this leading institute in refuge from war, 
Wallace represented both the promise of U.S.-supported democracy and the potential for 
agricultural improvement. A year after Wallace left China, and the war with Japan began 
to ebb, discussion regarding technical cooperation resumed between the United States 
and China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. In June of 1946, President Harry 
Truman wrote to Chiang Kai-shek (Jiǎng jièshí,  蒋介石) regarding an agreement 
 
 95 
between the two countries to investigate further agricultural partnerships. Truman 
stated that development cooperation ought to involve agriculture, as it was an important 
component of security, industry, and prosperity to the mutual benefit of both China and 
the United States (Acheson, 1946). In response, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to receive a 
team of US experts, stating that, 
 
We have been for centuries primarily an agricultural nation. The farmer is traditionally 
regarded with affection and respect. During recent times, unfortunately, our 
agricultural technique has fallen behind due to delay in the adoption and application of 
new scientific methods. I am keenly conscious of the fact that unless and until Chinese 
agriculture is modernized, Chinese industry cannot develop, as long as industry 
remains undeveloped, the general economy of the country cannot greatly improve. For 
this reason, I heartily agree with you that any plan for cooperation in economic 
development between our two countries should include agriculture. (Stuart, 1946) 
 
Again, the Nationalist government reiterated its support for international agricultural 
cooperation and the adoption of foreign agricultural technologies to the ends of 
increased food production. The agreement led to a last attempt at agricultural 
modernization under the Nationalist government under the support of the United States. 
A group of technical experts arrived in China for a period of 6 months to make 
recommendations on how the country could increase production and adopt new 
technologies. The Dean of University of California Berkeley’s School of Agriculture, who 
had previously worked with Albert Mann at the Rockefeller’s IEB led the group along 
with Raymond Moyer of Oberlin College. Shen Zonghan, now the Director of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry, guided the delegation on their tour. In addition to making 
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recommendations regarding the development of farm credit and stemming population 
growth, the commission focused once more on building a national agricultural extension 
system along with introducing improved crop varieties and chemical fertilizer capacity 
(US Agricultural Mission, 1946), this occurring the decade before the green revolution 
would begin. 
 By 1948, little progress had been accomplished regarding the commission’s 
recommendations. The end of Japanese occupation brought civil war across China 
between the Nationalist and Communist parties, diverting the financial commitments of 
the Nationalist government. In this context, a plan was designed for a “big push” of U.S. 
assistance for the Chinese economy, including agriculture. On April 3rd, 1948, the same 
day on which the Marshall Plan was approved by US congress, the United States made 
available US$338 million under the auspices of the China Aid Act of 1948. Of this total 
amount, 10% was earmarked for expenditure in agriculture, and a renewed support of 
the Rural Reconstruction Movement. In the congressional testimony that led up to the 
Act, the rationale for undertaking such an aid project was discussed at length. Concern 
over the Chinese civil war was palpable not only for the possible outcomes but also for 
the potential for the United States to be drawn into prolonged expenditure. George 
Marshall argued that growing support for the Communist Party at the expense of the 
Nationalists meant that,  
 
a great deal must be done by the Chinese authorities themselves—and that 
nobody else can do it for them—if that Government is to maintain itself against the 
Communist forces and agrarian policies. It also means that our Government must 
be exceedingly careful that it does not become committed to a policy involving the 
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absorption of its resources to an unpredictable extent (Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 1948).  
 
The use of U.S. funds for agricultural development in opposition to communism was 
already taking shape, as seen in this late effort to boost the Nationalist government’s 
status and the U.S.-China relationship. The record of U.S.-led partnerships in the 
previous decades also became pertinent to the rural component of U.S. assistance. 
Representative Helen Gahagan Douglas argued, “why can't we give aid to Dr. James Yen's 
mass education movement...From all reports, Dr. Yen has done a perfectly magnificent 
job in every way. The Generalissimo has now given him a whole province to work in. It 
seems money spent there would be in support of a positive program which could 
counteract Communist propaganda” (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1948). In the end, 
the rural component of the China Aid Act focused on supporting a new, broader vision of 
Rural Reconstruction drawing on the recommendations of the 1946 mission. The Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) would focus on agricultural extension 
activities, including improved seed varieties and irrigation, but also include issues of 
land survey and registration.  
When the JCRR agreement was finalized it brought together a familiar group of 
alumni from the pre-war agricultural development partnerships. Raymond Moyer was 
named as an American representative, while the Chinese contingent of the JCRR team 
included both Shen Zonghan and James Yen, now with long-term experience both in 
rural China and in partnerships with U.S. organizations. The JCRR began its work in 
Nanjing on October 1st 1948, but was moved to Guangzhou before the year’s end due to 
the Communist Party’s advancement into Southeastern China (Lapham, 1949). By 1949, 
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the Nationalist government and the JCRR had moved again, this time to the new 
headquarters in Taiwan. The Cornell trained agronomists and rural developers of the 
Nationalist government continued their work in Taiwan, and were instrumental in 
carrying out both land reform and plant breeding on the island. Shen would lead the 
organization, bringing with him several students and colleagues, including T. T. Chang 
(Zhāng décí, 张德慈). Chang had studied for his undergraduate degree at Nanjing 
University, and was recommended for an MSc at Cornell University by Shen after 
working with him in Guangzhou and then at the JCRR in Taiwan. For his part, James Yen 
went on to open a sister organization in the Philippines in 1952, which kept connections 
to Taiwan’s JCRR. The effort by U.S. actors to forge ties to China’s agricultural 
development did not succeed in establishing lasting institutional linkages in Mainland 
China, however it did create a network agronomists that would go on to shape the green 
revolution in Asia. 
In the post-war period, the path set forth by the U.S.-trained plant breeders 
continued outside of Mainland China. In 1960, IRRI was established in Los Baños, 
Philippines, with the goal of developing HYVs of rice in the same manner done at 
CIMMYT for wheat and corn. While establishing IRRI, officials looked to take on 
agronomists to conduct the breeding work being undertaken by the organization. Back 
from the United States after receiving his PhD from the University of Minnesota, T. T. 
Chang was now a senior agronomist at the JCRR in Taiwan. While visiting James Yen’s 
Rural Reconstruction initiative in the Philippines, he met with IRRI officials in 
September of 1960 (Chandler, 1992). By 1961 he was employed at IRRI, and brought 
with him rice varieties being bred by the JCRR in Taiwan, including the Dee-geo-woo-
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gen dwarf variety, which proved crucial to the creation of several IRRI rice strains key to 
green revolution activities in Asia (Chandler, 1992, 53-54). In effect, the legacy of U.S.-
sponsored agronomic activities in pre-1949 China (and post-1949 Taiwan) was 
essential for the development of the rice varieties IRRI spread throughout Asia. It is to 
these activities that we now turn, before examining the distinct path taken by the PRC in 
Mainland China after 1949. 
4.3. The U.S.-led green revolution in India and the Philippines 
National governments in South and Southeast Asia that embraced green revolution 
technologies in the post-war period have a distinct formulation of the meaning of self-
sufficiency, particularly in India and the Philippines. The formulation is similar to that of 
the Guomindang in that self-sufficiency is to be attained by increasing domestic 
production through the significant use of technologies and capital from abroad. In South 
and Southeast Asia, the research and extension of HYVs of wheat, rice, and corn were 
propelled by the activities of CIMMYT, IRRI, host governments, and the support of both 
public and private actors from the United States. In part, as described above, the work of 
Nationalist China seed breeders now operating in Taiwan would have a direct 
relationship with the work of IRRI in the development of HYV rice seed. In contrast to 
Mainland China, the lineage between Nationalist China and Taiwanese seed breeding 
mirrors the idea of self-sufficiency through foreign partnership that would develop 
under the green revolution. In order to see this lineage we now turn to the experiences 
of India and the Philippines, which illustrate the differences in approaches to self-
sufficiency between the PRC and green revolution countries.  
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The activities of both CIMMYT and IRRI in the post-War period were not 
immediately embraced by either India or the Philippines. Both countries had only 
recently become independent with long colonial histories. American advisors 
themselves had also been wary of the manner in which overseas agricultural and seed 
breeding initiatives would take place. American geographer Carl Sauer cautioned that, 
“[t]he possibilities of improvement by selection are enormous, but such selection should 
proceed from the local materials. A good aggressive bunch of American agronomists and 
plant breeders could ruin the native resources for good and all by pushing their 
American commercial stocks” (Sauer, 1941). Nevertheless, agricultural assistance was 
carried forward in the hopes of yield increases with the paramount objective of 
achieving self-sufficiency in production for both countries. In a similar fashion to that of 
Nationalist China, seed breeding activities were a focus in India and the Philippines, with 
the same institutions providing funding and expertise.  
4.3.1. Green revolution and India’s self-sufficiency partnerships 
In India, seeds were recognized as a critical part of achieving self-sufficiency driven both 
by national government priority and the activities of the newfound post-war 
international institutions. While grain seeds are implicated in the normative objective of 
pursuing India national food security, little distinction was made in terms of their 
source; based on the normative priority of self-sufficiency in production, successive 
Indian governments established international agricultural projects including the use of 
outside germplasm resources and funding. In the mid-20th century two institutions 
served as primary interfaces between the Indian government and international 
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organizations: the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) (established prior to 
independence in 1929) and the Central Rice Research Institute (CRRI) of India 
(established in the late 1940s). Both organizations undertook internationally oriented 
projects from an early stage. During the 1950s, the Rockefeller Foundation was invited 
by the ICAR to coordinate India’s corn breeding initiatives bringing in commercial 
varieties from North America (Kumar et al., 2012). In terms of rice, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) International Rice Commission (IRC) sponsored the 
major CRRI project of the 1950s.11 The FAO financed research focused on crossing rice 
varieties at the CRRI, eventually producing varieties such as ADT 27 which was 
circulated only in parts of the country (Barker, Herdt, & Rose, 1985). However, given 
limited success, the IRC called for a broader international breeding and training 
program leading to the creation of IRRI in 1960.  
Though India undertook multiple international collaborations in the post-war 
period, self-sufficiency discourse also received a renewed focus. In the early 1960s, 
Agricultural Minister C. Subramaniam was attempting to redefine self-sufficiency in 
production by reducing reliance on the U.S. supply of food aid coming through the U.S. 
food aid bill PL 480, passed a decade before (Singh, 2008). However, the mid-1960s saw 
a major drought, making self-sufficiency in production difficult to reach and resulting in 
frequent high-level discussions between the U.S. and Indian governments regarding 
requests for food aid (Kux, 1992). Though the normative priority for Indian 
policymakers was shifting toward increased domestic production, the way to achieve 
                                                        
11 The IRC came into existence in 1948 under the FAO, with Nationalist China included among its initial members. The 
People’s Republic of China was excluded from representation. 
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self-sufficiency was very specific. Government policy focused on production but did not 
require domestically controlled inputs. Looking back, M. S. Randhawa, a senior official 
from the Punjab argued that,  
 
An outstanding achievement is attainment of self-sufficiency in food by the 
country…These [production] increases are largely due to the introduction of high-
yielding varieties of wheat, rice, pearl millet (bajra) and maize and their adaption to 
Indian conditions. Our scientists were not the mere recipients of this material but 
they improved it significantly. (Randhawa, 1979)  
 
Randhawa’s use of the term self-sufficiency required domestic production increases in 
order to meet domestic consumption, and allows for the introduction of foreign seed 
technologies for use by agronomists to meet this priority. By the early 1960s, there was 
a nationally based drive to produce domestically bred crop seeds, and multiple domestic 
seed and agrochemical companies were promoted. In 1963, a state seed research 
strategy was developed through the creation of the National Seed Corporation (NSC) 
under the Ministry of Agriculture. In subsequent years, provincial seed companies were 
also created with the aim of producing seed and extending regionally. By the mid-1960s, 
thousands of seed distribution and experimentation stations existed throughout the 
country, to varying degrees of capacity (Bell, 1965). Not only were national seed 
companies developed, but accompanying input industries supporting commercial 
growth were also put in place. This included PI Industries and Rallis, which started 
focusing on pesticide in the 1960s alongside green revolution technologies. In addition, 
private domestic seed firms began operations, including Mahyco, which began its seed 
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business in the 1960s, “start[ing] with a founding vision of changing the agricultural face 
of India and making the country self-sufficient in food production” (Mahyco, 2016). 
Though the ICAR, NSC, and private Indian actors were involved in a mission to 
increase national grain production, they quickly became involved in the transnational 
seed breeding initiatives of the U.S.-led green revolution. In 1964, the NSC’s Chairman, 
Dr. G. V. Chalam, visited IRRI, bringing back 2kg of a semi-dwarf rice variety in his 
suitcase (Rockefeller Foundation, 2016). After IRRI released its IR8 rice variety in the 
mid-1960s, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations imported 20 tons of IR8 from the 
institute by 1966. CIMMYT had also begun its formal work in India during the 1950s and 
1960s, bringing in Mexican wheat and corn varieties to be bred and planted in the 
Punjab region. Given limited foreign exchange available to import new seeds, the 
Rockefeller Foundation again financed the shipment of CIMMYT wheat (Varshney, 
1998). Rice, wheat, and corn varieties supported by transnational research and 
germplasm exchange were extended by the network of the NSC, state seed companies, 
and the State Farm Corporation of India (Singh, Pal, & Morris, 1995, 9). By the early 
1970s, the Government of India, through ICAR, had signed formal memorandums with 
both CIMMYT and IRRI focused specifically on germplasm exchange and breeding 
cooperation with a view to providing seed/inputs to increase production (CIMMYT and 
ICAR, 1972). In other words, to achieve national self-sufficiency in production, the 
Indian government did not conceive of self-sufficiency as relying solely on domestic 
resources. Rather, the primary actors of the U.S.-led food regime expanded germplasm 
and breeding technology networks within India, provided development financing, and 
attempted to shape the structure of domestic agricultural systems. 
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A crucial component of the transformation of India’s seed production and 
distribution system during the green revolution was the role of the World Bank in 
providing international finance. In 1964 the World Bank’s Bell Mission, led by Bernard 
Bell and including World Bank staff advisors along with a member of the Ford 
Foundation, undertook an evaluation of India’s agricultural development policies. The 
report criticized the NSC for a slow start, argued the need for greater investment in 
agricultural technologies, and advised that foreign multinationals were looking to 
partner in the country (Bell, 1965). India was considered the centre of operations for the 
World Bank in the 1960s and 1970s. The relationship between the green revolution and 
the World Bank was in lockstep, with the World Bank headquarters located inside the 
Ford Foundation building. World Bank staff from the time recall that they were keenly 
aware of domestic press concern about the entry of foreign ownership (World Bank, 
2006). In fact, the initial offer of the Rockefeller Foundation to bring in new seed 
technologies through CIMMYT (and later IRRI) had been met with hesitation from the 
Government of India for similar reasons (Perkins, 1990). Despite these concerns, the 
work of these organizations continued. 
World Bank lending in India focused significantly on the agricultural input sector. 
The HYV seeds of the green revolution required intensive use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides, which were unavailable at the scale needed to match the proliferation of the 
new seeds. This new demand created a surge in imports subsidized by aid, equating to 
$280 million in 1968 (Lipton & Toye, 2010). However calls for national production of 
agrochemical inputs increased, leading to the opening of further domestic chemical 
fertilizer plants, financed through foreign loans. Between 1969 and 1986, the World 
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Bank lent Southern governments US$3.4 billion to construct fertilizer plants in support 
of the new seed types, with India receiving approximately US$1.5 billion (Tomich, Kilby, 
& Johnston, 1995, World Bank, 2019). Fertilizer consumption was less than 1 million 
tons before the mid-1960s, and with the increase in HYV seeds this figure reached 12.73 
million tons by 1991 (FAO, 2005). Tomich et al. (1995, 244) argue that, “The [World] 
Bank's 1970 decision to support fertilizer investment [in the South] on a major scale was 
not related to price volatility or comparative advantage. Rather, it seems to have 
implicitly accepted the notion of self-sufficiency.” The irony of this statement is in its 
limited view of self-sufficiency as focusing solely on end production, and disregarding 
technology import and foreign debt. Loans were made more appealing by restrictions on 
foreign investment introduced in 1974, which maximized foreign ownership at 40% 
equity helping to spur further dependence on World Bank loans. India’s engagement 
with the U.S.-led food regime contributed to indebtedness to international financial 
actors and increased reliance on imported green revolution technologies (both seeds 
and agrochemicals). This stands in contrast to the case of the PRC, as we will see below.  
Emphasizing these linkages is not intended to remove agency from the Indian state. 
Indian scientists did adapt many varieties before extending them locally, and World 
Bank employees themselves recall that the government of India was able to influence 
the World Bank as well given that it was the biggest client of the time (World Bank, 
2006). However, it does serve to demonstrate that the manner in which the goal of self-
sufficiency under the green revolution was pursued had specific parameters. For the 
Indian state, the idea of self-sufficiency included a centralized seed research system with 
significant international partnerships in the development of state infrastructure, and 
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included drawing on international finance to underwrite the needed inputs. These 
developments likely resulted from long colonial relationship and historical involvement 
by foreign actors in India’s domestic governance. As a result, by the 1970s, CIMMYT 
wheat varieties, sometimes cross-bred with local landraces, were present in the vast 
majority of varietal releases (Byerlee & Moya, 1993). Though IRRI rice took longer to 
diffuse, by the 1980s, the combination of directly adopted IRRI varieties and varieties 
with IRRI ancestry accounted for over 50% of rice seed used in India (Fan, Chan-Kang, 
Qian, & Krishnaiah, 2005). Agrochemical companies financed by global capital 
supported these seeds with the inputs required in an attempt to meet the yields needed 
to achieve self-sufficiency in production. 
4.3.2. Importing green revolution in the Philippines’ self-sufficiency 
The place of rice in the Philippines was central to the national development project and 
the normative priorities of state actors. Like India, the Philippines’ approach to self-
sufficiency did not prioritize the use of domestic resources to increase production; 
rather it engaged the U.S.-led food regime to use foreign germplasm, foreign 
agrochemical inputs, development finance, and international partnerships. During the 
1940s and 1950s, attempts to increase rice production in the Philippines were focused 
on reconstruction and irrigation but not on domestic seed breeding (Hayami & Kikuchi, 
1999; USAID, 1969b). The key institutions undertaking breeding research were the 
Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) and the University of Philippines College of Agriculture 
(UPCA), with the UPCA holding partnerships with both Cornell University and the 
Rockefeller Foundation (Rockefeller Foundation, 1955). In 1957, the BPI developed one 
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key indica rice variety, BPI-76, which was extended in 1960. For its part, the UPCA had 
also bred an indica variety, C4-63, in 1962, and released it shortly thereafter. However, 
uptake of these new releases was relatively slow. In the lead up to their introduction, 
Philippines President Carlos Garcia’s 1958 inaugural address laid clear the ideational 
drivers regarding food production in the country in the wake of shortages faced during 
the Second World War, 
 
It is a strange paradox that while the basic articles in our fundamental economy are 
rice and fish, we are not self-sufficient in both from time immemorial. We have gone 
into extensive plans and schemes in industrialization, foreign exchange and similar 
matters, but we have not given sufficient thought or incentives, nor have we done 
enough to provide for the fundamental need of national life — foodstuff. In the midst 
of abundant natural resources for rice culture and fish production, we still have to 
import from abroad a substantial part of the supply to meet these absolute and 
irreducible necessities of life…never again [should we] neglect this essential side of 
our economy. (Garcia, 1958) 
 
In his address, Garcia’s self-sufficiency priority calls for an increase in national rice 
production in order to feed the Philippines’ population without the use of imports. 
Despite this stated national objective, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (1969, 1) would characterize the Philippines’ early post-war 
agricultural development programs as insufficient, stating that, “over time, the 
government's extension services became relatively emasculated.” This “emasculation” 
would serve as impetus to increase foreign collaboration in Philippine agriculture and 
seed breeding. Most notably IRRI built its headquarters outside of Manila through Ford 
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and Rockefeller Foundation funding. The institute was established with the support of 
the Philippines government and the University of the Philippines, who provided land to 
IRRI for its headquarters and experimentation fields (Chandler, 1992). The two 
foundations and the Philippines’ Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources signed 
the Memorandum of Understanding enabling IRRI’s creation in 1959. The document 
opens with a declaration that places Philippine food security squarely in the context 
U.S.-led international research efforts to address concerns regarding population growth 
and international food production,  
 
the annual supply of rice falls far short of needs in many rice-consuming countries 
and the situation is becoming increasingly serious with progressive population 
increases. In many areas rice varieties are unimproved and cultivators make little 
use of modern techniques of production with the result that yields are far below 
production potentials. In view of the importance of rice as a human food and the 
interest of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations in contributing to increasing the 
quantity and quality of available food crops for the peoples of the world. These two 
foundations and the Government of the Philippines have…decided that there is 
great need for a research institution of this character that it should be located in 
Southeast Asia, and that the Philippine Islands could provide an ideal site for its 
establishment. (MOU 1959) 
 
With the creation of IRRI, foreign researchers from the United States, Japan, as well as 
China (by way of Taiwan, as seen above) came to work in the Philippines. In addition, 
UPCA research was reoriented to serve the needs of this new institution aimed at jointly 
addressing production issues domestically and throughout Asia. However, like in India, 
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domestic production increases in the name of self-sufficiency were to be achieved using 
imported seed technologies and inputs. 
Less than a decade after Carlos Garcia’s declarations and shortly after IRRI began 
producing “miracle rice” varieties, newly elected President Ferdinand Marcos cemented 
the goal of achieving self-sufficiency in rice production, adopting and supporting the 
work of the institute. In his first “state of the nation” speech, Marcos specifically 
addressed the need for self-sufficiency in rice in view of both feeding the population and 
gaining foreign exchange through rice exports. This goal was situated within the “sacred 
and noble mission” of building the Philippine nation (Marcos, 1966). Ideological reliance 
on food production was reiterated in 1968, when food self-sufficiency was announced as 
having been achieved, “fulfill[ing] a historic dream of several generations of Filipinos 
who equated the solution of the rice problem with the nation’s self-esteem.” Other 
domestic and international observers credited the distribution of IRRI’s IR8 seeds as an 
important part of achieving self-sufficiency (Marcos, 1968).  
Whether the Philippines was ever actually able to reach self-sufficiency in the 
production of rice (and corn) is subject to debate (Cullather, 2010). Nevertheless, the 
concern for the argument at hand is the means taken in the attempt to reach this goal. 
Self-sufficiency was to be achieved through an umbrella program called the National 
Rice Program. This, and related platforms, highlight a Philippine government view of 
self-sufficiency focused on the final rice product as opposed to including the inputs to 
produce the rice itself. Marcos’ drive toward self-sufficiency was undertaken in close 
collaboration with the United States. After IR8 rice was created, using key genetic 
components imported from Taiwanese researchers involved in the JCRR, Philippines 
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national agricultural development planning focused on extending these varieties widely 
throughout the country. In particular, USAID worked with IRRI and organizations in the 
Philippines including the National Economic Commission and provincial governments to 
distribute so-called “do-it-yourself” kits to farmers. These packages contained IR8 rice, 
fertilizer, pesticide, and instructions (Moseman, 1969). Over the next years, though 
peasant-saved seeds continued to be planted, the majority of rice produced from the late 
1960s to the 1980s originated from varieties developed by IRRI.  
As in India, the Philippines’ engagement with the U.S.-led food regime resulted in 
greater U.S. structural power over the framework for agricultural development in the 
country. A study on the evolution of a village in Laguna province, where USAID’s 
SPREAD program was piloted, showed that, in 1966, wet season rice was planted solely 
to traditional varieties (with almost no dry season planting); by 1979 almost 98% of rice 
was planted to IR varieties in the wet season and all the newly irrigated dry season rice 
was planted to these breeds (Hayami & Kikuchi, 1999). In a speech to IRRI in 1972, 
Marcos himself noted that he was, “proud to say that no nation in the world has 
embraced the high yielding varieties developed by IRRI more enthusiastically than the 
Philippines. Fully sixty per cent of our rice paddies are now planted to high yielding 
varieties…As far as you can see, there is nothing but short, stiff-strawed, and non-
lodging varieties” (Marcos, 1972). Indeed, the Philippines came to heavily rely on 
elements of the U.S.-led food regime, including the seeds developed by IRRI and the 
import of agrochemicals. Extension of IRRI rice was accelerated with the Masagana 99 
campaign beginning in 1973, which was labelled a “program of national survival”, 
relying also on agrochemical inputs and rural credit (USAID, 1979). The rapid extension 
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of new IRRI rice resulted in IR36 being, “grown almost in monoculture” (IRRI, 1981). In 
this context, domestic investments in rice research capacity significantly decreased from 
the early 1960s until the mid-1980s (Revilla-Molina, 2012).  
Importantly, in addition to the internationalized germplasm and research 
activities, the agrochemicals needed to support these HYVs of rice depended heavily on 
foreign content. The agrochemicals contained in the “do-it-yourself” packets initially 
distributed by USAID were produced by a combination of multinational agribusinesses 
and the Philippine agrochemical industry. Esso Standard Fertilizer and Agricultural 
Chemical Company (ESFAC), of the Rockefeller-owned Standard Oil Company, played a 
particularly important role in producing the fertilizers and cooperating with both USAID 
and UPCA (Davide, 1969). Though efforts were made to promote national agrochemical 
production to meet fertilizer and pesticide demand, between the 1960s and 1980s, 60% 
of Philippines market share in pesticides was occupied by Shell, Bayer, and Planters 
Products (which purchased ESFAC in 1970) (Boyce, 1993). In addition, the Philippines 
began borrowing significant sums of money from the World Bank for various 
“development projects”. Bernard Bell, who had led the World Bank agricultural mission 
to India in 1964, was World Bank Director for East Asia and the Pacific by the mid-1970s 
when loans to the Philippines increased. Under Marcos, the World Bank and 
international creditors would lend significant sums of money adding to an external debt 
that roughly equalled the size of the Philippine economy by the mid-1980s, with a 
portion focused on agricultural credit and irrigation (Dohner & Intal, 1989).  
Both India and the Philippines were at the forefront of the U.S.-led green 
revolution and intimately tied to the U.S. food regime. In each instance, the content of the 
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term self-sufficiency was largely focused on attaining a level of domestic production that 
would supply domestic demand or even produce for export. In each country, self-
sufficiency goals during the green revolution did not focus on national ownership over 
or development of germplasm resources, nor did self-sufficiency goals succeed in using 
domestic capital to either finance or produce the majority of inputs required of HYVs. 
Rather, engagement with the U.S.-led food regime in the name of self-sufficiency led to 
greater structural power of the U.S. state via its influence on international organizations, 
agrochemical companies, and research institutions. This is seen in the adoption of green 
revolution technologies funded by U.S. state and private actors. The experiences of these 
countries, though similar to China in some respects, would differ drastically in their 
approach to seed breeding and agricultural inputs. I argue that this difference in 
experience has lasting effects on the way that national food security is conceived of and 
pursued by Party-state actors in the PRC. It is to the case of China that we now turn. 
4.4. China’s self-reliant green revolution 
4.4.1. The Communist Party’s self-reliance in Yan’an 
Prior to 1949, the combination of actors, financiers, and international orientation placed 
China on track to undergo a similar experience to that of green revolution countries. 
However, the rupture created by the CPC’s ascent to power in China’s civil war set the 
country on a very different course with a lasting effect on the Party-state’s views of food 
security and interaction with the global food system. The pre-1949 influence of nascent 
green revolution programs supported by various actors from the United States was 
greatly reduced as post-1949 China saw a significant change in the country’s political 
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economic relationships. Despite some initial discussion on cooperation, in 1950 the U.S. 
placed an embargo on the PRC in reaction to the Koran war and the onset of the Cold 
War (Chen, 2006). With the Nationalist Party relocated to Taiwan, receiving full U.S. 
support and retaining its seat at the United Nations, the PRC became relatively isolated 
from the previous activities of U.S. state, business, and philanthropic actors. In this 
context, the PRC underwent massive reorientation and maintained distance from the 
expanding networks and structural power of the dominant global food system during 
the U.S. food regime.  
Prior to 1949, self-sufficiency in grain production was a frequently cited goal of 
the CPC. In the mid-1940s, Mao reported from his base in Yan’an (Yán'ān, 延安) that it 
was “unnecessary to buy grain from outside [provinces]…there is no longer any doubt 
that the border region can be self-supporting in grain” (Schram, Cheek, & MacFarquhar, 
2015).12 Regardless of whether Mao’s claims were true, the idea he articulated points to 
a parallel system of self-sufficiency goals existing alongside those of the Nationalist 
ambitions to increase grain production. Among the means to achieve Mao’s early goal of 
increased grain production in mountainous central China was a focus on processes such 
as improving irrigation and to “popularize the use of superior quality seeds” (Schram et 
al., 2015, 218). In terms of seeds, Mao wrote that improved varieties could increase 
production without increasing the use of limited inputs such as farm labour and 
fertilizers. The model he discussed included taking seed varieties deemed to be 
improved, and encouraging peasants to plant them in different districts to test for local 
                                                        
12 The Yan’an era reports discussed in this paragraph are contained in the anthology of Yan’an era writings by Mao 
and senior Communist Party official compiled by Schram, Cheek, and MacFarquhar (2015). 
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suitability. Along with testing for improved seed, partnerships were initiated with 
newcomers, allowing the development of a system in which the Communist Party 
distributed “seed, plow oxen, and agricultural implements…” while promoting pig 
rearing to ensure efficient use of waste and fertilizer production (Schram et al., 2015, 
304, 307). The CPC was already beginning to develop an agricultural extension system 
under resource constraints, which included mandating the local improvement of seed 
varieties.  
This focus on self-sufficiency in agricultural production was part of a larger principle 
of “self-reliance”. Mao’s principle of self-reliance was ideological but also based in the 
material circumstances of the party at the time: economic blockade, Japanese invasion, 
conflict with Nationalists, and geographic isolation. In advocating self-reliance, he 
frequently spoke of avoiding dependence on foreign aid, particularly from the United 
States but also more generally. Of course, like self-sufficiency, claims of self-reliance did 
not necessarily translate to the full embodiment of complete isolation, as the CPC did 
continue to purchase goods from the outside and receive Soviet assistance (Kerr, 2007). 
Nevertheless, self-reliance was certainly a goal that directed various configurations of 
agricultural production during this period. Schmalzer (2016) gives one example by 
pointing to competing models of agricultural research experimented within the 
Communist Party’s base in Yan’an during the 1930s and 40s, particularly to the division 
between two academics, Xu Teli (Xú tèlì, 徐特立) and Le Tianyu (Lè tiānyǔ, 乐天宇).13 
Where Xu promoted “basic science” in agronomy, which included the use of foreign 
                                                        
13 Schmalzer notes that Le Tianyu has been incorrectly Romanized as Luo Tianyu in the past (Schmalzer 2016, 
237n27). Le Tianyu will be mentioned again below, and I have retained the correct spelling. 
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textbooks, Le focused on local production methods and peasant engagement; the latter 
of which won out due to its compatibility with “self-reliance”. The concept of self-
reliance and the importance of grain seeds continued after the CPC moved from its base 
in Yan’an to establish the PRC. Under Mao, the concepts of self-sufficiency and self-
reliance take on the meaning of a relatively strict isolation. However, the 
implementation of these ideas in Mainland China’s grain seed research differed 
significantly in practical terms from the ideas of self-sufficiency in India and the 
Philippines, where international engagement was a central component. 
4.4.2. Soviet influence and U.S. distance in 1950s agriculture 
Three months prior to establishing the PRC, Mao emphasized that China must “lean to 
one side” and ally with the Soviet Union in order to learn from their experiences. As a 
corollary, Britain and the United States, classified as “imperialists”, were not legitimate 
partners in China’s development plans. Capital injection from the United States once 
destined for Mainland China under the Nationalists was met with suspicion,  
 
supposing they might be willing to lend us money on terms of mutual benefit in 
the future, why would they do so? Because their capitalists want to make money 
and their bankers want to earn interest to extricate themselves from their own 
crisis - it is not a matter of helping the Chinese people. (Mao, 1961) 
 
The formal relationship to the West as it existed under the Nationalist government was 
no longer practicable, and the CPC began to define the PRC’s national self-interest, 
including its views of food security, in opposition to that of the United States. 
 
 116 
The implications of this initial severance were significant in terms of research 
and extension on crop seeds, including grains. The previous work of United States 
agronomists was challenged in official publications. Technicians from the newly 
reformed North China Institute of Agricultural Science (formerly the Beijing Agricultural 
Experimentation Farm) took issue with the international extension activities of the past,  
 
[b]efore this Institute took the form of a revolutionary barracks, the previous 
direction of the area’s extension of American corn seed to peasants did not bear 
fruit. American radish seeds merely produced cherry-sized roots. These seeds by no 
means went through any rigorous adaptation to local conditions; so much so that 
they were given in envelopes marked with English writing and went straight into 
farmer’s fields. Agricultural science and technology staff merely kept busy with 
calculating statistics, writing articles to send to American newspapers with grand 
statements of America’s seed productivity. This is the epitome of China’s old 
agricultural science and technology work. (Ma & Zhu, 1953) 
 
The station in question, in the Beijing area, was one visited by Roy Wiggans of the 
Cornell-Nanjing project on his tour of northern experimental stations prior to the area’s 
occupation by Japan (Shen, 2004). This statement of rejection, tainted with government 
directives of the time, critiqued U.S.-style agricultural assistance as being removed from 
the reality of farmers and an imposition of outside seeds. The direct planting of foreign 
varieties and U.S. assistance was framed as running counter to the goals of the newly 
formed PRC. 
During the 1950s, the idea of self-reliance became entangled with the economic and 
ideological relationships to the Soviet Union. This entanglement is observed in China’s 
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agricultural research of the time, particularly in the influence of the Soviet scientist 
Trofim Lysenko, who promoted a version of the peasant-led research of Ivan Michurin 
(Schneider, 2005; Schmalzer, 2016). After shunning U.S.-sponsored research activities, 
agronomic teaching was quickly replaced by the favoured biologist of the Soviet Union. 
Trofim Lysenko was president of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science, and held a 
prominent position in Soviet biology. Contrary to Mendelian genetics emphasizing 
heritable traits, Lysenko’s view was that plants change through generations based solely 
on their environment and that humans could control this environment (Schneider, 
2005). This viewpoint was brought to China and implicated in the ideals and practices 
regarding the development of improved agricultural systems, indicating that self-
reliance at the time did not discount the possibility of foreign interaction.  
At the top level of the Communist Party, Le Tianyu brought in Lysenkoism as the 
preferred philosophy of science after he gained prominence due to his self-reliant 
approach to production in Yan’an.14 In terms of applied research in plant breeding, 
influences can be seen in publications as early as 1953, when the Guangdong Agriculture 
Experiment Station began its work (Huang, 1953). By 1954, popular publications 
introduced Michurin as a model for plant breeding and promoting Lysenko’s 
interpretation of his work (Jing, 1954). Michurin, in particular, as opposed to Lysenko, 
had been embraced for his advocacy of engaging peasants in the work of seed research 
(Schmalzer, 2016). For example, in the mid-1950s, a young peasant researcher, Yang 
Minghan (Yáng mínghàn, 杨明汉), was widely praised in Chinese propaganda for his 
                                                        
14 Laurence Schneider (2005) indicates that it is difficult to tell whether Le advocated for Lysenkoism based on an 
actual appreciation for it, or whether it was simply an opportunity for him to gain power within China’s major 
institutions. For an in depth discussion of these events, see Schneider (2005). 
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practices of seed selection and for assisting the goal of increased production through 
domestic research (Biological Study Bulletin, 1955). Prior to joining Ding Ying to study 
at Huanan Agricultural University (or South China Agricultural University) (Huánán 
nóngyè dàxué, 华南农业大学), Yang wrote of reading Michurin in middle-school and 
using his works as inspiration to conduct seed breeding in his hometown (Yang, 1955). 
Schmalzer (2016) notes that many of the top scientists of the time selected peasant 
partners to work with. 
Though Lysenkoism began to be discredited in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s 
death in 1953, its stronghold in China’s academic institutions continued until the 
Qingdao conference of 1956 in which scientists expressed alternative opinions on 
genetics (Schneider, 2005). Nevertheless, the Lysenkoist practices had been mobilized 
through Mao’s influence down to the level of the commune and formed part of the 
backing for agricultural “productivity increases” in the Great Leap Forward (Dàyuèjìn, 大
跃进). The “Eight Character Charter” for agriculture (Nóngyè bāzì xiànfǎ, 农业八字宪法) 
was promoted by Mao in the mid-1950s, and emphasized eight components of 
increasing agricultural production: land, fertilizer, water, seeds, close planting, crop 
protection, tools, and management. Within the Charter, the main contribution of 
Lysenkoist thought came in the form of close planting and deep tilling, emphasizing the 
environmental factors perceived to influence yields. Despite being adopted in official 
policy of the 1950s, the extremes of Lysenkoist ideas did not always go unchallenged, 
with prominent agronomists noting issues with close planting and other practices (Ding, 
1958; Li, 2012). However, such criticism was not enough, and during the Great Leap 
Forward, peasant farmers operating under collectives were instructed by CPC cadres to 
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follow lingering Lysenkoist methods. In 1958, experimental plots around the country 
were initiated, called “satellite fields” (Wèixīng tián, 卫星田), an allusion to the Soviet 
Sputnik satellite that launched in late 1957 (Chang & Halliday, 2005, 419-420). Reports 
were released that these plots of wheat, rice, and other crops were producing 
extraordinary yields, achieved through high yield seeds, deep tilling, close planting, and 
the application of manure, in line with the Eight Character Charter slogan of the time 
(Shangai Academy of Social Sciences, 1959; Wuhan University, 1959). Of course these 
reports are now known to have been mostly false or greatly exaggerated (Li, 2012; Lu, 
2014). Though there were many contributors to the famines that killed millions during 
the Great Leap Forward, such as diversion of capital to industry, the commune system, 
bad weather, exports of grain, etc. (Manning & Wemheuer, 2011), the pinnacle of Soviet 
influence also contributed to the devastation (Schneider, 2005). 
Despite Mao’s initial emphasis on the need to introduce Soviet technology and 
know-how, the relationship was not one-directional. As early as 1950, leaders of the 
Communist Party questioned the balance of power in their relationship with the Soviet 
Union. In order to bring in Soviet industrial technology, Stalin required joint ventures 
within China to hold 50 percent ownership and for Soviet control of management 
(Zhang, 1998). As a result, the Chinese leadership “suspected that the Soviets were 
trying to take advantage of China's difficult situation…Beijing saw the Soviet leaders 
continuing to practice the old czarist ‘imperialism’ toward China” (Zhang, 1998). In 
addition, Mao’s attempt to rapidly collectivize agriculture was carried out despite 
disapproval from the Soviet Union (Hou, 2010). By 1960, the relationship between China 
and the Soviet Union had become hostile, and Soviet technical advisors left Chinese soil. 
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After 1961, translations and joint publications between Chinese and Soviet agricultural 
researchers no longer appeared in the pages of the Ministry of Agriculture sponsored 
journal, Scientia Agricultura Sinica. With the decline in soviet influence, the CPC’s 
concept of self-reliance took a further inward turn to further rely on domestic resources 
and avoid direct cooperation with the two world powers. 
4.4.3. Self-reliance in the PRC’s grain seed system 
Peasant-led seed selection was a key component of the establishment of China’s national 
seed breeding program. The national program prioritized the development of seeds with 
increased yields, particularly through the use of existing domestic germplasm resources 
and previously imported varieties. The research and extension infrastructure promoted 
in “New” China began by adapting and expanding the infrastructure left behind by the 
Nationalist government. Shen Zonghan’s vision of a national extension system had never 
been realized, but the CPC began working on this directly. The immediate goal of the 
Mao-era extension system was the collection and inventory of domestic germplasm 
resources, for which it relied on the mass-mobilization of peasants and researchers 
throughout the country. 
To carry out the national priority for self-sufficiency in food production, domestic 
institutions were devised to promote agricultural research throughout the country along 
with a system of seed proliferation. In the early 1950s, 14,000 varieties of corn were 
collected with the goal of selecting improved varieties for eventual hybridization (Sun 
1987, 174). In addition, corn and wheat varieties previously brought in through US 
partnerships, including the Cornell-Nanjing program, were used along with newly 
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catalogued domestic landraces and wild varieties. One foreign corn selection, Golden 
Queen (Jīn huánghòu, 金皇后), was planted widely in central China, reaching 55% of the 
corn area of Shanxi province (Stone, 1988). This variety was initially extended by 
Raymond Moyer and his colleagues in the 1930s as part of an American collection 
provided by Oberlin College (Shen, 2004). Though the extension system disseminated 
previously imported corn varieties in the 1950s, domestic varieties were also planted 
and extended, and the PRC launched a national corn research program mid-decade 
(Zhang & Bonjean, 2011).  
In terms of rice, there was also a renewed focus on breeding and extension. Ding 
Ying, who had promoted self-sufficiency through local rice breeding during the 1920s 
and 1930s, became the president of Huanan Agricultural Institute (Huánán nóngyè 
kēxuéyuàn, 华南农业科学院) in the early 1950s after the restructuring of Sun Yat-sen 
University. By 1956 he had officially joined the CPC, and was named president of the 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science (CAAS) (Zhōngguó nóngyè kēxuéyuàn, 中国农业
科学院) upon its creation in 1957 (World Scientific, 1981). His research team, beginning 
prior to 1949, had collected over 7,000 species of wild and landrace rice in Southern 
China (Li & Zhang, 2012). Ding Ying’s works on the archaeology and genetics of rice 
were also increasingly used to make nationalist claims about the origins of the rice 
planted in the country; the rice of China was seen as having deep roots that could not be 
unearthed from the country and was differentiated from the rice of India or Thailand 
(see Sun, 1987; World Scientific, 1981). However, as with corn, not all rice varieties 
planted in China during the 1950s were sourced from the Mainland. For example, one 
variety that was used in domestic breeding programs, Nongken58 (Nóngkěn 58, 农垦
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58), was acquired on a trade mission to Japan in 1957 when Chinese scientists in the 
delegation visited a Japanese agricultural demonstration centre (Jiangsu Province, 
1997). Nongken58 and rice with its lineage would be extended widely in southern China. 
Nevertheless, while foreign seeds were used, the actual breeding was undertaken 
domestically and extended using domestic resources. Agricultural universities were 
created from existing institutions, newly developed ones, or a recombination of the two. 
Overall, the CPC’s normative priority to ensure self-sufficiency required that significant 
material resources be devoted to collect and inventory germplasm in order to develop 
domestically controlled seeds. 
The collection of domestic germplasm resources both from landraces and wild 
varieties led to the discovery of dwarf varieties of rice resistant to lodging due to their 
short height and thicker stem. The emphasis on dwarf rice breeding in Mainland China 
had solidified by the early 1950s, with varieties being introduced as early as 1956, 
before IRRI came into existence (Sun, 1987, 146). These varieties included aijiaonante 
(Ǎijiǎo nántè, 矮脚南特), selected in 1956 and subsequently released for cultivation 
experiments. By 1965, it was being planted on 733,000ha. Other varieties include 
guangchangai (Guǎngchǎng ǎi, 广场矮) (1959) and zhenzhuai (Zhēnzhū ǎi, 珍珠矮) 
(1961). By the time IRRI had released IR8 in 1966, based in part on a dwarf variety of 
rice found in Taiwan, there were over 10 similar rice varieties bred and released on the 
Mainland (Sun, 1987, 147). The late 1950s also saw the beginning of China’s corn 
hybridization program. Corn hybridization was illegal under Lysenkoist policies of the 
Soviet Union until 1952. This was also the case in China until 1956, when domestic 
hybrid corn research began (Schneider, 2005, 157). Li Jingxiong (Lǐ jìngxióng, 李竞雄), a 
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graduate of Cornell’s plant breeding program who remained in the PRC after 1949, 
headed the research unit calling for accelerated research and extension of hybrid corn 
including the use of domestic germplasm resources (Li, 1960). In order to produce seed 
in adequate quantities, beginning in 1954, the PRC established a nation-wide 
development program for local seed fields (Zhǒngzǐ tián, 种子田) to select and multiply 
HYV seed for dissemination (Hunan, 1958; Shi & Rong, 1955; Xu, 1955). By the late 
1950s, “an extensive network of 13,669 agricultural technical stations, 1,390 seed 
stations and 1,899 demonstration and breeding stations for seed strain improvement 
had been established” (Stone, 1988). The seed breeding and distribution system in the 
PRC was becoming formalized in a way it had never been previously. The system 
promoted domestic varieties that started to take the place of farmers’ saved seed, all 
before IRRI was established. 
 In the wake of the famine following the Great Leap Forward, domestic seed 
research and extension systems were revised. In the absence of Soviet partnership, 
views of self-reliance took a stronger position against the direct use of imported 
germplasm. Paramount to views of self-sufficiency through self-reliance was the Dazhai 
(Dàzhài, 大寨) model. Dazhai was a town in Shanxi province with limited resources that 
(at least in slogan) achieved local self-sufficiency and was promoted in CPC campaigns 
(“Learn from Dazhai”) (nóngyè xué Dàzhài, 农业学大寨) as the idea to be strived for 
(Schmalzer, 2016). During this time, national self-sufficiency was to be achieved at the 
sub-national level. In other words, regions and even counties were encouraged to 
become self-sufficient within their own unit. The promotion of this model was 
motivated, at least in part, by the external threat of the United States and Soviet Union 
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from which China was now isolated (Zweig 1989, 6). For example, a village in southern 
China began receiving new rice seed varieties as a late adopter in the mid-1960s. 
Requiring heavy fertilizer application and reliable irrigation, the village had to use a 
combination of manufactured fertilizer received from the government, while also using 
local sources of nitrogen like alfalfa cover crop, co-planting water plants alongside rice, 
and using all available compost (Chan, Madsen, & Unger, 1984). Though the extension of 
seed became increasingly widespread as a mechanism to achieve local self-sufficiency, 
peasants were often reluctant to begin planting these new varieties given the proclivity 
to sudden crop failures, as described in the case of Golden Queen corn (perhaps 
strategically, given the U.S. origin of the variety) (People’s Daily, 1958). 
During the late 1960s to the late 1970s, though much of the formal education system 
and bureaucracy was disrupted due to the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, 
research and extension of new grain seed varieties often continued throughout the 
country. The  “four-level agricultural scientific experiment network” (Sì jí nóngyè kēxué 
shíyàn wǎng, 四级农业科学实验网) originating in Hunan province proliferated 
throughout the country given its local (county) level focus (Gao & Zhang, 2008; 
Schmalzer, 2016, 44). Yuan Longping’s (Yuán lóngpíng, 袁隆平) two-line hybrid rice 
varieties are perhaps the most famous examples of seed-variety diffusion as a result of 
this extension system. These high yield rice varieties would result in Yuan becoming a 
household name as China’s “father of hybrid rice” (Zájiāo shuǐdào zhī fù, 杂交水稻之父). 
In 1970, the discovery of a male-sterile variety enabled the development of this new 
breeding method. The team of researchers shared their findings and the genetic 
materials to research institutions in 13 rice producing provinces (Li, Xin, & Yuan, 2009, 
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5). Over the next several years nation-wide breeding activities took place (though 
particularly in Hunan), with experimental extension activities in place by 1974. Tens of 
thousands of research stations now existed at the local level, including seed stations 
(Zhǒngzǐ zhàn, 种子站) and units within Mao-era production brigades (Shēngchǎn dàduì, 
生产大队). To be sure, the extension system’s characteristics varied over time during the 
Mao period, nevertheless, by 1974, over thirteen million people were participating in 
extension activities or an average of almost 400,000 per administrative division 
(Schmalzer, 2016). 
As seen above, seed production, not solely in relation to rice, was considered a 
crucial component of achieving self-sufficiency. On this point, the Provincial Agricultural 
Bureau of Liaoning Province issued a statement that “seed work is the foundation of 
agricultural production, both for current production, but also to be prepared with 
extendable improved varieties for the future” (Liaoning Agricultural Bureau, 1974). By 
1978, with the country on the cusp of reform and opening (Gǎigé kāifàng, 改革开放); 
domestically bred “improved” strains of semi-dwarf rice were being planted on 80% of 
total rice area, while newly introduced hybrid rice was already being planted on 12.6%. 
Meanwhile HYVs of corn were being planted on 60% of the total area dedicated to the 
crop. For both rice and corn, the variety-types in question were being planted on less 
than 1% of the total devoted areas prior to 1949 (Stone, 1988). Traditional, farmer 
saved, varieties now occupied a minority position in terms of overall planting of grain 
seed. Though some germplasm had originated from imports, the original foreign 
varieties had been bred out domestically and were no longer being planted directly. The 
national objective of reaching self-sufficiency in production was targeted not just by 
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increasing production but also by doing so using domestic germplasm resources and 
breeding technologies. 
4.4.4. PRC interaction with the U.S.-led green revolution 
IRRI and CIMMYT varieties did arrive in China, however not through direct contact with 
the organizations. Though the work of the CGIAR institutions was initially meant to 
prevent Chinese-style revolutions in Asia, it is clear that controlling the spread of these 
technologies was not easy; for example, IRRI rice varieties became popular in North 
Vietnam (Cullather, 2010). When IRRI rice varieties made their way to Mainland China, 
it was through economic back channels. An investigative report by Australian journalist 
Richard Hughes indicated that researchers in China had received samples of the CGIAR 
varieties (particularly IR8 and Mexican wheat) through Nepal and Pakistan in 1970, 
previously having obtained samples in the late 1960s (Dalrymple, 1986, 97n37; Hesser, 
2006, 150). It was only in 1972, with the China-Philippines rapprochement, that Chinese 
officials officially acknowledged receiving samples of IRRI rice varieties from a trade 
mission to the Philippines. In this instance Ferdinand Marcos, courting closer diplomatic 
ties, provided samples of IR varieties (Karplus & Deng, 2007). China was formally 
provided with IRRI rice and CIMMYT wheat only after the development of formal 
partnerships with the organizations in 1974. Even with this limited interaction, there 
was almost no direct adoption of either institution’s grain seeds in China, either in the 
1960s/70s or beyond (as will be discussed in Chapter 5). 
Though IRRI/CIMMYT’s HYVs were not extended during this period, varieties 
developed in Mainland China also required greater water and fertilizer inputs. Most of 
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the fertilizer needed to sustain the new seeds was initially supplied through organic 
methods (manure, compost), which had been promoted by Mao since the Yan’an period 
and could be sourced locally. In the 1960s, chemical fertilizer was introduced in greater 
measure, produced on a small-scale in brigades around the country. By the 1970s, small-
scale production totalled some 2 million tons per year. Nevertheless, China was still 
reliant on fertilizer imports (mostly from Japan) to the level of 1 million tons per year. 
Examples of Japanese fertilizer use abound (Chan et al., 1984; Zweig, 1989). Beginning in 
1972, large scale factories were constructed with external engineering assistance, and 
added 4 million extra tons of production by 1980 (Barker et al., 1985).  
At the centre of the major fertilizer infrastructure purchases was the M. W. 
Kellogg Company, which had previously worked in various green revolution countries 
constructing fertilizer operations for major global chemical and agrochemical firms 
including Shell, Standard Oil, and DuPont (For Your Information, 1975). Three sets of 
contracts were devised with the M. W. Kellogg Company constructing 8 ammonia plants; 
its Dutch subsidiary (Kellogg Continental) was contracted to open an additional 8 urea 
plants. Finally, Kellogg received joint contracts in partnership with a Japanese firm, Toyo 
Engineering Corporation, for an additional two ammonia plants (Wilcke, 1973). 
Significantly, in order to settle the several hundred million dollars in costs, the 
transactions were undertaken without the use of credit. Neither commercial banks nor 
the World Bank were implicated in financing the transaction (Torbert, 1977). In the 
twilight of the Mao period, the fix of agrochemicals needed to support the newly 
disseminated seed varieties began to draw on foreign support, though still outside of the 
global credit and development finance systems.  
 
 128 
Nevertheless, the PRC was largely shut out from flows of capital and technology 
emanating from both the United States and the Soviet Union, and also from the 
international financial institutions of which it was not a member. The majority of seed 
varieties, and particularly seed breeding, was derived nationally. Between 1950 and 
1960, ten rice varieties were introduced from abroad, while the period 1960-1970 saw 
only one extra foreign variety extended into farm fields (Shen, 1980). Similarly, the 
development of domestic hybrid corn varieties meant that very few foreign varieties 
were planted directly after 1960. By the late 1970s, as domestic political transition was 
occurring in the wake of Mao’s death and Deng Xiaoping’s (Dèngxiǎopíng, 邓小平) rise to 
leadership the PRC’s seed system was already unrecognizable compared to the pre-war 
Nationalist period. Mao and the CPC had constructed a national concept of food self-
sufficiency that prioritized the development of a seed system that no longer relied on 
foreign germplasm, breeding technology, finance, or institutional partnerships. In turn, 
significant material resources were dedicated to the objective, including the 
development of seed breeding and research networks within the PRC. 
4.5. Comparing green revolutions 
4.5.1 Defining self-sufficiency: the PRC vs. India and the Philippines 
In the decades leading up to the establishment of the PRC, multiple actors from China 
and the United States were in partnership with the goal of increasing grain production 
(and other crops) in China. This goal was to be achieved in large part by improving 
agricultural inputs, using new seeds, techniques, and/or capital imported from abroad – 
particularly from the United States. The Republican government’s focus on self-
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sufficiency included regaining control of trade and developing domestic markets 
without a strong focus on or ability to control investment and technological exchange. 
With the fall of the Guomindang, many of the key individuals involved in U.S. agricultural 
partnerships moved to Taiwan, and later contributed to the development of IRRI rice. As 
the green revolution got underway, first in Mexico, and then in India and the Philippines, 
these countries focused on self-sufficiency in production as opposed to technology and 
capital transfer. In contrast, the CPC undertook a “self-reliant” approach, in part shaped 
by the Cold War context.  
 There is an important element of continuity between the U.S.-sponsored activities 
in Chinese agriculture in the pre-1949 period, and the post-war green revolution 
activities in Asia. Likewise, there are important discontinuities between the experiences 
of green revolution countries and that of China under Mao. The meaning of self-
sufficiency differed between these two versions of agricultural transformation. The 
definitions, in combination with the geopolitical and economic structure of the time 
under the U.S. food regime, produced important differences related to sources of 
germplasm and sources of finance for inputs. Table 4.1 illustrates each country’s 
differences in the international dimensions of the concept of food self-sufficiency, where 
the checkmarks are based on the analysis above. Where each country established goals 
of self-sufficiency, India and the Philippines relied significantly on international 
partnerships in their approaches to meet production targets, from germplasm to 
finance. In comparison the PRC focused not only on the goal of adequate production, but 
also on the (largely) domestic sourcing of germplasm, breeding ability, and inputs. 
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In terms of germplasm and breeding, the key difference is in the level of reliance 
on external support and the development of norms related to the adoption of seed 
varieties from abroad. In India and the Philippines, though local varieties and national 
breeding institutions existed, there was significant cooperation with CIMMYT and IRRI 
in addition to the FAO and U.S. development institutions. In each country, key grain 
varieties and chemical inputs came from abroad for use in domestic breeding programs. 
Though many domestic institutions and agronomists were involved, U.S. and 
international partnerships played a key role in directing research and extension. Private 
and public actors from the U.S. offered advice on breeding techniques, encouraged land 
reform, and emphasized the selection of specific grains suitable to these breeding 
techniques. In addition, they made parallel recommendations to introduce industrial 
agrochemicals alongside the introduction of HYVs. 
 


















PRC ✔ ✔  ✔ ✔  
India ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Phili-
ppines ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Legend: ✔ = significant presence; ✔ = moderate presence; ✔ = some presence 
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Although the PRC initially drew directly on the grain seeds left from international 
partnerships under the Nationalist government, the tendency was to move in a different 
direction. Local breeders and work units collected germplasm resources from across the 
country for exploitation, the state restricted outside varieties from coming into the 
country, and previously imported varieties ceased being directly adopted and were 
rather used for breeding after 1960 (Fan et al., 2003; Stone, 1988). Though the state did 
promote agrochemicals, the priority was on local production, relatively independent of 
outside resources. However, the PRC was not immune to the importation of fertilizer for 
use in its new input-intensive agricultural model. Among low income countries in Asia, 
China and India each accounted for the largest total amount of fertilizer imports. 
However, in a relative sense, imports were much lower for China. Between 1975 and 
1979, imports to China accounted for 18.4% of the total fertilizer used in the country 
whereas in India they represented 34.3% (Barker, Herdt, & Rose, 1985, 89). This figure 
must also be understood in the context of India’s domestic production being largely 
underwritten by World Bank loans. In the Philippines, though the total volume of 
fertilizers used was much lower, imports from foreign agrochemical firms made up a 
much larger percentage of the total, reaching 73% in the same period (Barker, Herdt, & 
Rose, 1985, 89). Further, domestic fertilizer production in China during this time was 
focused on a combination of organic sources (such as animal and green manure) in 
addition to local-scale chemical fertilizer production. This dynamic is in direct contrast 
to the sourcing of agrochemical inputs in green revolution countries, which relied upon 
a combination of foreign loans, foreign investment, and foreign imports to achieve 
desired yields.  
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I argue that these key differences mark an important divergence for the PRC in 
terms of the meaning of grain self-reliance and distance from the global food system. 
Food production, particularly in the context of rice, was put forward in each country as 
an important component of national identity and national economic development. While 
“food nationalism” was present in China, India, and the Philippines, the parameters of 
national production varied in the context of agricultural development. Each state made 
national self-sufficiency in grain production a priority as a means to feed their 
population and conserve foreign exchange. For the PRC, this developed in a broader 
period of economic isolation. As a result, discourse and action surrounding food grain 
self-sufficiency took on a unique flavour as compared to green revolution countries. Self-
reliance under strict sufficiency in agricultural production required a focus on 
ownership of and national control over each segment of the production chain, from the 
sourcing of germplasm, to the breeding and extension of new varieties, to the inputs 
used and necessity to produce enough for national consumption. As such, the grain 
varieties developed and extended during this period were considered an instrumental 
component of achieving self-sufficiency. Rice, in particular, was given the characteristic 
of being an integral part of the Chinese nation with deep historical meaning.  
The model of agricultural development undertaken by the PRC, a function of both 
ideology and material limits, was essentially autonomous from the dominant global 
political economy of the time. The PRC’s relatively strict self-sufficiency during this time 
meant that it was not a participant in the U.S. food regime. The positive power of the U.S. 
food aid system and green revolution was not successfully exerted on the PRC in the way 
it was in green revolution countries. In essence, this period marked a point at which 
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global agribusiness and financial actors made inroads in green revolution countries but 
were unable to extend networks into the PRC. The various U.S. and European companies 
and institutes involved in selling and/or extending seed and chemical inputs, along with 
commodity trading, did not regularly operate in the PRC during this period. Even when 
it did occur, agribusiness interaction of the period was conducted “cash on the 
barrelhead and [the PRC government] expressed no interest in long-term credits, even 
for large purchases such as M.W. Kellogg's ammonia plants” (Torbert, 1977, 1120).  
This self-reliant model, however, held with it an important contradiction. Though 
seeds were promoted by the state as being crucial to the development of food self-
sufficiency in a modern national economy, the large-scale extension of HYVs brought the 
beginning of a widespread displacement of local seed varieties and the dis-embedding of 
local agricultural systems. In a similar fashion to the green revolution countries, China’s 
HYVs began to take over traditional seed varieties and imposed the de facto requirement 
of farmers to source new seed to plant each year in order to achieve the promised yields. 
The key difference is that in China, the annual requirements of rice and corn seed were 
nationally developed, using domestically controlled research and extension networks. 
While this was in part made possible by the PRC’s large size and population, market size 
was of secondary importance to the priority of self-reliance, as seen in the comparison 
to other large economies like India and the Philippines. As the following chapters 
highlight, this distinction becomes important with the further commercialization of seed 
industries in the 1980s and 1990s. The gradual integration of private businesses in 
China’s domestic public seed research and extension system comes both in stark 
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contrast and striking familiarity to the privatization of the seed systems supported by, in 
large part, the CGIAR institutions. 
4.5.2 Conclusion 
Though the PRC and green revolution countries pursued similar kinds of agricultural 
development, focused on increased production, they did so with different normative 
approaches and different breeding and research networks. In the PRC, these norms and 
networks were embedded in the domestic economy rather than the global political 
economy. These factors are important for securitized foodways as they demonstrate a 
distinct historical path followed by the PRC during a key period of global food system 
expansion under the U.S. food regime. The dynamics of the Cold War and normative 
priorities of the CPC allowed the PRC domestic autonomy during a time when the U.S. 
exerted positive power on the agricultural systems of many Southern countries. This 
autonomy allowed the Party-state domestic policy space to expand independent seed 
breeding networks and state-controlled agricultural research infrastructure, at times 
with significant human costs. 
The objective of making this comparison is not to evaluate whether one approach 
or the other was better. In fact, the key similarity among each country was the use of 
HYVs and fostering dependence on the agrochemicals needed to reach promised yields. 
In addition, the spread of HYVs came at the expense of biodiversity in each country, and 
the planting of monoculture in various areas. Rather, the comparisons above establish 
the key areas of difference in the Party-state’s conceptualization of self-sufficiency in the 
context of grain seed research and extension. While some historical research situates 
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China simply as the foil for the U.S.-led green revolution, the dynamics within the PRC 
were unique and differentiated in important ways both from the path that might have 
been taken under the Nationalist government and the path that was taken in comparison 
to India and the Philippines.  
Surely the agricultural transformation in the PRC was influenced in part by 
foreign practices; however, there were also substantial barriers to the expansion of 
networks by agribusiness, international organizations, and U.S. philanthropic 
organizations. This distinction is important as it points to a shortcoming in scholarship 
of the U.S. food regime. During the post-war period, the key food regime dynamics were 
the expansion of US food aid, agricultural capital, and technology transfer (Friedmann, 
1982). As shown above, this set parameters on the exercise of national self-sufficiency in 
developing countries. However, the case of China operates largely in parallel to the 
second food regime without becoming a part of it.15 Food regime scholarship has always 
claimed not to encompass all aspects of the global food system (Friedmann & McMichael, 
1989; McMichael, 2009); however, the absence of discussion pertaining to China during 
the second food regime is conspicuous given the context of the contemporary global 
political economy and the historical leaning of food regime analysis.  
The importance of the concept of self-sufficiency was not unique to the CPC, as 
the Nationalist Party had also attributed importance to domestic grain production. 
However, the CPC leveraged the Republican Party’s international collaborations by 
framing self-reliance in opposition to unbridled cooperation and expanded the 
                                                        
15 The PRC did import wheat on several occasions, equaling only a small percentage of overall production, while 
continuing to export rice. Equaling a relatively small amount of 4-5 million tons per year, these imports came, “mostly 
from Canada, Australia, Argentina and France” (Mah, 1971). 
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parameters of the concept to ownership over research and extension. For the Party-
state, this period reinforced a foundational national priority regarding control over grain 
production, from research and extension, to seed inputs, to imports, to agricultural 
capital. As a result of this priority, national agricultural activities received frequent 
rhetorical focus, and significant national resources were devoted to pursuing self-
reliance at each step of production. Further, the PRC separated itself from the structural 
power of the U.S. food regime, allowing the PRC to develop autonomy from the 
contemporaneous power dynamics of the global food system. The Party-state began to 
establish its own domestically controlled networks of research facilities, including the 
extension of domestically developed grain seed varieties by provincial and local 
research units. This level of autonomy and the creation of national networks serve as a 
key point of departure for explaining the trajectory of the PRC within the contemporary 
global food system. The next chapter delves into a period of enormous change in the 
global political economy; however, the experiences explored in this chapter continue to 




Chapter 5: China’s Domestic Seed Industry 
and Global Agribusiness 
5.1. Introduction 
Since the late 1970s, China’s grain seed system has not escaped the economy-wide re-
orientation toward interaction with the global economy. In an environment of renewed 
international engagement, the concepts of grain self-sufficiency and self-reliance were 
faced with new challenges. No longer was Party-state control over the grain seed 
industry guaranteed through state ownership, (mostly) closed borders, and small 
volumes of state-mediated trade. Instead, new states, enterprises, foreign agribusiness 
actors, and technologies interacted with the PRC. These dynamics set the domestic seed 
system on course to develop into a commercially oriented seed industry, eventually on a 
global scale. I argue that the concept of self-reliance was adapted to the context of 
greater interaction, leading to a policy focus on national control over the domestic seed 
industry and global competitiveness of national agribusiness firms. In acting on this 
priority, the Party-state exercises ideational and structural power over the domestic 
market by influencing agribusiness priorities and the structure of industry.  
The domestic component of securitized foodways explains the contemporary Party-
state’s policy approach to national food security through pursuing self-reliance in the 
global economy. Self-reliance is maintained by carving out domestic policy space that 
allows state and private actors from the PRC to retain ownership of, and technology 
used by, grain seed enterprises. In the seed system created during the Mao period, 
thousands of work units (along with research institutions) across the country carried 
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out seed research and extension as opposed to centralized state or private enterprises. 
The sections below will examine the networks of these thousands of work units that 
were transformed into thousands of small seed enterprises. Further, the policy priorities 
of the Party-state act to maintain and create space for the national seed industry to exist 
and form, making it difficult for MNCs to establish joint ventures with immediately wide-
reach. These policy priorities, supported by the normative objective of the Party-state, 
reveal both the change and continuity in the practice of national food security and 
concept of grain self-reliance in the global economy. 
More generally, this chapter demonstrates why and how the structure of the 
contemporary grain seed industry in the PRC currently diverges from the trend of MNC 
consolidation since the 1970s. Building on its autonomy from the structural power of 
the U.S.-led food regime, the PRC began to refashion its domestic institutions in the late 
1970s to interface with global agribusiness. Not only were domestic institutions 
modified, but also the meaning of the Party-state’s national priority of self-sufficiency 
through self-reliance was reconstructed. Rather than pursuing self-sufficiency through 
enforcing hermetically sealed technological development, self-reliance was reoriented to 
accommodate increased international trade and investment in the agricultural sector. 
The key continuity for the CPC was the imperative of national control over seed 
enterprises through domestic ownership, despite increased global economic 
engagement.  
Building on this strong ideational orientation, Party-state control over the grain seed 
industry is made possible by the additional power dimensions at play in securitized 
foodways. The negative power of the PRC in the post-war period led to the absence of 
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international organizations and foreign investment during the green revolution, which 
disconnected China from the global food system emerging in the 1980s. This early 
autonomy allowed for the development of policy space focused on financially, 
technologically, and geographically limiting inward MNC agribusiness investment.  
Further, the networks of decentralized seed research and extension organizations of the 
Mao period provided a base upon which seed enterprises could develop and expand 
within the PRC. Together, these dynamics contribute to China’s securitized foodways in 
the global political economy.  
To develop these points, this chapter contains four sections. I first provide a brief 
overview of the initial steps that the PRC took towards re-engaging the United States in 
terms of agricultural cooperation, and re-conceptualizing grain self-reliance through 
self-sufficiency. I subsequently investigate the linkages between the PRC’s current 
domestic seed industry and global agribusiness, including the types of domestic seed 
firms in the PRC, existing joint ventures with major global seed companies, and the 
policies that govern seed industry change. Finally, I turn to an empirical example of 
domestically engineered, GM rice and its path to domestic commercialization. This 
example will illustrate the factors at play in this chapter, and point to a critical area of 
difficulty faced by contemporary economic nationalist policies; the use of foreign 
patents to develop “national” agricultural technology create potential limits on control 
through ownership.  
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5.2. Developing a seed industry in the PRC 
5.2.1. Self-reliance and re-engagement with U.S-led green revolution 
actors 
During the 1970s, the world’s largest agrochemical, pharmaceutical, and seed 
companies underwent a series of mergers and acquisitions (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). 
This transformation began during the green revolution, and the U.S.-centred food regime 
(Friedmann, 1982). During the same period there was increased discussion of “food as a 
weapon” in American policy circles (Zhang, 2018). Prior to the World Food Conference, 
and in the wake of the global food crisis, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency produced a 
report stating that, “Without indulging in blackmail in any sense, the United States 
would gain extraordinary political and economic influence [through control of food 
supply]. For not only the poor LDC’s [lesser-developed countries] but also the major 
powers would be at least partially dependent on food imports from the United States” 
(Weinstein, 1975). While President Gerald Ford declared that the U.S. would not use 
food as a weapon against the Soviet Union, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz continued 
to refer to the use of “agripower” and the advantage of dependence on US grain exports 
as a mechanism to increase compliance: 
 
Other nations, too, are getting their lifelines extended right into our markets, in 
that they must have U.S. food on a continuing basis. That means they don't want 
even a one years' interruption of supply. It is one thing to depend on the U.S. 
market for steel products or airplanes. You can postpone purchases for a year if 
you need to.  But if you're building up your livestock population - as they are in 
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Yugoslavia or Poland or Iran - based on a continuing flow of feed grains and 
protein supplement from the United States, you simply want to maintain 
reasonably amicable relationships to keep that lifeline open. (U.S. News & World 
Report, 1976) 
 
This statement points directly to the type of structural power held by the United States 
in the global food system and the use of food for national security via the extension of 
lifelines into other countries. As discussed in Chapter 4, China was largely independent 
of the international grain seed research of the green revolution until the mid-1970s, and 
was also independent of the flow of US grain exports to the global South. However, the 
PRC was by no means agnostic to the concept of U.S. agri-power. In 1974, only three 
years after the PRC was recognized at the United Nations, future president Deng 
Xiaoping addressed the U.N. General Assembly. There, he gave a definition of self-
reliance, which consciously opposed the structural power of the United States in global 
agricultural markets: 
 
By self-reliance we mean that a country should mainly rely on the strength and 
wisdom of its own people, control its own economic lifelines, make full use of its 
own resources, strive hard to increase food production and develop its national 
economy step by step and in a planned way…each country should work out its own 
way of practising self-reliance in the light of its specific conditions…Self-reliance in 
no way means “self-seclusion” and rejection of foreign aid. We have always 
considered it beneficial and necessary for the development of the national 
economy that countries should carry on economic and technical exchanges on the 
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basis of respect for state sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and the 
exchange of needed goods to make up for each other’s deficiencies. (Deng, 1974) 
 
This statement rebukes the idea of control over the flow of food as a tool of power over 
national economies, while emphasizing the need to secure the PRC’s own economic 
lifelines at a time when greater economic exchange was beginning. During the same 
period, researchers from around the world began receiving access to study China’s 
agricultural system through invited/guided visits to the country. Several months after 
Deng’s speech at the United Nations, a U.S. Plant Studies Delegation visited several 
Chinese cities. The delegation included green revolution leader Norman Borlaug, 
Rockefeller Foundation Vice President Sterling Wortman, as well as the Director General 
of IRRI, and involved seed exchange with representatives of China’s national academies, 
including IRRI rice (Wortman, 1975). Additional missions from the FAO, IRRI, and 
CIMMYT, gained in frequency during the late 1970s (FAO, 1980, 49-50). 
The PRC’s domestic seed industry began to further exchange with the global seed 
research system of the green revolution. A critical example of this new context is the 
International Rice Research Workshop. October 1979 saw the first concrete interactions 
with the green revolution actors that had left China thirty years before. CAAS and IRRI 
jointly hosted this workshop in the southern city of Guangzhou. Almost four decades 
after supporting James Yen’s Rural Reconstruction movement, the Rockefeller 
Foundation made a small return to agriculture in China by financing the event, with 
additional funds from the United Nations Development Program. Though IRRI seeds had 
previously entered China on several occasions, it marked the organization’s first official 
activity in the country. The event was hosted at the Guangdong Academy of Agricultural 
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Sciences (Guǎngdōng nóngyè kēxuéyuàn, 广东农业科学院), the alma mater of former 
CAAS president Ding Ying. Familiar characters were in attendance including T. T. Chang, 
who had studied at Nanjing University with Shen Zonghan and later worked at IRRI, and 
the PRC’s lead hybrid rice researcher, Yuan Longping. This event marked the beginning 
of new international networks being created in the PRC’s grain seed industry, and 
renewed exchange of germplasm resources and breeding technologies. 
The October 1979 workshop took place as Deng Xiaoping promoted the “four 
modernizations” (Sì gè xiàndàihuà, 四个现代化) slogan in national policy discourse and 
direction. Agriculture was Deng’s primary focus for modernization, in addition to 
prioritizing industry, national defence, and science and technology. Top scientists from 
the PRC speaking at the workshop dutifully referenced Deng’s slogans, and encouraged 
specific priorities for seed breeding. In a speech that marked a turning point in the way 
that agricultural self-reliance would be perceived in the PRC, CAAS vice president He 
Guangwen (Hé guāngwén, 何光文) told the room of foreign participants that, “to realize 
agricultural modernization, [China] must not only work hard, we must also seriously 
study and learn from the advances and experiences of other countries” (He, 1980, 3). 
The PRC’s agricultural pursuits were being aligned with those of industrialized countries 
with a willingness to bring in foreign technology.  
 As argued in Chapter 4, under Mao, the grain seed system was built principally 
using the genetic resources available within the country including those legacy 
collections of foreign specimens from Nationalist China. In the 1980s, self-reliance 
would continue rhetorical prominence, though with a more distinct focus on 
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international engagement. As Shen Jinhua (Shěn jǐnhuá, 沈锦骅), a plant breeder from 
CAAS, stated in a prepared speech,  
 
we must further collect genetic resources, both indigenous and foreign cultivars 
and wild species, and strengthen our genetic evaluation and utilization 
program…we must further strengthen cooperation with international agencies 
such as the International Rice Research Institute, with Japan, and with Southeast 
Asian countries to expand the scope of scientific discussions, technical cooperation, 
and exchange of genetic material and experiences. Such cooperation will enhance 
the development of rice breeding and rice production, both in China and the rest of 
the world. (Shen, 1980, 30) 
 
This statement has several important points regarding the concept of self-reliance in 
food security: the PRC’s seed research system was to 1) re-engage in international 
technical cooperation; 2) promote exchange and develop germplasm resources; and 3) 
maintain China’s distinct place in comparison to the “rest of the world”.  
5.2.2. Seed businesses, outside examples, and domestic regulation 
In assessing China’s agricultural transformation during the 1980s, much focus has been 
placed on the important changes that took place in terms of agricultural land and 
production rights during this time. The household responsibility system was introduced 
in the late 1970s, and farmland was decollectivized in the early 1980s, with agricultural 
production increasing significantly (Nolan, 1988; Lin, 1991). What most explorations of 
this time have not dealt with is the place of seeds within these reforms and subsequent 
increase in grain production (for an exception, see Lin, 1991). The statements made at 
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the CAAS-IRRI conference above hint at the form of these changes. In November of 1977, 
just as Deng was assuming de facto leadership of the CPC, the State Planning Committee 
(Guójiā jìhuà wěiyuánhuì, 国家计划委员会) issued a policy statement that affirmed the 
role of seeds in the changes to come, 
 
Agricultural policy…must strengthen seed research. Seeds degrade easily, so we 
must have a resource base. Capitalist countries have seed companies that sell to 
farmers. Seeds need constant research and continuous renewal, requiring strong 
measures [to achieve this]. (Zhang, 1984, 2) 
 
This statement made an unlikely comparison. It looked toward the method of seed 
research and distribution in “capitalist countries” (Zīběn zhǔyì guójiā, 资本主义国家) as 
a potential pathway toward strengthening China’s agricultural base. Deng linked this 
more explicitly to the United States in 1978 during a visit to Sichuan province, when he 
stated that, “Seeds are very important. We must establish a seed-breeding base of 
operations… America has seed companies, and every year they produce seeds for sale” 
(Guo, 2014, 123). Deng was introducing an industrial and commercial perspective of 
agricultural production, one based on a specialized supply chain. For Party-state policy, 
the concept of agricultural self-reliance would now also differentiate between 
specialized components that make up the national food supply, with the seed industry at 
its core. The decentralized landscape of seed research and extension in the previous 
period gradually moved towards a loosely coordinated network of seed enterprises and 
research institutions, conscious of the global agribusiness landscape. 
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This nationally focused system did not abandon the normative priority of self-
reliance by opening to unchecked foreign investment in the seed industry as occurred 
elsewhere in the world. Rather, the Party-state exercised structural power over its 
domestic economy by refashioning domestic institutions to interface with global 
agribusiness without rapidly liberalizing as occurred elsewhere at the time (Nolan, 
2012). In 1978, the Party-state established its first national state-owned seed enterprise, 
China National Seed Group Corporation (CNSGC) (Zhōngguó zhǒngzǐ jítuán gōngsī, 中国
种子集团公司). The domestically focused company was created under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and overseen by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture. It was charged with 
carrying out modernization policy, to increase seed production specialization, 
mechanization, standardization, and varietal regionalization. The central government 
also built on the existing seed extension system in communes put in place during the 
Mao period, providing provinces with additional funding to establish or expand seed 
stations that extended new varietals and carried out new agricultural directives (Jiangsu 
Province, n.d.).  
Reference to outside seed research and production systems resulted in greater 
activity comparing China’s seed system to those in other countries. Throughout the 
1980s, the extension system began reaching out to international models for formal 
comparison. Fan (1982) gave an early overview of the U.S. extension system, placing 
emphasis on the country’s ability to produce its own seed varieties both through state 
and business institutions, and on the role of agriculture in the U.S.’s early state 
formation. While Fan (1982) didn’t acknowledge a specific comparison or takeaway to 
be gleaned from reviewing the American system (though this was implied), further steps 
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were taken for more direct comparisons in subsequent years (Liu, 1987). These studies 
bore a remarkable resemblance to the papers published by Shen Zonghan forty years 
prior in Republican China given their broad examination of U.S. models. Now, the Party-
state’s shifting orientation regarding interaction with the global economy opened up 
possible new ways of organizing the national seed industry.  
The new official focus on outside technologies also spurred research into the 
major agribusiness changes occurring outside China, as global seed and chemical 
companies began a rapid series of mergers and acquisitions in the early 1980s. 
Researchers in the PRC began examining the changing structure of the global seed 
industry, taking stock of the rise of companies like Dupont Pioneer, their commercial 
practices, and the technologies they employed (Gao, 1983; Wu, 1980; Zhang & Gao, 
1982). These observations were disseminated to a specialized readership that had been 
less familiar with the operations of foreign agribusiness. As such, Party-state actors were 
increasingly informed about the developing reach and consolidation of foreign 
agribusiness at the time. In the late 1970s, state delegates were visiting agribusiness and 
chemical operations abroad. On a first visit to the United States, Deputy Minister Liu of 
the CNSGC led a delegation of grain seed experts to explore American practices, 
including to the labs of DeKalb (Salina Journal, 1979). As CNSGC transformed into 
China’s largest seed enterprise, it embarked on some 170 “business 
contacts/professional networks” (Yèwù liánxì, 业务联系) in over 50 countries (Ye, 
1983). In 1981, a further Chinese petrochemical delegation visited Monsanto, which had 
not yet acquired DeKalb (Song & Zong, 1982). The pattern of foreign engagement 
marked a significant reorientation from the relative isolation of the seed industry and 
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keen interest by actors from the PRC in the operations of foreign agribusiness and 
chemicals. With these actions in mind, the statements made by PRC representatives at 
the 1979 CAAS-IRRI workshop mentioned above were followed up in relatively short 
order. 
Despite international engagement, the PRC’s grain seed industry remained almost 
completely domestically owned and controlled. In the 1980s and 1990s, other Southern 
countries underwent structural adjustment at the behest of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, often resulting in greater investment liberalization of the 
seed and agrochemical sectors in the 1980s and 1990s (ESCAP, 2007). However, the 
PRC’s interactions with the international financial institutions were much different 
(Jacobson & Oksenberg, 1990).16 Having been excluded from the U.N. system until 1971, 
China did not become a member of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
until 1980. A Senior Officer of the World Bank in China during the 1980s, Paul Cadario, 
indicated, “conditionality was not something you did in China” (Cadario, 2013, 50). In 
other words, at least in part because China did not have significant debt to the 
international financial institutions, no macroeconomic policies could be imposed on the 
PRC. Though the government did take on agricultural development loans in the 1980s 
(Brautigam, 2015, 42), the purpose for engaging with the international financial 
institutions was to access international technology and learn competitive bidding 
                                                        
16 In 1988, India’s seed law began a series of reforms at the same time as its structural adjustment program. Though it 
was understood that the Indian state continued to place rhetorical priority on self-sufficiency, and claimed self-
sufficiency was achieved through the CIMMYT and IRRI varieties of wheat and rice, reforming the seed law would 
open the door to multinational control of the commercial seed industry (Bhattacharjee, 1988; Pray, 1990). The 
Philippines similarly expanded access to its seed industry in a 1992 reform to its seed law, a foreign company could 
now invest at 100% ownership, however within 30 years, 60% of the ownership stake must be transferred to 
“Philippines citizens” (Marcos, 1973; Sudan Tribune, 2016). 
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processes (Cadario, 2013, 51-52). As a result, the pressures faced by green revolution 
countries to open for foreign investment in the 1980s and 1990s did not come to bear in 
the same way on the PRC’s seed market as the Party-state largely retained control over 
its ability to set policy. This dynamic was made possible by the PRC’s historical 
autonomy from global capital and agribusiness. 
In practise, the structure of a newfound grain seed industry began to take shape 
within the PRC. During the 1980s, township and village enterprises were created from 
former communes and work brigades. As seen in Chapter 4, a substantial number of 
communes and brigades throughout the country had units focused on seed research, 
extension, and production. The commercialization of these units saw the gradual 
proliferation of state-owned seed enterprises and the creation of research institutes 
conducting seed breeding activities across the country (see Fan, Qian, & Zhang, 2006, 
35-36). By 1982, over 2285 state seed companies already existed in the PRC at the local, 
provincial, and national levels and would later expand in number (Ye, 1983). These 
companies had been selected by sub-national governments as the first to operate 
outside of the planned economy as the central government gradually allowed the 
introduction of for-profit local enterprises. Some of these enterprises represented seed 
organizations that had been in development since the 1950s, while others were newly 
created entities (Zhang, 1984). As seed work (Zhǒngzǐ gōngzuò, 种子工作) continued, 
and both state-owned and private enterprises proliferated, the number of companies 
expanded during the 1980s and 1990s to reach over 10,000. By comparison, in the 
1990s less than ten seed companies controlled over two thirds of the U.S. field crop seed 
market (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004, 27). 
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Ownership of these companies was in the hands of various levels of government, and 
the seed varieties that these institutes and state companies worked with were largely 
based in domestically collected germplasm. However, in the wake of the 1979 IRRI 
conference, collaboration with IRRI and CIMMYT accelerated. These partnerships 
represented a new way of approaching seed research, and food security by formally 
including foreign ideas and resources. Both IRRI and CIMMYT germlines were used in 
China’s wheat, corn, and rice breeding. Despite frequent collaboration and resource 
exchange, direct adoption of international public germplasm resources was strictly 
avoided. Table 5.1 compares the degree of adoption of IRRI rice varieties in China and 
India during the 1980s and 1990s (Fan, Chan‐Kang, Qian, & Krishnaiah, 2005, 374). In 
India, an early adopter of the CGIAR institutions’ germlines, most IRRI rice planted was 
either directly adopted or introduced into breeding research. In China, on the other 
hand, IRRI varieties have very seldom been used through direct adoption, and were 
rather incorporated into domestic breeding programs. As Table 5.1 demonstrates, 
rather than adopting seed directly, IRRI samples were used as restorer lines, bred into 
domestically developed varieties. The discouragement of directly adopting outside rice 
varieties favoured the use of domestic breeding programs, encouraging researchers to 
both use foreign germplasm and undertake further research. 
Wheat seeds from CIMMYT had a similar trend, with very little direct adoption, 
though much greater cross-breeding with local varieties (He & Rajaram, 1997). This 
example illustrates the limits put on external technological engagement within the PRC’s 
domestic seed industry. Though government policy emphasized the need to access 
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foreign germplasm and technologies, this was to be done without directly relying on 
seed sourced from abroad. 
 
   Table 5.1 Percentage rice area planted with IRRI ancestors in China and India 
Year 
China India 
Direct adoption IRRI ancestry Total IRRI Direct adoption IRRI ancestry Total IRRI 
1981 0 23.0 23.0 - - - 
1982 0.2 23.9 24.1 - - - 
1983 0.1 29.3 29.4 - - - 
1984 0.1 36.0 36.1 - - - 
1985 0.0 38.7 38.7 - - - 
1986 0.2 45.3 45.5 - - - 
1987 0 49.6 49.6 - - - 
1988 0 58.8 58.8 - - - 
1989 0 56.2 56.2 - - - 
1990 0 62.6 62.6 - - - 
1991 0 64.9 64.9 23.2 38.8 62.0 
1992 0 58.9 58.9 34.7 34.0 68.7 
1993 0 54.7 54.7 21.0 41.6 62.6 
1994 0 53.0 53.0 25.0 30.3 55.3 
1995 0 53.6 53.6 20.8 37.3 58.1 
1996 0 41.1 41.1 24.4 35.3 59.8 
1997 0 36.8 36.8 21.9 41.7 63.5 
1998 0 30.5 30.5 18.7 44.5 63.3 
1999 0 27.2 27.2 15.3 44.8 60.1 
2000 0 18.7 18.7 14.5 43.9 58.3 
   Source: from Fan et al. (2005, 374) 
 
Rather, externally sourced seed was used to expand on domestic breeding programs 
focused on continued research and extension of hybrid seed that began development 
under Mao. In the 1980s and 1990s, the HYVs of corn and rice discussed in Chapter 4 
were extended even more widely. Hybrid corn seed now accounts for almost all of the 
planted corn in the PRC (i.e., over 99%), with the exception of areas in the mountainous 
Southwest where hybrid adoption is lower but remains over 50% (Meng, Hu, Shi, & 
Zhang, 2006, 38). Hybrid rice has expanded to reach approximately 50% of all rice area 
in the PRC, while “improved” varieties make up most of the remainder (Peng, Tang, & 
Zou, 2009). This pattern bears a striking resemblance to green revolution countries, as 
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HYVs have taken over, requiring continuous sourcing of seeds and chemical inputs from 
outside the farm. The vast majority of grain seeds were delivered to farmers through 
domestically owned seed companies and associated research institutions (Chen, Shelton, 
& Ye, 2011, 86).  
However, as Fan et al. (2006) note, initial attempts to re-design the extension 
system to create commercially oriented state-owned enterprises in the 1980s had varied 
impacts. Though seed enterprises expanded into the thousands, this period is noted for 
its corruption. Within state seed companies of the time, friends and kinship networks 
generally profited from newly commercialized seed enterprises.17 The 
commercialization of seeds also impacted the goal of extension work. Some extension 
workers active at the time now question the motivations and techniques that arose from 
this period. Rather than working with farmers to focus on traditional cultivation 
techniques the new extension system became focused on selling chemical products.18 
While seed enterprises have continued to evolve over time, the “reformed” extension 
system continues to be known for its focus on agrochemical sales to make up for budget 
shortfalls due to reductions in state funding (Peng et al., 2009, 6). In fact, in an attempt 
to generate profits, research institutes also began purchasing real estate and opening a 
variety of non-agriculture enterprises since the 1980s (Pray, 2001). Though the CPC has 
tremendous influence, it does not always have instrumental power over all actors within 
China. As such, though priorities and policies exist to shape the seed industry and 
national food security, in practice results have varied over time. Nevertheless, the Party-
                                                        
17 Interview, Beijing, November 2015.  
18 Interview, Hong Kong, October 2015. 
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state holds structural power over the laws and regulations within China, shaping the 
framework for the seed industry in conformance with the normative priority to both 
engage international agro-industry while maintaining domestic control over the seed 
industry. 
In the 1990s, the legal infrastructure for enterprises became more defined, and 
newfound domestic agribusinesses began focusing on specialty seed sales (Fan et al., 
2006). At the same time, the PRC was faced with changing diets and increased imports 
(as will be further discussed in Chapter 6). Given the sudden increase of imports, 
principally soybean, the State Council issued a white paper in 1996 defining national 
grain self-sufficiency as producing 95% of food grains, though in practice the target has 
shifted (Schneider, 2014a; State Council of the PRC, 1996). This policy guideline 
included clauses on the advancement of the national “seed project” to introduce new 
high-yielding varieties with greater yield and environmental resistance (State Council of 
the PRC, 1996). In 1997, the central government allowed state-owned companies to be 
listed on domestic stock exchanges, resulting in multiple large seed enterprises going 
public, while continuing to be majority-owned by the State. During this period, grain 
seeds developed and sold in China remained mostly state-owned, in contrast to other 
countries in Asia. For example, corn seed sold in China in the late 1990s was 100% from 
state organizations, whereas in Asia more broadly during this time, 89% of corn seed 
was sold by private enterprises, including 66% by multinationals (Gerpacio, 2001, 33). 
In terms of overall agricultural research, private research in China accounted for only 
3% of total agricultural research spending and typically came from a small number of 
foreign joint ventures, a figure much smaller than Asian counterparts (Pray & Fuglie, 
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2001). The seed system, now with thousands of domestic enterprises, remained 
nationally controlled with very little foreign presence. 
The major change in the rules governing the domestic seed industry arrived in the 
year leading up to the PRC joining the WTO. In 2000, the Seed Law was put in place, 
laying the contemporary framework for the way seeds in China would be produced and 
sold. The Seed Law reaffirmed the Central Government’s role in the seed system, 
declaring that “the State has sovereignty over germplasm resources”, including the right 
to approve or deny outgoing and incoming germplasm (National People’s Congress, 
2000, Article 10). Importantly, it also allowed for private grain seed companies to be 
established, beyond the profit-oriented activities of state-owned seed companies at the 
national, provincial, and local levels (Karplus & Deng, 2007, 81). Previously, such private 
operations had been restricted to vegetable seeds (Koo, Pardey, Qian, & Zhang, 2003, 
10). From the point of view of major global agribusiness, the USDA argued that this law 
better suited US interests than previous draft versions of the law, stating that 
multinational agribusiness lobbying resulted in broader scope of access to China’s seed 
market (Kameny, 2000). However, despite the greater foreign access to PRC markets, 
the Seed Law maintained certain elements of control.  
Further examples of state control over the domestic seed market include provisions 
that seeds produced in foreign countries cannot be sold in the PRC, foreign test crops 
cannot be sold commercially in China, and the State Council (Guówùyuàn, 国务院) 
retains prerogative in assessing foreign imported seeds, including GM seeds (Kameny, 
2000; National People’s Congress, 2000). The Party-state took this approach to allow for 
continued structural power over key dimensions of the interface between the domestic 
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and global grain seed market by limiting direct access to the market and through 
establishing regulatory organs of the State Council, including the State Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (Guójiā zhìliàng jiāndū jiǎnyàn jiǎnyì 
zǒngjú, 国家质量监督检验检疫总局) which enforces phytosanitary measures at the 
border (Augustin-Jean & Alpermann, 2013). Further, the declaration of state sovereignty 
over germplasm resources conceptually ties seeds directly to the notion of sovereignty, 
indicating their priority status for the Party-state. 
The legacy of the Mao period was a highly decentralized seed system independent of 
global agricultural capital with already expanding circulation of domestically developed 
HYVs. While the PRC began to engage with major global research and agribusiness 
actors, Party-state policy began to reflect a modified concept of self-reliance focused on 
control over the domestic seed industry. To maintain control, the Party-state employed 
structural power over the domestic economy by imposing limits on the level and content 
of foreign engagement in the seed industry and by keeping seed industry enterprises 
under the purview of the state. By the early 2000s, the contemporary seed industry of 
the PRC began to take shape. The relationship between public/private and 
domestic/foreign seed enterprises became more complex, though still beginning from a 
highly fractured starting point. The following section will examine the parameters put in 
place to maintain ownership control over the PRC’s domestic grain seed market, and the 
subsequent pattern of investment from agribusiness MNCs. 
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5.3. China’s national seed industry 
5.3.1. Developing a seed industry through Party-state priority and policy 
Though the PRC’s seed industry is now commercially oriented and globally connected, 
the underlying objective of maintaining national food security remains. However, rather 
than pursuing national food security through strict self-sufficiency, the concept now 
takes on a paradoxically global dimension. No longer is the objective to pursue a base of 
seed operations largely removed from the global economy. Rather, it is to maintain 
national ownership over the companies that produce and sell seeds along with the 
intellectual property that underpins these activities, while also ensuring that global 
agribusinesses are limited in the domestic market. In pursuing national food security in 
a global context, Party-state policy seeks not only to maintain national control of the 
domestic seed industry but also to develop globally competitive agribusiness 
enterprises that control supply chains abroad.19 
These objectives are found embedded in Party-state policy aimed at developing 
seed companies that can compete with global agribusiness actors. In 2011, the State 
Council published a directive on building a national seed industry, pushing a new central 
government priority of seed industry consolidation. The directive begins by declaring 
that: 
 
China is an agricultural and seed-using power. The crop seed industry is a national 
strategic and core industry, and is fundamental to promoting stable, long-term, 
                                                        
19 For a broader discussion and critique of China’s “National Champions”, see Nolan, 2012. 
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agricultural development and ensuring national food security. (State Council of the 
PRC, 2011) 
 
The directive establishes goals for the seed industry to promote competitiveness in 
commercial seed breeding and sales. While international cooperation is referenced, the 
objective is to arrive at independent innovation (Zìzhǔ chuàngxīn, 自主创新) for Chinese 
companies and to establish independent intellectual property rights (Zìzhǔ zhīshì 
chǎnquán, 自主知识产权) (State Council of the PRC, 2011). The policy document 
highlights how the concept of self-reliance has shifted over the last decades, clearly 
toward commercial orientation, but retaining national control in this new global context. 
The way in which commercial seed varieties are sourced for sale offers an entry point 
into the structure of China’s contemporary seed industry.  
Seed companies in China currently source their seed varieties through several 
development channels. These channels shape the current trend of industry 
consolidation being undertaken as a result of the Party-state’s policy to build an 
internationally competitive domestic seed industry. These channels form a typology of 
mechanisms used by seed companies to acquire new varieties (see also Tong (2015) and 
Karplus & Deng (2007) for other categorizations). This typology is not a mutually 
exclusive system, and many of the largest seed companies acquire their seed varieties 
through multiple mechanisms. Scholars have identified many paths through which 
commercial seeds end up in farmers’ fields (Karplus & Deng, 2007, 82). The 
development channels presented here are key links in the network through which seeds 
travel in China between development, retail/distribution, and end user. The vast 
majority of seed companies do not develop grain seed varieties internally. Rather they 
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are licensed companies that sell seed varieties they have purchased from public 
research institutions (Zhang, Li, Wang, & Zhu, 2014). Some companies are directly 
owned by, or affiliated with, a specific research institute. For example, CAAS has over 73 
related seed companies (Fan et al. 2006, 37). Table 5.2 offers a typology of four main 
avenues for grain seed to be introduced to China’s expansive commercial seed markets: 
1) licensed seed, where varieties are purchased from research institutes, 2) 
private/independent research, where seeds are bred by a company, 3) foreign 
partnership, using foreign-developed seed varieties, and 4) informal seed, where the 
varieties of type 1-3 are sold without a license. It is possible for a seed company to have 
more than one arrangement.  
 
   Table 5.2: Development Channels for Commercial Grain Seed Varieties 
Type Description of Seed Company Sources Frequency 
Licensed seed Purchases the (exclusive) rights to seeds 
developed by institutes 
Many 
Private research Conducts research to develop varieties for sale Few 
Foreign Partnership Markets and develops varieties from foreign 
agribusiness 
Few 
Informal seed Reproduces/sources and sells seeds initially 
developed by others, without license 
Many 
 
 The majority of seed companies in the PRC source varieties from public research 
institutes, many of which have origins in the 1950s or in the expanded research system 
of the 1980s (Karplus & Deng, 2007). Varieties developed by research institutes are 
either sold by companies that are the commercial arm of the public research institute or 
by independent companies that purchase a license to sell a specific varietal. Many 
companies formally partner with research institutes for a first option to test and 
purchase the institute’s seed varieties; companies can pay between 1-2 million RMB 
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(US$150,000-$250,000) for such rights (CCM, 2015b, 10). In general, licensing contracts 
for specific seed varieties are conducted on a flat fee or royalty basis. While some seed 
varieties produced by research institutes such as universities or scientific academies are 
sold exclusively to a single company, other varieties are sold to more than one 
enterprise. One example is the most-planted corn variety in China over the last decade, 
Zhengdan958 (Zhèng dān, 郑单 958). The Henan Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
(Hénán shěng nóngyè kēxuéyuàn, 河南省农业科学院) bred this early maturing variety of 
hybrid corn that entered the market at the turn of the 21st century (Zhang & Bonjean, 
2011, 43). In total, five companies purchased licenses to sell this hybrid seed, including 
Wanxiang Doneed (Dénóng zhǒngyè gǔfèn gōngsī, 德农种业股份公司) and CNSGC (see 
Appendix I), in addition to several smaller regional seed companies. Both Wanxiang 
Doneed and CNSGC spent approximately 35 million RMB for the right to market the 
hybrid corn seed from 2011 to 2016 (CCM, 2015, 24). This type of relationship, though 
usually on a much smaller scale, is typical for most of the thousands of seed companies 
in the PRC. 
 Two other channels of commercial seed development originate outside of state 
research institutes. Both private research and foreign partnerships are not as 
widespread as licensing varietals from research institutes; however, these types of 
arrangements have increased significantly over the last 15 years (CCM, 2015b; Karplus 
& Deng, 2007, 77). Out of the thousands of seed companies in the PRC, comparatively 
few perform internal seed breeding research or source seed through foreign-
partnerships. Foreign partnerships remain highly controlled, and are typically focused 
on hybrid corn seed. The influx of foreign developed seeds by joint venture companies in 
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various regions of China has led to several domestic appeals to “maintain corn seed 
autonomy” (Xiong, 2013). The dynamics of foreign partnerships will be further explored 
below. 
The final channel for commercial seed varieties is the informal sector. The 
category serves as a catchall, but generally includes seeds sold from unlicensed entities. 
The Central Government has, for years, been critical of “pirated” or “fake” seeds sold 
under the name of approved seed varieties that either contain independently 
reproduced versions of these seeds or an entirely different variety. There are likely 
thousands of seed companies that sell these varieties of grain seed, many of which 
advertise themselves to be most-used seed varieties including those sold by MNCs such 
as Pioneer (Zhong, 2014). Separately from the commercial development channels 
discussed above, alternative seed networks are an additional mechanism through which 
independent producers can source seeds, including seed banks and farmer exchanges. 
Seed alternatives will be addressed more fully in Chapter 7. 
Though there are now over 5000 seed companies in the PRC, down from over 
8000 in 2010, there are several dozen companies that are frequently referred to as 
“dragonhead enterprises”, or top companies within the seed industry. Appendix I 
records the largest commercial seed companies in the PRC.20 The types of channels for 
commercial grain seed presented above in Table 5.2 are applied to the companies in 
Appendix I. The predecessors to China’s dragonhead seed companies often have their 
roots in the reforms of the 1980s, beginning as local or provincial seed companies. Since 
                                                        
20 This non-exhaustive list is derived from a combination of listed companies on the Chinese stock market, regionally 
representative companies, and the largest companies both nationally and regionally as of 2017.  
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the 1980s, some of these companies have been listed on domestic stock exchanges, and 
therefore are publicly traded, with significant interests maintained by state actors. 
Unlike smaller seed companies in the PRC, most major seed companies acquire seeds 
through more than one channel, relying on a combination of licensed seed, foreign 
partnership, and private research (CCM, 2016b). While a minority has foreign joint 
ventures, the majority conducts a mixture of private research and purchasing seed 
licenses from research institutes. Further, the ownership of these companies is a 
mixture between private individuals from the PRC and state entities (either a larger SOE, 
state banks, research institutes, and/or local/state government) (CCM, 2015h, 2015i, 
2015b). 
 Though there are thousands of seed companies across the country, no handful of 
companies dominate the market in any given grain variety.21 As recently as 2011, the 
top 10 grain seed companies in the country had approximately 13% of the domestic 
market share (Zhang et al., 2014). Though they represent significant volumes of revenue 
and market capitalization these companies account for a minority of new rice and corn 
seed varieties approved for commercialization by national or provincial authorities 
(CCM, 2016a, 20). The exception to the low level of concentration is on a regional basis. 
For example, in Heilongjiang province Beidahuang Kenfeng (Běidà huāng kěn fēng zhǒng 
yè gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 北大荒垦丰种业股份有限公司) Seed holds approximately 25% 
market share in corn (part of which is from KWS-partnered seed) and 33% of rice seed 
                                                        
21 The case of vegetable seed, however, is rather different. It is reported that over 50% of the vegetable seed market, 
which is not subject to national food security policy, is occupied by MNCs (CCM, 2015c, 31). 
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(CCM, 2015a). The vast majority of new grain seeds continue to be registered by 
research institutes and companies that have local and/or provincial reach.  
To pursue consolidation, many of the seed enterprises identified in Appendix I 
began to purchase smaller entities both in their home region and across the country. 
This new wave of domestic consolidation is driven by further policies with the objective 
of streamlining operations and expanding commercial networks on the domestic 
market, ensuring that national agribusinesses are in a position to compete with large 
global agribusinesses. Since 2011, in order to apply for a hybrid seed production license, 
seed companies must have 30 million RMB in registered capital (5 million RMB for 
conventional seed) (CCM, 2015b, 8). These capital requirements were implemented to 
encourage mergers in the seed industry in order to meet the capital thresholds, making 
it difficult for small-scale seed companies to be viable. Additional minimum capital 
thresholds exist for public listing on stock exchanges. Further, a company that wishes to 
operate along the entire crop seed value chain (i.e., in the breeding, production, and sale 
of crop seeds) must obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
have registered capital of 100 million RMB and fixed assets of at least 50 million RMB 
(CCM, 2015h). Such constraints on seed enterprises have in fact forced mergers and 
acquisitions, compelling larger domestic firms to gradually build an “aircraft carrier” 
sized enterprise to compete with global agribusiness (see Yang et al., 2010). An aircraft 
carrier enterprise is anticipated to contribute to national food security by allowing the 
state to retain national control over key inputs in the production process and by 
extending control over a segment of global supply chains (see Chapter 6). 
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For example, as mentioned above in section 5.2, CNSGC was created in 1978. 
Since that time, the SOE has expanded its reach significantly. In 2007, the company was 
acquired by one of China’s largest SOEs, Sinochem (Zhōngguó zhōng huà jítuán yǒuxiàn 
gōngsī, 中国中化集团有限公司), and began acquiring smaller regional companies in the 
following years. Sinochem, which reports to SASAC, recently purchased controlling 
shares in Guangdong Golden Rice (Guǎngdōng shěng jīn dào zhǒng yè yǒuxiàn gōngsīi, 广
东省金稻种业有限公司) and Hunan Dongting (Húnán dòngtíng gāokē zhǒng yè gǔfèn 
yǒuxiàn gōngsī 湖南洞庭高科种业股份有限公司) while also acquiring a minority stake 
in Sichuan Chuanzhong (Sìchuān chuān zhǒngzhǒng yè yǒuxiàn zérèn gōngsī, 四川川种种
业有限责任公司) (CCM, 2016a). These companies each have significant presence in their 
respective regions in Southern China, and relationships to provincial research institutes. 
Guangdong Golden Rice, for example, receives seed varieties from the Guangdong 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the former institute helmed by Ding Ying. CNSGC 
further established the China Seed Life Science Technology Center (Zhōngguó zhǒngzǐ 
shēngmìng kēxué jìshù zhōngxīn, 中国种子生命科学技术中心) in Wuhan (Wǔhàn, 武汉), 
aimed at creating new seed varieties for commercialization and engaging in 
biotechnology research (CCM, 2016a). In doing so, a leading SOE has established a 
research and sales network among its subsidiaries and partners in the domestic market.  
In terms of private research, Beijing Origin (Běijīng ào ruìjīn zhǒng yè gǔfèn 
yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 北京奧瑞金種業股份有限公司) is a unique entity in China’s seed 
industry, as it was the first privately owned seed company in the PRC. Han Gengchen 
(Hán gēngchén, 韓庚辰), the founding CEO, worked at both Pioneer and CIMMYT in the 
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1990s. He began Origin in 1997, the year after his departure from Pioneer. Since that 
time, Beijing Origin has purchased multiple domestic biotechnology companies, and 
established a nationwide distribution network (CCM, 2015h). The company is known for 
its development of GM corn products, which are awaiting approval for commercial 
cultivation in China. Beijing Origin, with its U.S. listed counterpart Origin Agritech, has 
applied for foreign patents (Origin Agritech, 2013). Similar to CNSGC, Beijing Origin and 
Origin Agritech now hold a network of biotechnology research facilities and test sites in 
Mainland China and overseas. 
For several years, Longping High-tech (LPHT) (Yuánlóngpíng nóngyè gāo kējì 
gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 袁隆平农业高科技股份有限公司) was also a privately owned seed 
company after being purchased by a private capital group Hunan Xindaxin (Húnán xīn dà 
xīn gǔfèn yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 湖南新大新股份有限公司). The company, named after hybrid 
rice breeder Yuan Longping, specializes in both hybrid rice and corn seed, and has a 
relationship with the Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Húnán nóngyè 
kēxuéyuàn, 湖南农业科学院). Hunan Xindaxin attempted to purchase Beijing Origin in 
2014, but was unsuccessful (Origin Agritech, 2015, 134). In the same year, LPHT 
returned to state ownership when it was bought out by CITIC Group (Zhōngxìn jítuán, 中
信集团), the investment arm of the major state-owned bank. Since then, LPHT has 
acquired stakes in multiple seed and agricultural technology companies (SinoCast, 
2013). A similar pattern exists across the thousands of seed firms and agro-technology 
companies in the PRC. Rhetoric among executives of the largest companies has also 
ramped up. The Chairperson of Liaoning Dongya (Liáoníng dōngyà zhǒngyè yǒuxiàn 
gōngsī, 辽宁东亚种业有限公司), for example, is “determined [for the company] to build 
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itself as China’s Monsanto” (Shi, 2014). Each of these examples serves to demonstrate 
the current trend of consolidation, spearheaded by dragonhead enterprises and financial 
actors in the seed industry, in line with the Party-state’s policy to build a domestic seed 
industry competitive with global MNCs. In a more interconnected global economy, the 
Party-state sees a competitive, nationally owned, seed industry as a key component of a 
self-reliant national food security, ensuring access to supply of grain. Using the Party-
state’s normative framing, state entities have developed policy incentives and 
statements to encourage consolidation, which has in turn been articulated and practiced 
by leading domestic SOEs and private seed businesses. 
5.3.2. National seed companies and controlled interaction with global 
agribusiness  
As indicated above, though the Party-state’s normative commitment to self-reliance 
aims to compete with MNCs, it also allows foreign interaction with the domestic seed 
industry. The first major entry of a global agribusiness actor in the PRC occurred in the 
1990s, and subsequent investments accelerated after the turn of the 20th century. In 
practice, the degree to which global agribusiness can operate in the national markets of 
the PRC is much more restricted. Control over MNC entry is exercised through the use of 
joint venture restrictions, regional segregation of MNC operations, and flexible 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. The development of these control 
mechanisms can be first illustrated in the case of Monsanto’s entry into China’s 
cottonseed market (Karplus & Deng, 2007). Below, I will introduce the path that major 
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global seed companies have followed to operate within the PRC’s domestic grain seed 
industry and the mechanisms initiated by the Party-state to control this presence.  
Monsanto entered the cottonseed market in China as global agribusinesses increased 
their reach into national markets worldwide in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1993, Monsanto 
first attempted to make inroads into China’s seed market after initiating sales of 
agrochemicals. As Paarlberg (2001, 124) notes, this initial attempt failed, given that 
“China’s national cotton research institute did not want foreign competition for China’s 
own state-owned seed companies.” In the same year, the company hired a Chinese 
national, Liu (David) Shi (Liú shí, 刘石), who had family connections in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, to assist its Mainland China entry (Yu, 2011). Liu helped Monsanto make 
connections with domestic Chinese seed companies, expanding on its existing chemical 
business. In 1996, Monsanto established a joint venture company with the Hebei 
Provincial Seed Group (Héběishěng zhǒngyè jítuán, 河北省种业集团) and Singapore 
Economic Development Board to sell Bt cotton in China (Hennessey, Gupta, & Kowalski, 
2014). In this arrangement, before the passage of China’s Seed Law, Monsanto gained 
2/3 ownership of the company. However, the GM cotton was only approved for planting 
in Hebei Province, which surrounds Beijing, and was rejected in other provinces (Smith, 
2000). A similar dynamic occurred in Anhui province, where a second joint venture was 
created. Given that China did not recognize intellectual property rights over the Bt 
cotton variety, Monsanto’s Bt cotton was “pirated” and adopted widely outside of Hebei 
through domestic seed company sales without being controlled by Monsanto 
(Hennessey et al., 2014). Respect for intellectual property rights is a point of contention 
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between China and the United States and other OECD countries (Mertha, 2005; Zhang, 
2019). 
Subsequently, domestically developed GM cottonseed varieties bred and sold by 
CNSGC were planted throughout cotton-growing provinces, without the provincial 
restrictions faced by Monsanto. GM cottonseed is now planted extensively throughout 
the country, with domestically engineered varieties occupying the majority of the 
market (Huang, Hu, Rozelle, & Pray, 2007). The experience in China’s cottonseed market 
during the 1990s was a critical test of Party-state protection measures prior to the 
introduction of the Seed Law and strict investment restrictions in the seed industry. The 
experience affirmed the Party-state’s need to exercise control over the national grain 
seed market in the context of increased interconnection with global agribusiness. The 
joint venture structure obtained by Monsanto where Monsanto and its partner Delta and 
Pineland controlled 66% of the company would not be replicated in the future. From 
1997 onward, joint venture restrictions were imposed, limiting foreign control in grain 
seed and agricultural biotechnology firms to 49% (Keeley, 2003). The use of regional 
segregation would continue as a tool to further limit the expansion of global 
agribusiness in Mainland China. Finally, the issue of intellectual property rights 
continues to be a double-edged sword at the nexus of domestic-international interaction 
in China’s securitized foodways. 
All major multinational seed companies have operations in Mainland China. These 
operations are bound by investment restrictions, limiting MNCs to minority share joint 
venture agreements with domestically owned firms. Figure 5.1 maps this global-national 
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network in China.22 In each case, the foreign ownership of the joint venture is limited to 
a maximum 49%, with the Chinese partner retaining the controlling share, a minimum 
of 51%. The joint ventures are not always static, and have proven to be both 
controversial, subject to government intervention, and vary in the degree to which they 
result in the introduction of outside seed varieties.  
The entry of Pioneer into China’s domestic market is controversial from the Party-
state’s traditional view of food security as a relatively autarkic system. The State-driven 
narrative surrounding this investment and the role of joint venture partner Shandong 
Denghai (Shāndōng dēng hǎi, 山东登海) attempts to mediate this change (see Figure 5.1 
and Appendix I). 
 
    Figure 5.1: Joint venture map: grain seed companies in the PRC 
 
      Sources: AgroNews, 2015; CCM, 2015b, 2015a; CPM, 
2007; LFSW, 2008; SeedQuest, 2011; Syngenta, 2007.23  
                                                        
22 Chapter 6 will address the recent (2017) acquisition of Syngenta by the SOE ChemChina. 




An article in the People’s Daily from 2015 put the spotlight on Li Denghai (Lǐ dēnghǎi, 李
登海), the largest shareholder of Shandong Denghai and Denghai-Pioneer, and also a 
billionaire and former representative in China’s National People’s Congress. The article 
faithfully states that,  
 
America’s Pioneer Hi-Bred Company has always dominated the global seed market. 
When they turned to the Chinese market, Denghai Seed Company was the 
preferred partner. However, Pioneer held to the condition that it must own 60% of 
the company. After being rejected by Li Denghai, the company offered 50%. ‘Seeds 
are related to national food security, I must hold strong!’ [said Li] In 7 years of 
marathon negotiations, Li Denghai held firm. In November 2002, China's first Sino-
foreign joint venture company - Shandong Denghai Pioneer Seed Industry Co., Ltd. 
was established, the Chinese side accounted for 51% of the shares. (Xu & Bian, 
2015) 
 
The above quote portrays Li Denghai as a defender of China’s national food security with 
the power to prevent agribusiness multinationals from gaining control of the domestic 
seed industry. In reality, it was State investment regulations that prevented Shandong 
Denghai from taking a majority share in the joint venture. In any case, the priority of 
national control over ownership stakes is clearly defined. The negotiation of the 
Shandong Denghai-Pioneer joint venture occurred during the tenure of Liu Shi, the 
former point of contact for Monsanto in China, who had moved to set up Pioneer Hi-
Bred’s office. Liu Shi presided over multiple MNC joint ventures in the seed industry, 
including Monsanto’s first cottonseed venture, Denghai-Pioneer, Longping Hi-Tech-
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Limagraine, and Hengji-Limagrain. In contrast to Li Denghai’s positive portrayal, Mr. 
Liu’s role in setting up joint ventures within the confines of the Party-state’s limit is at 
times controversial, and he has been publicly accused of facilitating foreign entry in the 
seed market. As one commenter said, “You are a guilty person in China's history because 
you promoted Pioneer's seeds” (Zhou, 2011). Nevertheless, the Party-state has 
encouraged this form of controlled engagement with a view to importing foreign 
germplasm and technologies, for example Pioneer’s Xianyu335 (Xiānyù, 先玉 335) 
hybrid corn. The engagement allows national firms to access foreign technologies and 
research networks while maintaining ownership over the seed varieties that are 
released within Mainland China. Further, as shown in Chapter 6, controlled engagement 
with global agribusiness allows for outward expansion in global agricultural markets 
upon which the PRC is increasingly relying.  
The promotion of partnership itself has limits. In 2007, Limagrain attempted to 
increase its presence in the PRC grain seed market by acquiring a portion of the private 
holding company that owned LPHT, Hunan Xindaxin. The strategy worked, allowing 
Limagrain to, at the time, directly own 10% of China’s largest hybrid rice company. 
However, with the implementation of the 2011 directive on building a national seed 
industry, Limagrain was forced to cede its direct stake in LPHT given the conflict with 
national ownership (Girard, 2016). In the wake of this deal, Hunan Xindaxin itself 
relinquished its controlling share to the state-owned CITIC Group, returning LPHT to 
effective state control. Since this time, Limagrain and LPHT have established a separate 
joint venture that respects the mandated ownership structure (Lan, 2011).  
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Multinational presence in the hybrid corn market is also divided between 
regions. In the PRC, seeds can be registered either nationally or provincially, with the 
vast majority of grain seeds being registered provincially (GAIN, 2015, 4). This 
registration system is a legacy of China’s historical seed industry based in local and 
provincial seed breeding activities, but the effect has been to create a barrier to national-
scale entry of MNCs. Further, the historical structure of the industry is such that there 
are many provincial and regional firms, which lends itself to regionalization of MNC 
presence. Major grain crops themselves have differentiated planting patterns through 
the country (see Appendix II). As such, when joint ventures with global agribusiness 
firms began, MNCs could not immediately sell their seeds nationally, due to having their 
varieties registered only at the provincial level and/or due to their domestic partner 
organization having limited national reach. The Chinese companies in Appendix I are 
mostly based in a specific province of China, though their commercial seed varieties 
have extended regionally in recent years. For example, Gansu Dunhuang (Gānsù 
dūnhuáng, 甘肃敦煌) is based in Gansu Province, Beidahuang Kenfeng Seed is based in 
Heilongjiang, Jiangxi Nongke (Jiāngxī nóng kē, 江西农科) is based in Jiangxi, etc. As such, 
upon initial creation of joint ventures, MNC seed varieties are limited to the province(s) 
in which their seeds have been approved and to the distribution network of their 
partner. Over time, varieties are approved beyond the initial province (or nationally), 
but typically expand outward within the climatic region as opposed to entering new 
geographic areas. Another example is the geographic division of MNC-sourced hybrid 
corn seed, which is divided between Pioneer’s Xianyu335 in North and Northeastern 
provinces, Monsanto in the Southwest of the country, and KWS principally in the far 
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Northeast (CCM, 2015a, 220). Even though Pioneer and Monsanto together make up the 
greatest component of market share by foreign-partnered companies, this market share 
itself is, to an extent, constrained geographically.  
 Despite segmented regional markets, Pioneer’s Xianyu335 expansion across the 
Northern provinces made waves over the last decade. Introduced in 2004, by 2012 the 
hybrid corn variety increased its presence to 9% of the corn-planted area in China (Wu 
& Han, 2012). In 2010, an article published in the agricultural web-magazine Nongbo 
Online rumoured that foreign companies control 70% of the overall seed market in 
China, and that the entry of MNCs in the seed market is a threat to national food security 
(Nongbo Seed, 2010). In making its case, the article focuses on the threat of external 
control over the seed market, referring directly to Henry Kissinger’s quote that if one 
controls food, one controls the people. The article was widely circulated, and Sichuan 
Ludan (Sìchuān lǜdān zhǒngyè yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 四川绿丹种业有限公司), who later 
formed a joint venture with Bayer, even reposted it on their webpage (Sichuan Ludan, 
2010). Shortly thereafter, rumours began to spread that Xianyu335 was a GM corn 
variety, and was perceived by some farmers to be responsible for a variety of animal 
deaths and deformities (Ho, 2013). In 2011, the Ministry of Agriculture removed 
Xianyu335 from its annual list of recommended crop seed varieties (CCM, 2015a, 9). 
Though the content of these rumours is questionable, it is telling that the target is a 
foreign-origin corn variety, and that the stories gained such traction. 
The experience with Xianyu335 also relates to intellectual property rights and 
GM technologies. The key policy document that regulates foreign investment is the 
annual Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, published by the 
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NDRC in collaboration with the Ministry of Commerce. The Catalogue has reiterated 
foreign investment restrictions on the breeding of new crops and seed production, 
which must be majority owned by a Chinese party. It has also indicated that foreign 
investment in the “production and development of genetically modified plants' seeds” is 
prohibited (CCM, 2016, 10). The USDA reports that,  
 
China has not approved any GE food or feed crops developed by foreign 
biotechnology firms for domestic commercial production. When foreign 
companies have asked to submit an application for domestic cultivation, MOA 
[Ministry of Agriculture] informed them that China’s foreign direct investment 
restrictions prohibit them from doing so. (USDA, 2016, 2) 
 
Despite the attempts of MNCs to increase their presence in the PRC’s domestic market, 
they face an abundance of institutional limits and restrictions resulting from the Party-
state’s structural power over the domestic market. However, while the Party-state is 
able to frame food security norms in the context of national ownership and apply 
regulations to realize related objectives, the PRC is not immune from global economic 
pressures. In the next section, I turn to a case example to highlight the complexity of 
intellectual property rights in the context of China’s securitized foodways. 
5.3.3. Securitized foodways and the issue of genetically modified rice in 
China 
The example of GM rice in Mainland China serves to demonstrate the current form of 
interaction between the PRC and the global seed industry. The ability of Chinese firms to 
compete with MNCs using domestically developed GM seeds is a key objective of the 
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Party-state. However, in order to protect a degree of autonomy from the networks of 
global agribusiness, firms from within the PRC must own the inputs required to produce 
internationally competitive grain seed. The example provided here demonstrates the 
Party-state’s attempt to use positive, structural, power within the PRC’s territorial limits, 
and the difficulties it faces relative to the broader power structures in the global food 
system. 
In 2014, biosafety certificates expired for two GM rice varieties awaiting 
commercialization in the PRC. Observers often explain the delay in re-approving the 
biosafety certificates (and continued absence of commercial certificates) by pointing to 
public concern over GM products in China. This concern is particularly in the case of GM 
rice, given the staple status of rice and its previous illegal appearance on store shelves 
(Wen, 2017, 218). However, there is an additional dynamic that provides an alternative 
explanation, identified through the concept of securitized foodways and the creation of a 
competitive domestic seed industry. The GM seed issue relates to the foreign-domestic 
ownership of intellectual property rights, and the ability for the PRC’s domestic seed 
industry to retain control over intellectual property and to compete domestically against 
global agribusiness. 
Though GM cotton is widely planted in Mainland China, GM grain crops are not 
currently approved for commercial cultivation. Despite GM grain seeds not being 
approved for commercial planting, the central government has invested billions of 
dollars in biotechnology research since the 1980s (Huang et al., 2007). In 2008, the State 
Council approved a long term investment plan worth RMB 24 billion (~US$3.8 billion) to 
develop new agricultural biotechnologies, with half of the funds coming from domestic 
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agribusinesses (USDA, 2016). The program includes both crop and animal 
biotechnology, with crop varieties focusing on rice, wheat, corn, and cotton research. 
The current government “roadmap” for commercializing the cultivation of GM crops 
begins with those not used in food, followed by those for animal feed, and lastly for 
staple foods – however, no timeline exists for the implementation of this plan (USDA, 
2016). Further funding has come through the NDRC in 2012, aimed at improving hi-
technology crop breeding, totalling RMB 400 million (~US$63 million) to 41 seed 
companies (CCM Huazhong Agricultural University). The central government has 
continuously funded research and commercial application of GM crops, with a focus on 
key grains and cotton, though the rate of public investment has recently plateaued 
(Zhang, 2018, 101). 
The focus on GM crop research in the PRC is in part aimed at reducing the potential 
for reliance on foreign seed companies and the patents they hold. In 2001, Pang Liping 
(Páng lìpíng, 庞莉萍), the former chairperson of Hefei Fengle (Héféi fēnglè zhǒngyè gǔfèn 
yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 合肥丰乐种业股份有限公司) (see Appendix I), placed GM seeds within 
the context of powerful agribusiness MNCs. For Hefei Fengle, the potential for a 
domestically developed GM rice variety, "may provide us with an edge in competing 
with those foreign giants…The control of new seed breeding technology using genetic 
engineering is crucial for the survival of China's seed companies and even the whole 
industry" (He, 2001). This concern is reflected in the 12th Five-year plan, devised in 
2010 and published in early 2011. The central planning document states that the PRC 
will “speed up the innovation and application of biotechnology breeding in agriculture” 
in order to “develop new biological varieties with important application value and 
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independent intellectual property rights,” and “foster a large and strong modern seed 
industry” (National People’s Congress, 2011, Section 3). 
Currently, there are several domestic GM crops engaged in field trials or awaiting 
approval for commercial cultivation. Those that are closest to commercialization are two 
rice strains along with a GM corn variety, each holding biosafety certificates to continue 
research and development of the seeds. Of particular interest are the two Bt rice lines 
(cry1Ab/Ac Huahui No. 1 and cry1Ab/Ac Bt Shanyou 63), which received biosafety 
certificates in 2009 (Chen et al., 2011). Geographic restrictions were placed on these 
varieties with approval only in one region: Hubei province in central China. The 
approval came shortly after widely reported incidents where, in 2005, the Bt rice 
varieties were found being sold in grocery stores in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei, due to 
illegal planting and harvesting in the province (Greenpeace, 2005). Both Huahui No.1 
(Huá huī, 华恢) and Bt Shanyou 63 (Shàn yōu, 汕优) were developed domestically, 
through research at Huazhong Agricultural University, also located in Wuhan. After 
issuing the initial biosafety certificates in 2009, the certificates lapsed in August of 2014, 
awaiting renewal. The biosafety certificates for both rice varieties were later renewed 
on December 11, 2014, for a period of 5 years. However, Huazhong Agricultural 
University has never received the separate certification required for commercialization 
of these rice seeds. The Seed Law requires that several approvals and licenses be 
granted prior to commercial cultivation, and no GM grain crops currently possess all the 
required certification (CCM Nanjing University 2017). As a result, the two rice varieties 
remain restricted in their application, and are not currently commercially viable to sell 
to a domestic seed enterprise for licensing agreements and public sale.   
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In terms of securitized foodways and the national ownership priority, a crucial 
issue related to China’s GM crop research is that both the germplasm and laboratory 
techniques used to create GM seeds often rely on a global patchwork of intellectual 
property rights. The use of foreign-patented technologies to develop “domestic” crop 
seed varieties challenges the PRC’s continued negative power vis-à-vis MNC access to 
the domestic seed market. In terms of Party-state policy, the challenge is to navigate the 
status of intellectual property rights, the potential effect on exports, and MNC access to 
domestic markets for GM grain seed (Keeley, 2003). The impetus for recent concern 
over intellectual property came from a report published by Greenpeace and the Third 
World Network (TWN) in 2008 (TWN & Greenpeace, 2008). In this report, the 
organizations claimed that Bt Shanyou 63 and Huahui No. 1 used up to 12 different 
foreign-patented technologies to create the GM rice seed. The use of foreign technologies 
could fall into a patent trap whereby MNCs could legally challenge the ownership of the 
seeds, lock-in Chinese farmers to the technology, and possibly claim royalties (TWN & 
Greenpeace, 2008; Greenpeace & TWN, 2009). Importantly, as we will see in Chapter 7, 
the organizations place the issue of foreign ownership over GM patents on seed 
technology squarely in the context of food grain security and sovereignty, farmer 
income, and the potential increase of foreign influence on China’s seed market 
(Greenpeace & TWN, 2009, 17-18).  
The Greenpeace/TWN study was critiqued by academics due to its speculative 
nature; however, academic studies themselves partially support the findings (Liu & Cao, 
2014; Liu & Li, 2011). Available information showed it was possible that five U.S.-held 
patents were used in producing Bt Shanyou 63, though not all information was available 
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to these researchers. The study stated that these patents include, “the CAMV35S 
promoter and gene gun-mediated methods…owned by Monsanto, the Selectable Marker 
hph by Syngenta, the P-ract1 promoter by Cornell University, and the RC7 gene by two 
Japanese public research institutes” (Liu & Cao, 2014, 188). However, none of these 
listed patents are held in China, which indicates there is no potential for legal challenge 
within China. Two important caveats were elaborated by Liu and Cao, who argued that 
there could be impacts for exports outside of China in jurisdictions in which the patents 
are enforced, and also within China in the case where private agreements such as 
material transfer agreements are signed but not known publicly (Liu & Cao, 2014).  
From the perspective of securitized foodways, domestically produced GM rice 
seed is complicated in practice given the overseas origin of technologies used to create 
the seed. If the PRC commercializes GM grain crops, it will likely have to accept foreign 
GM grain crops for planting. Further, in that case, it will need to protect intellectual 
property rights of its own technologies, requiring it to also protect the intellectual 
property of others. Zhang and his colleagues from Shofine Seed Company (Shāndōng 
shèngfēng zhǒngyè kējì yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 山东圣丰种业科技有限公司) and Shandong 
province’s Ministry of Agriculture acknowledged this issue, including for the presence of 
non-GM grain seeds being planted in the PRC, and point to the inherent power dynamics 
in this relationship, 
 
Transnational corporations principally use technological lock-in to reinforce the 
technical dependence of the host country, reducing technological spillovers and 
maintaining the advantage of monopoly. With the continuous expansion of 
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transnational seed companies’ R&D activities in China, our country has lost its 
‘technological sovereignty’ in seed science and technology. (Zhang et al. 2014, 13) 
 
The patent question demonstrates that the Party-state’s objective of retaining control 
over the domestic grain seed industry is made more complicated by privately owned 
biotechnology. The concern is often replicated in market analyses that mention foreign 
intellectual property ownership issues in the context of the Chinese seed industry as a 
political risk to investors (see CCM, 2015f). Huazhong Agricultural University is not the 
only domestic company attempting to commercialize GM seeds in China. A separate rice 
variety developed by CAAS may involve 5 foreign patents (CCM, 2015i). In addition, the 
country’s only holder of a foreign patent on a GM grain, Origin Agritech, has actively 
lobbied the Ministry of Agriculture and Central Government to allow domestic planting 
of its GM corn products. Domestic seed companies in the PRC are moving forward on the 
government research agenda. However, despite government priority to control the seed 
market, containing the GM seed market is not guaranteed. 
 Major global agribusinesses are aware of the concern. At the turn of the 21st 
century, the former president of Monsanto’s PRC office argued that China’s regulatory 
framework governing production, research, and importation of GM crops “is specifically 
designed to shut foreign companies out of the world’s largest government-funded 
biotechnology-development programmes. They have one foot on the accelerator, which 
is funding biotech research and development, and they have the other foot on the 
regulatory brake” (Zhao, Ho, Xue, & Swart, 2015, 120). From a different perspective, 
Pioneer’s head in China more flatly acknowledges Party-state objectives, stating that, 
“[the PRC government] definitely want[s] to see locally developed biotechnology 
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innovations brought to market” (Hicks, 2014). These statements confirm the policy 
priorities of the Party-state vis-à-vis agricultural biotechnology in the seed industry, 
which are received differently, at least rhetorically, by competing global agribusiness.  
 The patent issues discussed above add difficulty for the Party-state to simply 
fund biotech research as a means to commercialize “locally developed” GM seed. 
Whereas ownership over grain seed companies can be maintained, ownership over the 
web of intellectual property that goes in to GM seeds may not be as feasible. This points 
to a key interplay between the structural power of the Party-state over the nationally 
controlled domestic seed industry and the structural power of global agribusiness firms 
in terms of their control over grain seed technologies in global markets. This dynamic 
illustrates a point of tension in the Party-state’s pursuit of securitized foodways in that it 
may or may not be possible to pursue GM grain seeds for the domestic market while 
simultaneously keeping agribusiness MNCs at bay.  
Additional domestic dynamics also affect the adoption of GM seeds. On the 
ground in the PRC, views differ on the future of GM crops. In Southwest China, a GM rice 
researcher indicated that biotechnology will be the future of China’s seed industry, and 
will be crucial to address issues of stress tolerance, pest resistance, and salination.24 
Meanwhile, hybrid rice and corn researchers indicated that China’s current advantage is 
in HYVs, making GM grains a less attractive avenue for the government to pursue.25 
From the official viewpoint, Chinese President Xi Jinping was quoted as stating that GM 
research must continue, but extension should proceed with caution. He also reiterated 
                                                        
24 Author Interview, Anonymous, Southwest China, October 2015. 
25 Author Interview, Anonymous, Southwest China, September 2015. 
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the need for independent innovation and that the PRC “cannot allow large foreign 
companies to occupy the market for GM agricultural products” (Farmer’s Daily, 2014). 
Liu Shi, who presided over Monsanto, Pioneer, and Limagraine’s entry into China, 
expects GM grain crops to be commercialized in the near future (Hicks, 2014). Based on 
the model of global agribusinesses from the West, CNSGC sees biotechnology and China’s 
domestic germplasm resources as the key factor in “catching up and surpassing 
transnational seed corporations, and the basis for development and expansion of China’s 
seed industry” (Zhou, Qiu, Li, & Zhang, 2012, 2).  
The ability for Chinese firms to compete with MNCs using domestically developed 
GM seeds with secure intellectual property is the Party-state’s ultimate objective (see 
also Zhang, 2018, 112-114 for similar perspectives). In doing so, the inputs required to 
produce internationally competitive grain seed must be owned by firms from within the 
PRC. However, countries outside the PRC hold control over techniques and specific 
genetic material, often major MNCs. In recent and upcoming years, some patents on GM 
technologies have, or will, expire, opening the possibility for generic varieties to be 
marketed without fear of infringement (Grushkin, 2013). When further patents expire in 
2020, the PRC will have wider access to varieties accessible to domestic firms that can 
compete with foreign-owned varieties. Though Mainland China prohibits foreign 
investment in biotechnology, seed companies continue to seek out GM technology and 
research partnerships continue to exist. The simultaneous exclusion of foreign 
investment in agricultural biotechnology, promotion of within-country investment in the 
sector, usage of foreign technologies in the domestic development of seeds, and an 
 
 182 
unclear intellectual property rights regime, create a complex environment for national 
seed security in the context of GM foods.  
The momentum for GM seed commercialization is mounting; however, the issue 
finds itself potentially at odds with the concept of securitized foodways if GM 
commercialization would significantly reduce the Party-state’s control of the domestic 
seed industry. As such, despite the rhetorical momentum, it is not likely that the PRC will 
commercialize GM grain crops (for food) until national seed companies can compete 
with MNCs on the domestic market, using seeds whose ownership is not foreign-
controlled. For the Party-state, the issue of MNC control over GM technologies presents a 
significant challenge to the pursuit of national food security and to retaining structural 
power over the domestic economy. As such, the issue becomes integrated into the Party-
state’s pursuit of overseas acquisitions as discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.4. Discussion and conclusion 
The notion of “food as a weapon” has not been lost on the CPC in the decades since re-
engagement with a global food system that features significant positive power held by 
multinational agribusiness firms. The sections above served to illustrate the key 
developments in the PRC’s grain seed industry since the country’s reform and opening, 
while retracing the manner in which national food security became redefined. In 
essence, food self-reliance under economic globalization requires a domestic grain seed 
industry that features home grown agribusiness firms and technologies that can 
compete with global agribusiness. In doing so, national food security is maintained 
through domestic control over the key input into grain production: seeds.   
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The first key point is that the conception of self-reliance adopted by the Party-
state shifted to accommodate controlled international engagement in grain seed 
research and investment rather than continuing relative isolation. In terms of national 
food security this required a continued normative priority to maintain state control over 
the presence of powerful global agribusiness in the domestic market and target national 
seed industry development. The second key point is that the independent and 
decentralized seed research and extension system of the 1950s-1970s set the condition 
for the proliferation of smaller seed companies throughout the country. The historical 
absence of concentration or initial MNC presence in China’s seed market reduced the 
ability of global agribusiness to extend within PRC, limiting the structural power of 
global agribusiness in China’s domestic markets. The third key point is that the Party-
state acted upon the priority of self-reliance in the context of international engagement 
by establishing state policies to build structural power over the domestic grain seed 
system, including: promoting national industry consolidation, limiting foreign 
ownership, geographic segmentation of investment, and restrictions on the type of seed 
technologies allowed to be planted. 
The domestic component of securitized foodways is manifest through domestic 
policy space in the context of increased interaction with entrenched actors in the global 
food system. Though foreign-controlled technologies exist in the PRC, they are often 
limited in application or kept at arm’s length due to government regulation. Despite 
establishing relationships with the CGIAR institutions, limits were imposed on the 
degree to which IRRI rice or CIMMYT wheat could be planted directly. More recently, 
MNC-owned GM grain seeds are restricted from planting in the PRC. Despite this 
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restriction, government investment and support for GM technologies remains high, 
indicating that the Party-state is building capacity in its domestic seed industry and 
corresponding market for GM seeds by promoting national technology and agribusiness 
firms. Restrictions on the type of seed technologies eligible to be planted limit the 
influence of international actors, and allow national agribusiness to produce seed 
varieties in which they already have an advantage. 
The largest GM seed agribusinesses in the world do have a presence in the PRC 
selling hybrid grain varieties. However, along with being restricted in terms of the types 
of seed technologies they can market in the PRC, the restriction on ownership share also 
creates continued space for domestic seed companies. The requirement for MNCs to 
operate as a minority-share joint venture (and not as an individual entity) means that a 
select handful of domestic seed companies gain access to the new technologies desired 
by the central government, while the MNC partner gains access to a geographically 
fragmented distribution network. This strategy is similar to other important sectors of 
the PRC’s domestic economy (Chin, 2010; Hsueh, 2011). Meanwhile, the Party-state is 
directing domestic agribusiness firms to increase in size through merger and 
acquisition, and to develop new “independent” seed varieties to compete on domestic 
and export markets. Securitized foodways act to partially protect the domestic seed 
industry while serving to reduce the influence of global agribusiness in terms of both 
market power and structural power that they have been known to hold in other areas of 
the world. 
In the PRC, redefining national food security and self-reliance in global terms has 
occurred in parallel to reducing restrictions on foreign investment in the seed industry 
 
 185 
over the last decades. The dynamic of promoting domestically owned seed companies 
and independent intellectual property is matched by simultaneously inviting and 
controlling MNCs and foreign developed seed varieties. As described above, a tension 
exists between these two logics. The example of GM rice helped to illustrate this 
complexity. On one hand, the pursuit of national control over the seed market as a key 
input in national food security through self-reliance can explain the absence of GM 
grains in China. Whereas in other countries, the absence of commercially available GM 
grain seed is often due to advocacy, in China the absence can be explained due to the 
difficulty of maintaining control of a specific market segment controlled by global 
agribusiness. Were China to commercialize the cultivation of GM rice or corn seed 
without nationally developed varieties to compete against foreign-owned varieties, the 
ability to retain control over the domestic market would be jeopardized, as would the 
pursuit of securitized foodways. On the other hand, the proliferation of illegal GM rice 
and concerns over the ownership over GM technologies indicate that maintaining 
control of China’s domestic political economy under the flows of economic globalization 
is complicated. 
Nevertheless, the grain seed market in the PRC remains significantly under the 
control of national agricultural capital, both through the state and private investors. 
Though some scholars and analysts argue that the PRC ought to lift restrictions on 
agricultural foreign investment in order to adopt the latest MNC varieties of seed and 
increase incentive for MNCs research and development in China (see Fan et al., 2006; 
Wang, 2013), these assessments neglect the normative goals of the CPC and power 
relationships that permeate global agri-politics. The PRC’s mid-20th century disconnect 
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from the global food system meant that the corn and rice seed planted across the 
country was largely divorced from the resources owned by foreign organizations. It also 
meant that the structure of the grain seed market (multiple regional companies) did not 
lend itself to wholesale foreign takeover. The irony is that although China’s leadership 
avoided direct cooperation with the U.S.-led green revolution and its political-economic 
ambitions, the increased reach of the PRC’s national extension system actually led to a 
much higher adoption of hybrid seeds (corn, sorghum, and rice) than some green 
revolution countries and a much more commercially oriented grain seed market. It also 
led to the same environmental consequences as the U.S.-led green revolution, including 
excessive use and dependence on fertilizer and pesticides (Zhang, Jiang, & Ou, 2011). 
Reactions to these effects will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
A globally oriented concept of national food security, achieved through historical 
autonomy and structural power over the domestic food system, does not end at the 
borders of the country. The next chapter will focus on the outwards orientation of 
securitized foodways: creating networks outside the territorial boundaries of the PRC to 
secure markets for domestic seed, securing foreign seed technology, and creating 
nationally owned infrastructure to serve both domestic and global grain markets.  
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Chapter 6: Projecting National Food Security 
Abroad: Extension and Acquisition 
6.1. Introduction 
In May 2015, the Chinese pavilion opened at the Milan World Exposition. The theme of 
the exposition was food and sustainability and the PRC’s pavilion, an expression of its 
national relationship to the theme, was shaped as a blade of wheat. Within the numerous 
exhibits, clear focus was given to the PRC’s, “agricultural supply network, practical 
farming methods and technologies” including domestically developed hybrid rice 
varieties (China Daily, 2015; Rong, 2015). Some thirty years prior, Yuan Longping stated 
that, “hybrid rice is marching towards the world, to bring benefit to the people of the 
world” (Zhang & Xun, 2007, 30). Over the decades since the PRC initiated engagement 
with the global economy, not only has its domestic grain and seed industry expanded, 
the global presence of agribusiness actors from the PRC has increased substantially. 
 Previous chapters primarily examined the development and retention of the 
Party-state’s negative power vis-à-vis the global food system, and positive power over 
its domestic economy. This chapter focuses on foreign expansion of grain and seed 
networks controlled by state and corporate actors from the PRC, the final component of 
securitized foodways. Importantly, the international landscape of global agribusiness is 
very much in contrast to that of the PRC. As argued in Chapter 5, the PRC is able to 
maintain domestic policy space while also retaining a degree of control over global 
agribusiness within the country. This domestic policy space allows the Party-state to 
expand its structural power at home by maintaining domestic rules and developing 
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networks of domestically owned agribusiness. However, outside of the PRC, the same 
levers are not available. Rather, global agribusiness markets are highly concentrated 
with networks of incumbent MNCs occupying significant presence in many countries 
(Howard, 2016). Further, the rules of agricultural trade have historically been heavily 
influenced by dominant states (Clapp, 2006; Hopewell, 2016). In this international 
context Party-state policy seeks to build positive power to assert national control over 
networks within the global grain and seed market. 
 Contrary to Yuan Longping’s sentiment expressed above, the movement abroad 
of PRC-developed grain seed is not primarily motivated by addressing world food 
security. Rather, it forms a piece of the Party-state’s contemporary national food 
security policy. In recent years, the Party-state is faced with challenges to maintaining 
control over China’s domestic food supply. Imports of soy and corn have increased 
substantially, and competition with global agribusinesses is intensifying on domestic 
markets. Further, the imported soy and corn has often been grown using seed sold by 
MNCs, sourced from a geopolitical rival, and imported by ABCD firms. In order to 
maintain control over its domestic grain and seed industries, the Party-state’s objective 
is to own competitive agribusiness in global markets. In this way, the Party-state can 
pursue self-reliance (distinct from strict self-sufficiency in production) by selling more 
grain seed outside of China, diversifying the sources of China’s grain imports, and 
expanding state-owned grain trade infrastructure. In doing so, foreign imports will 
themselves be sourced in part from seed technology and trading infrastructure owned 
by actors from the PRC. Similarly, by expanding the global reach of grain seed companies 
from the PRC, these companies stake out greater international market share and 
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increase their position relative to foreign-owned MNCs with whom they may compete 
on the PRC’s domestic market. 
  This effort takes the form of expanding resource networks around the world. 
There are two mechanisms used by actors from the PRC to build agribusiness networks 
in the grain and seed industries: 1) expanding domestically developed seed varieties to 
developing countries, and 2) taking possession of existing global agribusiness networks 
through merger and acquisition. Through these mechanisms, state-corporate and 
financial actors from the PRC are building markets for hybrid rice and corn seed owned 
by dragonhead enterprises. They are also controlling the portion of existing global 
agribusiness infrastructure required to primarily serve domestic markets either directly 
(sourcing grain) or indirectly (expanding markets for seed companies).  
This chapter first examines the development of the Party-state’s agricultural 
going-out policy, bringing context to the ideational shifts supporting the normative 
priority to expand national food security outwards. It then examines the first network-
building mechanism, where national seed companies develop export markets for 
Chinese seed varieties, often in Southern countries. I then switch to examining the going-
out activities as they relate to the dominant actors in the global food system. I begin by 
presenting a case example of a GM corn seed called Agrisure Viptera to highlight the 
dynamics at play in the grain trade and grain seed industries. I then map the pattern of 
overseas acquisitions and investment projects seen in the grain and seed industries. 
These maps demonstrate the rapidly accelerating infrastructure footprint of 
agribusiness from the PRC, which serve to build positive power in the global political 
economy in service of an outwardly oriented national food security.  
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6.2. Grains flow inward, food security shifts outward 
6.2.1. Grain import increases and the issue of self-reliance 
At the time that the domestic seed industry was beginning to take shape, the PRC was 
also facing a climate of greater imports. Beginning in the mid-1990s, in anticipation of 
acceding to the WTO and to serve livestock feed markets, the PRC liberalized soybean 
imports. As seen in Figure 6.1, the vast majority of these imports typically came from the 
United States, and later from Argentina and Brazil. Further, the shipment and processing 
of these soybeans was principally controlled by the vast infrastructure networks of 
Cargill, ADM, Bunge, and Louis Dreyfus within the United States and Brazil (Brown-Lima, 
Cooney, & Cleary, 2010, 31).  
 




Following WTO accession, the PRC was also required to further allocate 7.2 million 
tonnes of tariff-free corn imports (Reuters, 2013), though the volume of imports far 
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increased substantially since the late 1990s primarily to serve animal feed markets 
(Schneider, 2014a; Sharma, 2014). 
As foreign imports increased, China’s emergence on international agricultural 
markets began making headlines again. In 1995, Lester Brown (1995) published his 
report “Who Will Feed China”. This report echoed similar concerns raised in the 1920s 
and 1930s (see Chapter 4), claiming that population growth and production limits 
would lead to vastly increased food imports in the PRC, and raising an alarm regarding 
global food production levels and commodity prices (Brown, 1995). Notably, this 
publication stirred significant reaction within the CPC and among leading Chinese 
intellectuals. Boland (2000, 64-65) frames this reaction as a debate between state 
sovereignty and interdependence, where commentators in the PRC referred to the issue 
as a strategic concern, including debates as to the level of self-sufficiency in production 
that ought to be required in the interest of national security. These discussions focused 
on purchasing power in relation to food imports to the PRC, with the underlying 
assumption that the PRC would simply purchase grain on international markets, 
primarily from the United States (Brown, 1995; Paarlberg, 1996). These analyses did not 
typically elaborate on the ownership of infrastructure networks that go into making 
these markets possible, and the implications this may have had in relation to the Party-
state’s national food security priority in the context of increased interdependence.  
Shortly after these discussions, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Party-state 
introduced a “going out” strategy (Zǒu chūqù zhànlüè, 走出去战略) aimed at broadly 
promoting overseas investment in multiple sectors. The going out strategy would frame 
the PRC’s outward investment priorities including in food and agriculture. Announced in 
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1999 by the CPC Central Committee, the strategy has three principal objectives: 1) to 
supplement China’s required resources; 2) to drive commodity and labour exports; and 
3) to cultivate China’s transnational corporations and brands (State Council of the PRC, 
2006). By 2007, the going-out strategy had been integrated into the CPC’s No. 1 Policy 
Document (CPC Central Committee, 2017). In terms of national food security, these 
priorities framed the Party-state’s focus on securing imported grain, developing export 
markets for grain seeds, and promoting Chinese agribusiness abroad. Though the official 
strategy came into place in 1999, the going out policy had loosely been in place since the 
early 1980s, following the beginning of initial international investment and cooperation 
projects under Deng Xiaoping. Some analysts now refer to those early overseas 
investments retrospectively as part of the strategy (Zhai, 2006).  
While the strategy is broad in scope, food and agricultural investments abroad 
have received significant and specific attention. The tie between self-sufficiency, 
national food security, and the going-out policy is clearly made and consistently invoked 
(Qiang, Mi, & Zhi, 2012; Yang, 2015). However, despite the will of the Party-state to 
increase investment and cooperation abroad, the policy was critiqued for its lack of 
coordination. Researchers from the Ministry of Agriculture stated that there were 
significant shortcomings in terms of making the agricultural going-out policy a 
systematic strategy (Yan & Han, 2006). While agreeing with the national goal of 
establishing international links, significant structural barriers were identified both 
overseas in terms of foreign regulations on investment and labour as well as domestic 
financial configurations, from investment capital to corporate insurance (Yan & Han, 




cooperate closely with the state’s overall international political goals…[beyond] 
commercial and economic objectives…The most important thing is…to realize the 
effective allocation of domestic and foreign resources at a deep level, to make up 
for and alleviate the shortage of domestic resources…[and] requiring China's 
agriculture to gradually have a higher level and ability in international 
competition, including not only the government's service capabilities, but also for 
market entities to operate (agricultural companies, etc.). Through international 
agricultural cooperation and competition, learning and absorbing advanced 
management and technology, the international competitiveness of China’s 
agriculture will be comprehensively improved. (Yan & Han, 2006, 15) 
 
This statement outlines key elements of the mechanics that have developed over the last 
decade in the international context of securitized foodways. Importantly, the 
government authors tie together the pre-eminence of political priorities, the 
relationship between domestic and foreign resources, and the role of agricultural 
companies in carrying out political goals.   
6.2.2. The Party-state’s going out strategy and the issue of agribusiness 
In the context of the seed industry, much of the initial focus on agricultural going out 
remained on the piecemeal export and testing of domestic products, including grain 
seeds. In this context, the notion of South-South cooperation re-emerged, putting 
forward the Chinese development model as an ideal-type for many developing countries 
( Oliveira, 2017; Tan & Ye, 2008, 58). For example, analysts focused on the advantages of 
creating agricultural links specifically with countries outside of North America and 
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Europe, particularly where development levels were similar or China had an advantage 
(Bai & Liang, 2007). Likewise, Wang et al. (2013) of China Agricultural University argue 
in the Ministry of Agriculture’s Scientia Agricultura Sinica that key food security crops 
should be supported to expand internationally to build competitiveness, particularly in 
less-reached regions such as Africa and Latin America. More recently, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has referred to the need to increase strategic focus in the going out policy, 
and to play to advantages such as agricultural products including hybrid rice and corn 
seed (Yang, 2015, 30).  
However, analysts in the PRC identify corporate concentration along 
international agricultural supply chains as a primary obstacle to agricultural going out 
and national food security. In addition to overcoming domestic resource constraints, 
analysts charge the PRC government with helping to,  
 
get rid of international agribusiness corporation’s monopoly, and furthermore 
play China’s foreign exchange reserve to advantage in order to ensure the effective 
supply of our country’s agricultural products…and build a giant multinational 
group in China's agricultural field, thus occupying a reasonable seat in the global 
agricultural product supply chain and establishing China's agricultural trade 
status. (Tan, 2011, 66) 
 
The need to compete against global agribusinesses, and their networks of infrastructure 
and intellectual property, cause China’s smaller agribusinesses to be seen as currently 
uncompetitive (Wang, Liu, & Song, 2013). In this context, Yang (2015) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Planning and Design Research Institute argues that “new circumstances 
require our country’s agricultural science and technology development to have an 
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overall plan based in the combination of domestic and international conditions.” 
Likewise, Yin Chengjie (Yǐn chéngjié, 尹成杰), a party member, former Deputy Minister 
of Agriculture and representative on the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(Quánguó réndà chángwěihuì wěiyuán, 全国人大常委会委员), stated that “our country 
[must] correctly grasp agricultural internationalization opportunities and 
strategies…establish a robust international cooperation control mechanism for the 
agricultural industry, and energetically promote agricultural enterprise 
competitiveness” (Yin, 2010). Further, Chen Xiwen (Chén xīwén, 陈锡文), former 
Director of the Central Leading Small Group for Rural Work (Zhōngyāng nóngcūn 
gōngzuò xiǎozǔ, 中央农村工作小组) reporting to the CPC Politburo (Zhèngzhì jú, 政治
局), stated that the limited sources of international imports, and particularly the volume 
of corn and soybean coming from the United States, are “weak points” that must be 
protected from international volatility ( Zha & Zhang, 2013). Together, these statements 
demonstrate significant Party-state concern over multinational control, import sources, 
and the effect each of these factors has on the survival of PRC agribusiness. These 
concerns are reflective of the securitization of foodways. 
 In terms of current policy, outward expansion and international competitiveness 
remain a key priority for the CPC. The 2016 No. 1 Policy Document states that in the 
development of the seed industry, both international and domestic market resources 
will be pursued (CPC Central Committee, 2016, I.8.). Importantly, the way that the 
statement is written conceptually separates domestic and international spheres. It 
divides domestic and international markets by stating that there are both domestic and 
international resources, a clear indication that global integration or interdependence is 
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controlled. Further, the 2017 No. 1 Policy Document seeks to “strengthen agricultural 
foreign cooperation and promote agricultural going-out” particularly in Asia (CPC 
Central Committee, 2016, I.8.). The document also declares that the Party-state “will 
support agricultural enterprises to conduct transnational operations, establish overseas 
production bases, processing and warehousing logistics facilities, and foster large-scale 
enterprises with international competitiveness” (CPC Central Committee, 2016, I.8.). 
There is a clear national priority in developing domestic agribusinesses that operate 
within the global food system. Though these concepts now appear in a central policy 
document, this does not imply that the Party-state’s strategy has become fully unified 
and coherent, nor will it necessarily be implementable. Xu and Zhang (2015, 133) point 
out that obstacles will exist in many agricultural markets given the complexity of 
regulations surrounding seeds and other agricultural inputs. Nevertheless, officials at 
the provincial and national level are making efforts to secure access to foreign markets 
through leading delegations focused on access for agricultural technologies (Qu et al., 
2012). This process necessarily includes adapting to border measures and navigating 
commercial and phytosanitary regulations abroad (Tang & Tan, 2009, 34). 
The Party-state’s going-out policy, in the context of food and agriculture, 
encompasses a key ideational shift regarding national goals related to national food 
security and self-reliance. In the context of economic globalization, where the PRC’s 
domestic grain market increasingly interacts with international grain supply, the 
concept of self-sufficiency as operating solely within the domestic economy no longer 
holds. Rather, support for changing diets through an increased reliance on imported 
feed grains, particularly soybean and corn, extends the concept of self-reliance outward. 
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From the perspective of securitized foodways, an increase in feed grain imports 
threatens the former autonomy of the PRC grain and grain seed market through 
increased exposure to global markets and the structural power of global agribusiness 
actors, including states and MNCs. The challenge presented to the Party-state is that 
global supply chains are dominated by relatively few foreign agribusinesses, and the 
source of grain imports to the PRC are largely derived from the United States, a 
historical geopolitical rival. In this sense, self-reliance is jeopardized given increased 
dependence on powerful outside actors to fulfil a core normative food security priority. 
To ensure unmediated access to international grain markets and to increase the 
competitiveness of national agribusiness, the Party-state’s national food security policy 
emphasized self-reliance in international markets by promoting national seed varieties 
abroad and by the national acquisition of foreign multinationals. 
The next sections examine the response of actors from the PRC to the national 
objectives outlined above. More specifically, they present the gradual international 
extension of agribusiness power through the development of networks beyond national 
borders, and the creation of controlled market spaces at the international level. By 
building positive power through global infrastructure networks, the Party-state will 
increasingly secure control over grain trade networks, expand the area planted to 
nationally owned grain seed varieties, and build nationally owned agribusiness that can 
compete in both domestic and international markets.  
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6.3. State and private seed companies in Southern markets 
6.3.1. Overseas seed cooperation in Asia and Africa 
The first mechanism to extend networks overseas is to create space in markets where 
global MNC networks are less prevalent, and particularly in crop varieties that are vital 
to the PRC’s domestic seed industry. Seed markets in many Southern countries have less 
market concentration and smaller commercial seed markets. PRC actors are therefore 
extending domestically developed grain seed varieties in markets with relatively little 
MNC competition, focused on grain seeds in which they have a competitive advantage 
and are important for the PRC’s domestic economy. This activity serves to create 
potential outlets for grain seed exports and potential breeding bases for PRC-based 
agribusiness. As discussed below, this international extension takes several forms, and 
has not always been successful. There are a combination successful ventures and 
unsuccessful “paper tigers” partaking in seed industry expansion (Oliveira, 2017). 
Importantly, overseas development projects are not new to the PRC. Since the 
inception of PRC hybrid rice and corn breeding programs in the 1950s and 1960s (see 
Chapter 4), grain seed varieties from China have been involved in overseas development 
and extension projects. Early projects were firmly based in Cold War dynamics, 
accelerating after the PRC gained a seat at the United Nations and the subsequent 
handover of multiple international development projects spearheaded by Taiwan 
(Brautigam, 1998). Brautigam (1998, 18) highlighted that the PRC’s early agricultural 
development package in SSA partly followed Soviet teachings of the 1950s and included 
not only irrigation, labour, and machinery, but also rice seed varieties developed in the 
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PRC. The rice seeds used during this period were often, though not always, the HYVs 
discussed in Chapter 4, particularly zhenzhuai (Brautigam, 1998, 122). Since these 
earlier projects, the PRC’s overseas agricultural activities continue to include the export 
of seed technologies, as discussed below.  
 In recent years, the presence of agribusiness investors from the PRC across the 
globe began attracting significant attention. The increased scale of overseas agricultural 
investment and development projects, intimately tied to the going out strategy, has been 
subject to many debates. In particular, they have been implicated in “land grab” 
literature (Zoomers, 2010), the ethics of PRC foreign agricultural projects (Lawther, 
2016, 2017), and the efficacy of said projects (Xu, Li, Qi, Tang, & Mukwereza, 2016). In 
particular, the land grab literature initially pointed to actors from China as a primary 
source of large-scale investments in agricultural land, leading to dispossession (GRAIN, 
2008; Zoomers, 2010). However, the centrality of China’s role in the global land grab has 
been questioned since these early reports (Brautigam & Zhang 2013; Brautigam, 2015; 
Oliveira, 2017). Rather than focusing on the acquisition of land, the presence of actors 
from the PRC in the global South (and some former Soviet states) is even more 
significant in terms of the expanding footprint of hybrid seed businesses.  
 Below, many overseas seed projects are introduced, including their links to the 
PRC’s national seed industry actors discussed in Chapter 5. I focus on Chinese language 
scholarship that has reported on field trials in the two regions most implicated in the 
creation of markets for PRC-developed grain seed: South/Southeast Asia and SSA. Seeds 
comprise a key component of the Party-state’s going-out policy, yet the vast majority of 
literature related to China in the land grab has not focused on the source of seeds being 
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used (Lawther, 2016). Hybrid rice and corn developed in the PRC are being used to plant 
in many of these cases, making land only one aspect of any given investment. The 
international extension of national PRC varieties of hybrid rice and corn, as well as soy, 
is now accelerating. Commercial enterprises and institutes from China have gone abroad 
throughout the world to promote, test, and sell their hybrid grain seeds (He, 2013; Li, 
Yang, & Qiu, 2014). Whether the grain seeds become more widely commercialized 
beyond test farms remains to be seen; however, these test sites are an example of the 
PRC establishing foreign seed breeding networks and creating space for intellectual 
property owned by PRC actors in Southern seed markets. 
Many of the PRC’s dragonhead enterprises, as identified in Chapter 5, have 
increasing presence in foreign markets. While some companies engage mainly in exports 
(e.g. Grand Agriseed Technology, Zhongnongfa Industry Seed Group), other companies 
have expanded their production networks either through test sites or full subsidiaries. 
Those companies with a more active international presence directly cite the going out 
policy as part of their corporate strategy (Chongqing Seed, 2018). For example, Winall 
Hi-Tech Agriculture frames its recent overseas expansion in the rice seed market as 
“firmly grasping the national ‘one-belt one road’ and the seed industry ‘going out’ 
opportunity, and vigorously promoting overseas business development to a new level” 
(Winall Hi-Tech, 2018, 18). In comparison, Hefei Fengle also indicates that it will “seize 
the opportunity to accelerate going out opportunities” by expanding exports and testing 
in East and Southeast Asia, as well as SSA (Hefei Fengle, 2018). While LPHT officials have 
used the “going out” terminology, they often choose to focus on a message of global food 
security and, “[s]preading technology to benefit the world's hybrid rice production…” 
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(LPHT, 2018, 57). The repetition of party slogans does not necessarily mean that the 
company has a normative commitment to national food security driving the company’s 
investments. However, it does show that it is a desirable a practice for Chinese 
agribusiness to cite state policy. Building on the Party-state priority to expand domestic 
agricultural technologies abroad, hybrid rice and corn varieties are now being tested or 
commercialized in more than 23 countries across SSA and South/Southeast Asia. 
6.3.2. PRC seed companies in South and Southeast Asia 
Table 6.2 provides an overview of grain seed extension activities in South and Southeast 
Asia by actors from the PRC. Following the development channels for commercial grain 
seed varieties presented in Chapter 5, the grain seeds deployed abroad come from a mix 
of SOEs, private enterprises, and research institutes. The most significant actor in 
establishing overseas infrastructure for grain seed technologies is LPHT, while various 
research institutes have also developed partnerships for site tests.26 As seen in Table 6.2, 
seven of the countries represented feature LPHT or Hunan Rice Research Center (HRRC) 
(Húnán zájiāo shuǐdào yánjiū zhōngxīn, 湖南雜交水稻研究中心) (LPHT’s research 






                                                        
26 LPHT’s involvement in the acquisition of Dow’s Brazilian subsidiary will be discussed in Section 6.4.3. 
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     Table 6.2: PRC seed cooperation in South and Southeast Asia 
Country Seed company activity Reference 
Bangladesh • Hubei Provincial Seed Company exports corn and 
rice seed 
• Sichuan Nongda Hi-Tech Agriculture of the Sichuan 
Rice Research Institute partnership with 
Bangladesh Rice Research Institute 
Cao & Qiu (2016) 
Siddique (2014) 
Brunei • LPHT partnership with the Department of 
Agriculture and Agrifood in Brunei 
Xinhuanet (2017) 
Cambodia • Rice Research Institute of Guangxi Academy of 
Agricultural Sciences - test site in Battambang for 
zaoyou362 (早优 362), teyou362 (特优 362) and 
guiyuanyou362 (桂源优 362) 
Srean et al. (2012) 
India • LPHT subsidiary opened in 2017, and a hybrid rice 
variety was approved for cultivation 
Zhang (2007, 29) 
LPHT (2018) 
Indonesia • LPHT tested GNY50 and GNY53 hybrid rice and 
opened a subsidiary in 2015 
Zhang (2007, 30) 
Wang (2015) 
Laos • National Hybrid Rice Research Center of the Hunan 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences hybrid rice 
varieties DH2525 and DH163 near Vientiane Laos. 
• Chongqing Seed Company testing Qyou1 hybrid 
rice 
• Guangxi Wanchuan tested and exports hybrid rice 
seed. 
Xiong et al. (2010) 
Li et al. (2010) 
 
Wang (2005) 
Myanmar • Chongqing Seed Company tests hybrid rice and 
corn 
Wang (2005) 
Pakistan • LPHT tested hybrid rice varieties and has 
partnered with Guard Agricultural Research and 
Services 
Yang et al. (2002) 
Baig (2018) 
Philippines • LPHT partnership with SL Agritech Corporation 
(SLAC). Testing SL-8H rice using LPHT parental 
lines. 
Zhang & Xun (2007) 
Vietnam • LPHT has established test stations and exports 
both hybrid corn and rice seed  
• Guangxi Wanchuan Seed Company tested teyou136 
(特优 136) 
• Chongqing Seed Company tests Qyou1 hybrid rice 
Zhang & Xun (2007) 
Zhou et al. (2014) 





For example, LPHT developed a strategic partnership with the privately owned Filipino 
company SL Agritech Corporation (SLAC). Initial cooperation between Philippines 
national rice institute and Chinese academies began in the 1980s, including more than 
10 different provincial academies of agricultural science (Shandong Zhang & Xun, 2007). 
In 1999, a cooperation agreement was signed between SLAC and LPHT’s part-owner, the 
HRRC (Peng, Zhang, & Yuan, 2007). Since then, senior researchers from the HRRC joined 
SLAC, and tested LPHT parent lines. The joint venture eventually developed seed types 
including SL H8 hybrid rice, based on LPHT varieties (Zhang & Xun, 2007). By 2014, six 
varieties of hybrid rice had received certification for planting in the Philippines, 
primarily through SLAC; HRRC/LPHT-based varieties now account for half of the overall 
area planted to hybrid rice seed (Li, Yang, & Qiu, 2014, 194-195).27 These hybrid rice 
seeds compete directly against Syngenta, Pioneer, and Bayer, and are now being 
exported to other countries in tropical Asia (Pe & Tan, 2016). While the collaboration 
and flow of technology is clear, the profit-sharing agreement between SLAC and LPHT 
has not been made public, to my knowledge. 
In Pakistan, LPHT has engaged in testing for hybrid rice varieties for decades (Yang, 
Fang, Yang, & Chen, 2002). In early hybrid rice trials, company authors specifically 
compared newly introduced LPHT varieties to IRRI varieties introduced to Pakistan in 
the 1970s (Yang et al., 2002, 377). These IRRI varieties (IR-6 and DR-92) remain the 
most widely planted in the country. More recently, LPHT’s cooperation with the 
domestic Pakistani firm Guard Agricultural Research and Services have completed 
                                                        
27 In 2009, GRAIN reported that SL H8 seed had failed in some regions of Philippines, and was potentially mixed with 
hybrid rice seed imported directly from China (GRAIN, 2009). 
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testing and training, while initiating the development of “clear cut property rights” over 
parental rice lines (Ali & Yousef, 2017, 52). The partnership seeks to commercialize 
basmati rice hybrids in Pakistan’s Punjab province, creating a further mirror image to 
the green revolution (Pakistan Today, 2018). Guard Agricultural Research intends to 
export its rice seed to other countries, including the Philippines (Baig, 2018). 
 In India, LPHT has attempted to establish strategic cooperation with several seed 
companies. In the early 2000s, LPHT initiated strategic talks with Nuziveedu Seeds 
limited and Vihba Agrotech, each of which are private seed companies based in India 
(Zhang, 2007, 29). However, neither has resulted in significant activity. More recently, 
LPHT attempted to test its varieties through collaboration with another private seed 
company, J. K. Agri-Genetics Limited, bringing in 10kg each of LP0882 and LP0883 rice 
seed (Government of India, 2009). Further, in 2017 LPHT created a subsidiary in India 
called Longping Hi-Tech India Seed Company (Lóngpíng gāokē yìndù zhǒngzǐ chǎnyè 
yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 隆平高科印度种子产业有限公司). The subsidiary company is not yet 
operational, however LPHT obtained commercial planting approval for one variety of 
hybrid rice (LPHT, 2018, 17). In addition, LPHT’s international breeding centre on 
Hainan Island in China is targeting varieties that may be suitable to test in India. 
 Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, numerous field trials and cooperation agreements 
took place over the last decades until present. Again, LPHT plays an important role along 
with several institutes and companies. Approximately 80% of Vietnam’s hybrid rice 
seeds are imported from Chinese companies (SLAC, 2017, 47). This level of 
concentration is advantageous to companies from the PRC, who see Vietnam’s lack of 
“hybrid rice self-sufficiency” as a competitive advantage (Zhou et al., 2014). Guangxi 
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Wanchuan Seed (Guǎngxī wàn chuān zhǒng yè yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 广西万川种业有限公司) 
has tested rice and corn seeds in Vietnam, including the teyou136 hybrid rice variety 
(Zhou et al., 2014). The company, based in southern China bordering Vietnam, belongs 
to the Guangxi Academy of Agricultural Sciences, partnered with a domestic Vietnamese 
firm. Guangxi Wanchuan has also taken advantage of relative proximity to test and 
export seeds to Cambodia and Laos (Srean et al., 2012; Guangxi Wanchuan Seed Co., Ltd., 
n.d.). LPHT is also active in Vietnam, and has tested rice varieties in Indonesia and Laos. 
In Indonesia, LPHT focused on GNY50 and GNY53, and has since received commercial 
planting and import approval from the Indonesian government. In 2015, LPHT opened a 
subsidiary company and its hybrid rice varieties are being planted in several provinces 
(Wang, 2015). In Laos, it is LPHT partner Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences that 
has tested several hybrid rice varieties (Xiong et al., 2010). Chongqing Seed Company 
has also tested its proprietary hybrid rice and corn varieties in Laos, developed in 
partnership with the Sichuan Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Wang, 2005). It has 
tested this variety and others in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.  
The projects and investments listed above place actors from the PRC in most of 
the world’s top rice producing countries. The principal outlier is Thailand, where hybrid 
rice varieties are seldom grown due to government restrictions on imported germplasm 
for the purpose of commercialization (Napasintuwong, 2018). Despite the increased 
access of seed companies and institutes from the PRC, the adoption of hybrid rice in 
these countries typically remains comparatively low given their relatively small 
commercial seed markets. Nevertheless South and Southeast Asia are important 
destinations for China’s foreign seed expansion, and this presence may increase if 
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commercial seed markets grow in the region. Creating inroads in the region’s national 
rice seed markets serves to export the PRC’s domestically developed rice seed 
technology, extending the international reach of otherwise domestically oriented 
agribusinesses and providing competitive international exposure vis-à-vis major MNCs.  
6.3.3. PRC seed companies in sub-Saharan Africa 
Building on the discussion above, we now turn to an overview of the PRC’s grain seed 
extension activities in SSA. Though there are parallels with the examples above, in SSA 
Party-state actors from the Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Agriculture are 
focused on coordinating with SOEs and universities to create demonstration centres in 
countries across the continent (Brautigam, 2015; Jiang, Harding, Anseeuw, & Alden, 
2016). Though extension and demonstration projects have existed for decades, the 
renewed focus on these activities began after 2006 with the launch of the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (Zhōngfēi hézuò lùntán, 中非合作论坛). The forum had been 
initiated in 2000, however the official launch in 2006 specifically prioritized agricultural 
demonstration centres. In 2016, there were 25 planned demonstration centres 
throughout the continent, many of which focus at least in part on grain seed (Li, 2016). 
These projects are largely funded by the Ministry of Commerce as well as financial 
institutions from the PRC (Brautigam, 2009). Similar to the dynamic in Asia, specific 
companies and research centres host or develop test sites for agricultural products and 
processes, bringing specific seed varieties to test for local adaptation and eventual 
adoption. Table 6.3 provides a list of the examples that include both demonstration sites 





   Table 6.3: PRC seed cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country Seed Company Activity Reference 
Angola • Angola Longe Farm cooperates with 
LPHT and CITIC Group 
Hunan Daily (2016) 
CAAEPD (2018) 
Ethiopia • Rice testing with the Ethiopian Institute 
of Agricultural Research 
Chen (2017) 
Alemu, Cook, & Qi (2015) 
Kenya • China-Kenya Modern Agriculture 
Demonstration Center with support 
from Hubei Provincial Seed Company 
Chen (2017) 
Liberia • China-FAO South-South Cooperation 
Programme including cooperation with 
LPHT 
FAO (2015, 6) 
Xinhuanet (2018) 
Mali • China-FAO South-South Cooperation 
Programme 
FAO (2015, 11) 
 
Mozambique • Huazhong Agricultural University and 
Wanbao Grain and Oilseed Company 
testing hybrid rice varieties 
CADF (2018) 
Wang (2012) 
Nigeria • CGCOC and LPHT joint venture focused 
on hybrid rice and corn (Green 
Agriculture West Africa Co. Ltd.) 
• Chongqing Seed Company 
• China-FAO South-South Cooperation 
Programme 
Ye & Fan (2008, 35-36) 
CGCOC Agriculture (2018) 
FAO (2015, 16) 
Rwanda • Tongliao Golden Mountain Seed 
Technology Company testing Jinshan 1 
and Jinshan 28 hybrid rice 
Lawther (2016, 61-62) 
Senegal • China-FAO South-South Cooperation 
Programme 
FAO (2015, 18) 
Sierra Leone • China-FAO South-South Cooperation 
Programme 
FAO (2015, 20) 
Tanzania • Chongqing Seed Company tests hybrid 
rice and corn at the China-Tanzania 
Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Center 
Chen, Chen, Wen, Li, et al., 
(2012) 
Uganda • China-FAO South-South Cooperation 
Programme 
Government of Uganda 
(2016) 
Zambia • Zambia Agricultural Science and 
Technology Demonstration Park testing 





Nigeria was identified by PRC analysts as a potential destination for both hybrid rice and 
corn seed projects (Tan & Ye, 2008, 60). In 2004, research and extension workers from 
Guizhou Institute of Agricultural Sciences and other partners tested over half a dozen 
Chinese hybrid rice varieties against conventional rice seeds sewn in northern Nigeria 
(Ye & Fan, 2008, 35-36). Though the researchers showed that some were not suitable 
for the area, several varieties were to be followed up on for eventual commercialization. 
Following these initial tests, in 2005, a company named Green Agricultural Development 
Nigeria (Lǜsè nóngyè fāzhǎn nírìlìyǎ yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 绿色农业发展尼日利亚有限公司) 
was established, and primarily controlled by the state-owned CGCOC Group. In 2008, the 
company brought in LPHT to form a joint venture named Green Agriculture West Africa 
(Lǜsè nóngyè xīfēi yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 绿色农业西非有限公司) based on hybrid rice and corn 
seed expansion. Since then, the joint venture has collaborated with the Nigerian Ministry 
of Agriculture as well as some international organizations, and extended both hybrid 
and conventional seed varieties (CGCOC Agriculture, 2018). 
In Tanzania, Chongqing Seed Company is involved in a technical demonstration 
project. The vice president of the Sichuan Academy of Agricultural Sciences places this 
demonstration project squarely in line with developing export markets for Chongqing’s 
seed companies (Tang & Tan, 2009, 34). Test-publications argued that the hybrid rice 
and corn varieties brought by Chongqing Seed Company generated higher yields than 
the local varieties planted at the China-Tanzania Agricultural Technology Demonstration 
Center in Dakawa (Zhōngguó yuán tǎnsāngníyǎ nóngyè jìshù shìfàn zhōngxīn, 中国援坦桑
尼亚农业技术示范中心) (Chen, Chen, Wen, Li, et al., 2012; Chen, Chen, Wen, Yu, et al., 
2012). Since then the company has retained links to Tanzania, with some adoption of the 
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hybrid rice technologies (Makundi, 2017). However, the adoption of foreign varieties 
has not gone without resistance. Jiang et al. (2016, 19) note that a disagreement arose in 
Tanzania based on the desire of Chinese experts to introduce Chinese hybrid varieties 
for testing, while the national government wished for more local content. Nevertheless, 
Chongqing Seed Company continues to test its imported varieties. 
A similar test-site and demonstration centre was recently established in Kenya. The 
China-Kenya Modern Agriculture Demonstration Center (Zhōngkěn xiàndài nóngyè 
shìfàn zhōngxīn, 中肯现代农业示范中心) was installed at a local university and opened 
in 2017. The Center has focused on corn and rice, as well as sorghum, and an agreement 
was signed with Hubei Provincial Seed Group (owned by Zhongnongfa Seed Industry 
Group), among others, to source seeds (Chen, 2017). In Rwanda, Lawther (2016) found 
that Jinshan 1 (Jīnshān, 金山) and Jinshan 28 rice seeds were being tested for extension 
in the uplands, though wider uptake of the seeds had not yet occurred. The varieties 
were bred in Inner Mongolia by the state-owned Tongliao Golden Mountain Seed 
Technology Company (Tōngliáo jīnshān zhǒngyè kējì yǒuxiàn zérèn gōngsī, 通辽金山种业
科技有限责任公司), a state-sanctioned dragonhead enterprise owned by Sino 
Agriholdings (Zhōngnóng jítuán zhǒngyè kònggǔ yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 中农集团种业控股有限
公司).  
The Chinese Ministry of Agriculture also indicated that several Chinese firms are 
operating in Zambia and Mozambique, some of them legacy businesses from cooperation 
projects of the 1970s. These operations include wheat, corn, and soy production, and 
new investments are being promoted through high-level delegations (Chen & Chen, 
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2007). Most recently, the China-Africa Development Fund (Zhōngfēi fāzhǎn jījīn, 中非发
展基金), who reports to the Sate Council, supported an ongoing project to plant Chinese 
rice varieties in Mozambique through a partnership that includes Hubei Province’s 
Wanbao Grain and Oilseed Company (Wànbǎo liángyóu yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 万宝粮油有限公
司) and Huazhong Agricultural University (CADF, 2018; Wang, 2012). As of 2018, the 
project is currently planting 2200 hectares of rice received from Huazhong Agricultural 
University (the specific variety is unclear), though the project has faced significant local 
resistance in its plans to expand (Wise, 2018). In Zambia, LPHT is establishing the 
Zambia Agricultural Science and Technology Demonstration Park, which will include 
hybrid rice testing and demonstration (LPHT, 2018, 163). 
 Finally, beginning in 2004, the Chinese Government partnered with the FAO in a 
“South-South Cooperation Programme”. The Programme has initiated various 
agricultural extension and technology transfer projects throughout the continent, 
including Chinese hybrid rice and corn, as well as other grains (FAO, 2015a). For 
example, hybrid rice extension projects with Chinese technicians and seeds imported 
from the PRC are in progress in Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. 
The primary supplier of hybrid grains for this initiative is the HRRC of the Hunan 
Academy of Agricultural Sciences, drawing on its own resources and those of LPHT 
(FAO, n.d.). The wider uptake of the introduced varieties remains to be determined. 
However, speaking to the broader involvement of LPHT in extension activities 
throughout SSA, a LPHT official stated that, "Many of the trainees have become high-
level officials and policymakers in their countries, and their vast understanding of 
China's agriculture can help promote further cooperation with China" (Xinhuanet, 
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2018). As such, the operations of LPHT and other businesses are serving to expand 
networks and potentially markets and influence abroad. 
The overseas extension of seed varieties developed in the PRC serves the Party-
state’s national food security objective by embedding networks of businesses and 
research institutes throughout Asia and SSA. These activities introduce many of the 
implicated companies or institutes to international competition, expand the market for 
Chinese-developed seed varieties, and secure intellectual property rights for seeds in 
these new markets. The above examples are not an exhaustive list of all projects and/or 
joint ventures to be found throughout these regions, however, they are the cases that are 
most verifiable based on Chinese language (and international) literature. Further, there 
are more projects to be found in Latin America and former Soviet states, among other 
places (Ho & Hofman, 2011; Myers & Guo, 2015).  
The above cases, however, provide a broad picture of the connections between 
the PRC’s domestic seed industry and the many international projects that often make 
headlines or appear in the Land Grab literature (Lawther, 2017). Connections to the 
PRC’s domestic seed companies are often buried in favour of focusing on either broad 
trends or local political dynamics. However, the type of detail provided above is crucial 
to understanding the emerging networks of PRC agribusinesses across the global South, 
and in turn understanding the nascent agribusiness power of the PRC. Figure 6.2 maps 
the SSA and South/Southeast Asian countries in which PRC seed companies are 
engaging in grain seed research, extension, and/or commercialization, as outlined above. 
While most of the examples in this figure are either private business arrangements or 
bilateral state initiatives, several are multilateral in nature. As such, the networks of 
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foreign ventures are based on a mix of Chinese seed companies/organizations, both 
publicly and privately held, in addition to “traditional” development actors (Gaudreau, 
2015). 
 
Figure 6.2: PRC rice and corn seed activities in SSA & South/Southeast Asia 
 
Sources: Alemu, Cook, & Qi (2015); Baig (2018); CAAEPD (2018); CADF (2018); 
Cao & Qiu (2016); CGCOC Agriculture (2018); Chen (2017); Chen, Chen, Wen, Li, 
et al., (2012); FAO (2015, 6); Government of Uganda (2016); Hunan Daily (2016); 
Lawther (2016, 61-62); Lei, Huan, & Fan (2012); Li et al. (2010); LPHT (2018); 
Siddique (2014); Srean et al. (2012); Wang (2005); Wang (2012); Wang (2015); 
Xinhuanet (2017); Xinhuanet (2018); Xiong et al. (2010); Yang et al. (2002); Ye & 
Fan (2008, 35-36); Zhang (2007, 29); Zhang & Xun (2007); Zhou et al. (2014) 
 
Whether these ventures are able to establish themselves in local markets is subject to 
question. Though there are hundreds of test-sites and joint ventures throughout the 
world, there is no guarantee for the Party-state that the technology will be adopted. 
Nevertheless, such outward investments serve to extend the PRC’s domestic seed 
technologies outward and develop markets beyond its national borders. Importantly, 
most of the countries receiving these investments have less significant market presence 




























22 Locations Found Domestic Seed Extension: 1
Domestic Seed Extension
https://batchgeo.com/map/c5199f9c5c863fd42ceebabc7e936caa
1 of 2 2019-01-03, 8:32 p.m.
 
 213 
to promote their technologies while employing discourse of South-South cooperation. In 
turn PRC agribusinesses are getting a competitive foothold in hopes of increasing their 
ability to compete against MNCs not just abroad but in their home market as well. 
6.4. Buying agribusiness networks for national food security 
The overseas testing and export of grain seed varieties developed in the PRC has been 
ongoing for decades. However, as seen above, commercialization through this channel is 
a long and complex process. Testing and adaptation of seed can take years, without 
guarantee of success. Further, the development of resource networks faces regulatory 
barriers, social resistance, and diplomatic efforts. In contrast, the second mechanism 
employed by actors from the PRC to acquire global agribusiness networks uses global 
financial channels to overtake and/or create existing resources and infrastructure. This 
pathway is a much more recent trend in the PRC’s agribusiness sector than the previous 
focus on creating markets through test-sites and exports. It also parallels, and is 
precipitated by, the general trend of global agribusiness consolidation among the largest 
seed and agrochemical firms. As discussed in Chapter 2, each segment of the global 
agricultural value chain is highly concentrated with only several companies occupying 
the majority of market share. These companies have historically been based in the U.S., 
Europe, and to a lesser extent, Japan. I will explore the recent expansion of PRC 
networks through finance in three steps: first, to illustrate the power dynamics at hand, I 
introduce a case example of a trade disruption event related to a GM corn variety owned 
by Syngenta; second, I examine the PRC’s network changes resulting from COFCO’s 
acquisition of other grain trading companies; and third, I review the global financial 
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transactions of domestic PRC actors, including ChemChina’s purchase of Syngenta, and 
their implications for the Party-state’s control over a portion of global agricultural 
inputs.  
6.4.1. Syngenta’s GM corn, China’s domestic regulations, and the global 
grain trade 
In late 2013, a watershed moment occurred, both revealing and anticipating changing 
power dynamics in the global food system. Shipments of corn began being turned away 
at the port of Shenzhen due to their contamination with a GM corn variety sold 
internationally by Syngenta but not approved in the PRC. The event lasted for one year, 
and embroiled global agribusiness giants, powerful states, international organizations, 
and American farmers. In the 14 months following the resolution to the rupture in trade, 
the PRC shifted the source of its corn imports away from the United States, COFCO 
purchased two commodity traders with substantial global assets, and ChemChina 
initiated the purchase of Syngenta.  
Agrisure Viptera is a corn variety developed by Syngenta. This GM corn uses a Bt 
insecticidal protein coding sequence, which is introduced into a corn embryo using 
recombinant DNA techniques (Health Canada, 2015). This process creates the transgenic 
genotype titled Corn Event MIR162, which is a patented technology inserted into 
commercial corn varieties, namely Agrisure Viptera corn, as well as newer Syngenta 
corn varieties such as Agrisure Duracade. As a new GM crop, Agrisure Viptera was 
subject to regulatory approvals across the globe for the purposes of cultivation, 
human/animal consumption, and/or importation. 
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Syngenta filed for approval of MIR162 in the United States, receiving both food 
and feed authorization in 2008, though only receiving environmental approval for 
cultivation in 2010 (Syngenta, 2014). In November 2009, the trait was approved for 
food, feed and cultivation in Brazil. China’s import certificate legislation requires that a 
new seed variety be approved for planting in another country before an application can 
be submitted. As a result, Syngenta submitted its application to China’s Ministry of 
Agriculture for import approval in March 2010, based on Brazil’s approval of the trait 
for cultivation. In the years that followed, several other key corn markets approved the 
trait in varying capacities, including the European Union, Argentina, Mexico, and Japan 
(Syngenta, 2014). However, in China, approval for the importation of corn containing the 
MIR162 trait remained pending. 
By 2010, Agrisure Viptera was found in 1% of U.S. corn fields, representing 
approximately 1.5 million tons of U.S. corn, and reached approximately 3% by 2012 
(Iowa Corn, 2014). Statistically, the variety was likely to be found in any batch of corn 
from the United States, due to mixed corn collection and processing methods. In 2011, 
Bunge, one of the four largest international grain traders, announced that it would not 
purchase grain produced from Agrisure Viptera seed due to the trait’s pending approval 
in China. This announcement was followed by an initial lawsuit filed by Syngenta against 
Bunge, claiming that the processor has a responsibility, “to treat depositors of 
agricultural products fairly…” (US Court of Appeals, 2014). The lawsuit was eventually 
decided in Bunge’s favour, and pointed to a clear tension between shifting import 
markets and the ability of the PRC to set informal standards on other countries.  
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In August 2013, the PRC accepted a shipment of GM corn from Argentina, likely 
containing MIR162, brought in by China’s state grain trader, COFCO (Bronstein, 2013). 
However, in November 2013, a shipment of corn from the United States was turned back 
at the port of Shenzhen because it contained MIR162. The AQSIQ in charge of border 
inspections in China released a statement indicating that MIR162 was pending approval 
in China, and shipments of corn or other grains containing MIR162 would not be 
accepted for import into the country (Xinhua, 2013b). Over the next year, multiple 
shipments containing MIR162 were refused at ports throughout China. Though numbers 
vary, it is estimated that several hundred thousand tons of corn and corn products were 
refused, and millions more tons worth of orders cancelled, with industry groups 
estimating losses between $1-2.9 billion dollars in trade (Fisher, 2014). 
In September 2014, Cargill Inc. sued Syngenta AG in U.S. state court over the 
premature release of MIR162 ahead of approval for import to China. The following week 
another U.S.-based grain exporter, Trans Coastal Supply Co, filed a separate lawsuit 
against Syngenta in US courts. Subsequently, Archer Daniels Midland as well as 
hundreds of US farmers also filed claims against Syngenta in U.S. courts that fall. 
Significant lobbying activity was also undertaken in an attempt to influence China’s 
regulatory non-decision, including actions from industry organizations such as 
MAIZALL, BIO, and Corn Growers associations, as well as diplomatic activity from the 
United States, Argentina, and Brazil. In particular, MAIZALL, which represents 
agribusiness from Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S., met with the Permanent Chinese 
Mission to the WTO, to raise the issue of MIR162 and approval timelines (MAIZALL, 
2014). In September 2014, a group of 19 US senators wrote to the United States Trade 
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Representative (USTR) Michael Froman formally requesting that the MIR162 issue be 
taken up directly with China. After more than a year of trade disruption, the approval of 
MIR162 corn was announced at a meeting of the US-China Joint Commission on 
Commerce and Trade, hosted by the USTR in December 2014. The announcement was 
made that following bilateral trade discussions placing agriculture market access as a 
priority, Agrisure Viptera had received approval from China (OUSTR, 2014).  
This event demonstrated contemporary shifts in power dynamics in the global 
food system, and hints at the Party-state’s developing national food security strategy. In 
the years following China’s initial surge in corn imports, the PRC negotiated several new 
grain trade deals. These negotiations included phytosanitary agreements with 
Argentina, Ukraine, and Brazil, establishing bilateral rules for the import of corn. In both 
Ukraine and Argentina, COFCO signed additional agreements to source and ship corn to 
China (Bronstein, 2013; Zhou, 2012). As seen in Figure 6.3, in the wake of the MIR162 
incident corn imports from the U.S. dropped precipitously in favour of imports from 
Ukraine, with increased shipments from COFCO. This outcome aligned with a strategic 
objective of the Party-state, to displace U.S.-sourced grain, thereby reducing reliance on 
the U.S. In addition, stocks of corn in the PRC were at record highs during this period. 
Chen Xiwen of the Agriculture and Rural Leading Small group had indicated that to 
reduce stocks, it was necessary to “obstruct the imports of corn alternatives” in addition 












This event also demonstrates the changing structural power of the PRC in the global 
grain trade. Though the farmers harvesting MIR162 corn had followed the rules within 
their country, the position of the PRC as a major importer of corn effectively created new 
rules for major grain traders. Even though private governance initiatives existed to 
coordinate the international launch of agricultural biotechnology products, these 
mechanisms failed in the absence of formal global rules.28 In essence, a regulatory non-
decision by the Party-state was capable of disrupting global grain trade, affecting 
commodity prices, agribusiness incomes, and farmer incomes. Between November 2013 
and October 2014 at the height of the MIR162 incident, Syngenta’s stock price decreased 
from $70.78 to $57.61. This incident presaged key international financial actions by 
state-owned agribusiness in the PRC, greatly increasing the reach of global networks 
under the influence of the Party-state. These actions are elaborated below. 
                                                        
28 BIO, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, had introduced a Product Launch Stewardship policy to deal with 
situations of “Asynchronous authorizations combined with importing countries maintaining “zero tolerance””. Most 
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6.4.2. Creating global food corridors through grain trade acquisitions 
As discussed above, China’s long-term position of having very limited agricultural trade 
volumes changed in the mid-1990s with the liberalization of soybean trade and even 
more so after accession to the WTO in 2001 (Lardy, 2004; Schneider, 2014a; USDA, 
2013). Prior to this period, China’s ownership of foreign grain trading infrastructure was 
limited, with China’s state commodity trading company, COFCO, being restructured 
between the late 1980s and mid-1990s into an internationally operating entity 
(McCorriston & MacLaren, 2010). Though COFCO expanded its trading desks abroad, its 
global infrastructure footprint remained limited relative to grain traders. In recent 
years, however, agribusinesses from China, including COFCO, have increasingly invested 
in such trading infrastructure. 
There are multiple examples of investments connected to individual companies 
and countries. For example, in Australia, Beidahuang purchased not only agricultural 
land, but also ports in Albany through their company Vicstock (Thompson, 2015). In 
both Cambodia and Myanmar, Chinese firms are investing in rice processing projects 
(Far Eastern Agriculture, n.d.; Xinhua, 2013a). Over the last decade, China’s largest 
privately-owned agribusiness, New Hope Group (Xīn xīwàng jítuán, 新希望集团), has 
opened three plants in the Philippines, three in Vietnam, two in Indonesia, as well as 
facilities in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Egypt, and Bangladesh. However, the most important 
and expansive overseas investments were in 2014, with COFCO’s purchase of two 
international grain traders, Nidera and Noble Agri (Meyer, 2014; Thukral & Flaherty, 
2014; Oliveira, 2017).  
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As early as 2013, executives from Chinese SOEs were investigating foreign 
merger and acquisition possibilities in the grain sector, including conducting site visits 
abroad (Javier & Yun, 2013). Earlier, in 2012, Chen Xiwen stated that PRC agribusiness 
should expand by investing in grain trade in the name of supply stability (Javier & Yun, 
2013). By early 2014, at the height of the MIR162 event, COFCO had announced two 
planned acquisitions. In February 2014, COFCO announced the purchase of 51% of 
Dutch grain trader, Nidera. The purchase was finalized in October 2015. By September 
2017, COFCO had purchased the remaining share of Nidera, forming a wholly owned 
subsidiary. Subsequently, in April 2014, COFCO announced plans to purchase a 51% 
stake in Noble Agri, based in Singapore. The deal was closed in September 2015, and 
only months later COFCO announced plans to purchase the subsequent 49% stake to 
absorb 100% of Noble Agri. The total cost of these deals amounted to over $3 billion, 
and were financed jointly by COFCO and a private equity consortium where COFCO 
provided two thirds of the capital (Sterling, 2018; Thukral & Flaherty, 2014). The 
private equity consortium included a Chinese private equity firm, Hopu Investment 
Management Corporation, as well as the Singaporean sovereign wealth fund Tamasek, 
the International Financial Corporation (part of the World Bank Group), and Standard 
Chartered Bank’s private equity group. The debt taken on through these deals was 
financed “by a syndicate of banks with HSBC as coordinator and Bank of China as facility 
agent” (Clifford Chance, 2014).  
Though COFCO cooperates with global agribusiness, it is also a key Chinese state-





[a]s a state-owned company that has developed alongside our country, COFCO 
always considers national food security, the stability of grain and oil market and 
the improvement of people’s livelihood as our core responsibilities. Focusing on 
our core business is our strategic choice as the lifeblood industry of China. 
(COFCO, 2017, 9) 
 
Ning (Frank) Gaoning (Níng gāoníng, 宁高宁) was the company’s CEO from 2004 to 
2014. Ning, a high-ranking member of the CPC, oversaw the Noble and Nidera 
acquisitions. He also sat as one of nineteen members of the powerful central committee 
of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (Jìlǜ jiǎnchá wěiyuánhu, 纪律检查委
员会), China’s top anti-corruption body that answers directly to China’s top political 
body, the Politburo Standing Committee (Zhōngyāng zhèngzhì jú chángwù wěiyuánhuì, 
中央政治局常务委员会) (Gong, 2008). In 2010, Ning invited delegates from the 
Agriculture and Rural Leading Small Group, including Chen Xiwen, to a Party conference 
with the company’s Party Leadership Group to strategize on COFCO’s execution of the 
Party’s No. 1 Policy Document objectives (COFCO, 2010). The Noble and Nidera 
acquisitions can be seen as directly aligned with Party-state strategy and food security 
priority, even while being coordinated by and benefiting networks of agribusiness 
professionals (see Oliveira, 2017). 
As noted above, COFCO previously only held subsidiaries coordinating grain 
trade logistics in various countries worldwide and held very little in the way of trade 
infrastructure such as storage, processing, transportation and port facilities. Instead, its 
orders for agricultural goods had been filled either through major grain traders, or 
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through China’s state-owned shipping businesses. For example, COFCO and China Ocean 
Shipping Company (known as COSCO) agreed to a strategic partnership in 2007 given 
COFCO’s position as a ‘VIP customer’ (COSCO, 2008). The new agribusiness formation 
between COFCO, Noble, and Nidera has been described as building on a special 
relationship (Oliveira & Schneider, 2016). 
As seen in Figure 6.4, the acquisition of Noble Agri and Nidera has led to COFCO 
increasing (or initiating) its presence in 21 countries, across six continents. This 
expansion includes networks of processing, storage, and shipping infrastructure 
covering corn, soybean, rice and wheat among other commodities and fertilizer inputs. 
COFCO’s corporate plan specifically highlights the network established through these 
acquisitions, framed in the context of the Party-state’s going-out policy and national food 
security,  
 
Utilizing on our mature global grain trade networks, we have established stable 
food corridors bridging the world’s largest grain producing areas, such as South 
America and the Black Sea and the emerging markets in Asia, which have the 
largest grain demand in the world. By doing this, we have effectively executed the 
“Going Global” strategy for China’s agriculture industry and laid a solid foundation 
for food security of China. (COFCO, 2017, 2) 
 
The concept of “stable food corridors” is reflective of the concept of securitized 
foodways in that these corridors reflect global agriculture resource networks ultimately 
under control of the Party-state. Notably, the company acknowledges that the food 
security “of China” is directly linked establishing these “stable food corridors” 




Figure 6.4: COFCO - Nidera and Noble Agri’s global presence 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Nidera (2015) and Noble Agri (2015) 
 
Figure 6.4 highlights the new presence of COFCO in Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, and the 
United States, which are China’s most significant sources of soybean and corn imports 
(Oliveira & Schneider, 2016; USDA, 2013). Though there is very little in the way of direct 
land purchases/leases involved in these transactions of existing infrastructure, there is a 
significant increase in large and small farms becoming more closely connected to 
purchasing channels and infrastructure owned by the Chinese state. While the ABCD 
firms certainly retain the majority of global market share, there are already significant 
structural shifts at the country-level, with COFCO now controlling over 10% of 
Argentina’s grain export market (Clarin, 2014). In Brazil, the ABCD firms’ market share 
decreased from 57% in 2003 to 37% in 2015 due to increased purchases from Asian 
trading houses including COFCO (Bonato, 2016). In addition, COFCO’s purchase of both 
Nidera and Noble Agri is accompanied by research and development infrastructure in 
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corn and soybean, including intellectual property over internationally planted seed 
varieties.  
Given these major changes in global infrastructure networks, it is clear that 
actors from China are now increasingly involved in food supply chains before and after 
the growing of crops, both of which increase the international presence of Chinese 
actors in highly concentrated industries. Again, like the promotion of industrial seeds, 
China’s No. 1 policy document has promoted the acquisition of processing and trade 
firms, a government stance that continues from an agricultural going-out policy (Chen, 
2012; Zhai, 2006). The modified ownership of these marketing channels places farmers 
throughout the globe, working an immense area of land, in much more direct contact 
with Chinese actors than was previously the case. The result is that now a larger share of 
the grains being imported to China (and traded globally) passes through the hands of an 
enterprise ultimately owned by the Party-state. While the PRC no longer produces all 
the soy and corn necessary to satisfy its domestic animal feed demand, some of the grain 
it does bring in is sourced through domestically owned foreign infrastructure. 
6.4.3. Securing technology and competitiveness through seed company 
acquisitions 
In the wake of the PRC blocking corn shipments from global grain traders, and a chorus 
of voices arguing that China will not commercialize GM grains, several major 
agribusiness acquisitions occurred. Grain seeds and agrochemical inputs have been the 
focus of international financial transactions over the last several years. In December 
2015, Dupont and Dow announced their planned merger, while in May 2016 Bayer 
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began to the process of acquiring Monsanto. The examples provided below reflect the 
large-scale entry of actors from the PRC in the global seed, biotechnology, and 
agrochemical input sectors, resulting in a significant expansion of foreign seed industry 
resource networks.  
The most significant case is ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta. In February 
2016, ChemChina, a Chinese state-owned agrochemical firm, announced its intention to 
purchase Syngenta in an acquisition deal. In the arrangement, ChemChina would 
purchase the vast majority of Syngenta’s shares, and de-list the company in order to 
become a private (state-owned) enterprise. Costing $44 billion, the acquisition amounts 
to the largest ever by an actor from the PRC. To finance this significant cost, the deal 
brought in support primarily from PRC-based financial actors, including Bank of 
China/China Reform Holdings/Industrial Bank (US$18 billion), CITIC Bank consortium 
(US$12.7 billion), HSBC (US$6.81 billion), and Morgan Stanley (US$2 billion). In 
addition, ChemChina itself provided US$5 billion (Liu, 2017). The acquisition of 
Syngenta provides ChemChina with a significant global presence in the seed and 
agrochemical market as well as Syngenta’s intellectual property rights in the 
biotechnology sector. Indeed, Syngenta owns the GM corn seeds at the heart of the 
MIR162 incident. 
The purchase of Syngenta spurred criticism both within the PRC and from prominent 
U.S. politicians. Within the PRC, concerned citizens lobbied to halt the acquisition due to 
the threat of imported GM seeds (Collier, 2018). In a letter to the Ministry of Health that 
made its way to SASAC under the State Council, the 400 citizen signatories stated that, 
“[t]he acquisition of Syngenta and the promotion of its genetically-modified and agro-
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chemical agriculture in the country would destroy the country’s own agriculture and 
food security…” (Collier, 2018, 14). This dynamic between the Party-state and domestic 
alternative food advocates will be further explored in Chapter 7. Within the U.S., Iowan 
Senator and chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee Chuck Grassley stated that his, 
“concerns of concentration and national security are compounded by the fact the 
Chinese government, if the ChemChina-Syngenta deal is approved, would be both a 
regulator in regard to biotech product approval and also at the same time owner of an 
entity that needs biotech approval” (Donnan, 2016). Despite the protestations on both 
sides, the deal was approved. Following the approval, Senator Grassley argued that,  
 
[t]he ChemChina-Syngenta merger raises questions about national security 
because of the need to ensure a safe food supply in the United States. It’s clear that 
China is looking at purchasing companies with food production expertise as part 
of a long-term strategic plan and a component of their national security. We need 
to be looking at these mergers in the same way, so it makes sense for [the 
Committee on Foreign Investment] to take that angle into consideration when 
reviewing these transactions. (Grassley, 2016) 
 
He further advocated that the USDA be included in future national security 
reviews. Though his recommendation has not been implemented, it is clear that 
some corners of the U.S. government are beginning to rethink the relationship 
between agrifood power and national security. This dynamic provides a striking 
contrast to statements of previous U.S. administrations during the U.S. food 
regime, as discussed in Chapter 5, where it was U.S. agrifood power providing a 
“lifeline” to other countries. 
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On the part of Syngenta, former Chairman Michel Demaré noted that the acquisition 
makes Syngenta, “a partner of the Chinese government to basically drive the 
modernisation of Chinese agriculture — so we get the whole growth story” (Atkins, 
2017). Upon closing the transaction, ChemChina’s then-CEO Ren Jianxin (Rén Jiànxīn, 任
建新) stated his intentions to extend Syngenta’s seeds to Southern countries, 
"[d]eveloping countries around the world, including China, need Syngenta for its 
technology, for its products and for its services…India is another major growth market 
with a huge population...and I believe Africa will be the other major growth market for 
Syngenta" (Fukao, 2017). The purchase of Syngenta by ChemChina, much like the 
purchase of Noble and Nidera by COFCO, provides inroads to the global infrastructure 
necessary to establish securitized foodways. Figure 6.5 displays Syngenta’s global 
network, by country. Syngenta has a presence in 89 countries across the world. 
 
        Figure 6.5: ChemChina’s acquired global network through Syngenta 
 
       Source: Syngenta (2017); mapped using batchgeo.com 




























This network provides a Chinese SOE with the combination of intellectual property 
rights, germplasm resources, agrochemical inputs, production bases, and a global 
distribution network. Since ChemChina’s purchase of Syngenta, the GM corn seed at the 
heart of the import embargo has been approved in China along with other Syngenta GM 
seeds that were awaiting approval (Unglesbee, 2017). Syngenta also owns golden rice 
technology (Parayil, 2003). The company’s long-term focus on GM technologies within 
rice, as well as presence in Southeast Asian rice research addresses a central market 
concern in terms of outward expansion. These networks in SSA and Southeast Asia run 
parallel to the projects discussed in section 6.3. 
Since the initial acquisition of Syngenta by ChemChina, further consolidation and 
strategic partnership have occurred vis-à-vis state-owned seed businesses. In February 
2018, Syngenta/ChemChina acquired Nidera’s seed division from COFCO, seeking 
efficiencies between these two newly formed global agribusinesses (Syngenta, 2018b). 
ChemChina has also created partnerships with other seed firms in the PRC. For example 
it partnered with LPHT on corn seed biotechnology (Patton, 2018).  
In a significant development for the PRC’s overall seed industry, ChemChina is 
preparing to merge with Sinochem, though the tie-up was not complete at time of 
writing. Nevertheless, significant steps have already been taken. In July 2018, Frank 
Ning, who oversaw COFCO’s acquisition of Noble and Nidera, was appointed as 
Chairman and Secretary of the Party Committee (Dǎngzǔ shūjì, 党组书记) for ChemChina 
while concurrently serving as Chair and Secretary for Sinochem (Sinochem, 2018). After 
being appointed to these positions in ChemChina, Ning was promoted to Chair of 
Syngenta’s board of directors (Syngenta, 2018a). As discussed in Chapter 5, Sinochem 
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also purchased CNSGC, which has in turn gained control of many smaller seed 
companies over the last decade. Further, CNSGC oversees Monsanto’s key grain seed 
joint venture, International Seed. Overseeing Sinochem itself is SASAC, a supervision 
unit under the State Council – the top government body in the PRC. This supervision, 
partnership, and ownership structure is outlined in Figure 6.6. 
 
                   Figure 6.6: State Council supervision of the PRC’s global agribusiness 
 
            Source: based on author’s compilation (see in-text citations) 
 
In addition, since the purchase of Syngenta, other outward acquisitions of major seed 
companies have continued. In July 2017, CITIC Agri Fund (Zhōngxìn nóngyè kējì gǔfèn 
yǒuxiàn gōngsī, 中信农业科技股份有限公司), owned by the state-owned conglomerate 
CITIC Bank and LPHT purchased Dow AgroScience’s corn business in Brazil. As 
established in Chapter 5, LPHT itself is owned in part by CITIC, which as a state bank 
reports to the Ministry of Finance. This transaction offers LPHT significant resources, 
including “corn seed production sites and four research centers, along with a copy of the 
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Dow AgroSciences’ Brazilian corn germplasm bank, certain commercial and pipeline 
hybrids, and the Morgan trademark. CITIC Agri Fund also received a license to the Dow 
Sementes trademark for 12 months” (Dow, 2017). The sale itself took place as a result of 
Dow’s required divestiture under its merger with DuPont Pioneer. Combined, these 
financial transactions create a significant network of global resources under the 
(indirect) supervision of the PRC’s top government body, the State Council. 
Though the PRC will continue to require grain imports for its feed requirements, 
a larger share of that imported grain will now be grown using seed varieties and inputs 
that are researched, developed, and sold by domestically controlled SOEs. The 
acquisition of Syngenta greatly expands the PRC’s structural power in the global food 
system through access to established commercial seed markets, infrastructure, and 
access to significant intellectual property rights in the GM seed sector. These resources, 
ultimately reporting to the State Council, have the potential to have access to preferable 
regulatory treatment in Mainland China and preferential state support in international 
markets. As noted in Chapter 5, the previous lack of competitiveness in GM seeds 
relative to foreign-owned companies is a critical reason that the PRC has not 
commercialized GM grain crops for domestic cultivation. As such, these acquisitions 
address a critical national food security concern for the Party-state, by having a SOE 
among the global agribusiness giants with intellectual property in biotechnology, but 
potentially at the expense of the concerns of domestic food activists. 
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6.5. Discussion and conclusion 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Party-state was faced with a new dynamic in the context 
of national food security. For the first time in the history of the PRC, a significant portion 
of domestic grain requirements was being sourced through imports. U.S. global 
agribusiness supplied inputs and shipped/processed these grains, particularly soybean 
and later corn. As seen in Chapter 5, these agribusinesses were simultaneously 
attempting to enter the PRC’s domestic agricultural markets. These new pressures 
forced a reformulation of the concept of national food security in the context of changing 
domestic consumption and increased economic integration. In order to retain 
agricultural self-reliance, national food security required an external dimension. This 
external dimension is embodied by the agricultural going-out policy and is focused on 
the export of domestic technologies and securing ownership over a portion of global 
agricultural supply chains. The increasing concentration of foreign-owned agribusiness 
placed further pressure on the Party-state and state-owned agribusiness to more rapidly 
pursue a series of mergers and acquisitions at the global level.  
 Whereas control over the domestic grain seed market involved the exercise of 
structural power over China’s domestic market, gained through historical autonomy 
from the global food system and broader global economy, the Party-state’s pursuit of 
international expansion involved building power in a concentrated global food system. 
The two mechanisms laid out above focus on establishing networks through seed 
extension and export projects, particularly in SSA and South/Southeast Asia, and 
acquiring the resources of existing global agribusiness firms. Figure 6.7 brings together 




          Figure 6.7 Contemporary global grain presence of the PRC 
 
Source: Alemu, Cook, & Qi (2015); Baig (2018); CAAEPD (2018); CADF (2018); Cao & 
Qiu (2016); CGCOC Agriculture (2018); Chen (2017); Chen, Chen, Wen, Li, et al., (2012); 
FAO (2015, 6); Government of Uganda (2016); Hunan Daily (2016); Lawther (2016, 61-
62); Lei, Huan, & Fan (2012); Li et al. (2010); LPHT (2018); Nidera (2015); Noble Agri 
(2015); Siddique (2014); Srean et al. (2012); Syngenta (2017); Wang (2005); Wang 
(2012); Wang (2015); Xinhuanet (2017); Xinhuanet (2018); Xiong et al. (2010); Yang et 
al. (2002); Ye & Fan (2008, 35-36); Zhang (2007, 29); Zhang & Xun (2007); Zhou et al. 
(2014)  
 
Specifically, Figure 6.7 amalgamates the information presented in Figures 6.2, 6.4, and 
6.5, to present the recent foreign expansion of China’s agribusiness network, through 1) 
the overseas projects and partnerships of domestic seed companies and institutes in 
SSA, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, 2) COFCO’s purchase of Noble and Nidera, and 3) 
ChemChina’s purchase of Syngenta. Together this information paints a picture of a 
striking expansion of global infrastructure and resources, largely in the realm of the 
grains sector. Importantly this network is based on projects and acquisitions since 2005, 



























1 of 6 2019-01-03, 10:58 p.m.
 
 233 
significantly smaller, mainly containing older foreign seed partnerships along with 
several of COFCO’s trading desks. 
The cumulative effect of this network expansion is two-fold. First, markets and 
infrastructure for PRC-developed seed are expanding and branching out domestically 
owned intellectual property and agribusiness operations. The expansion of networks 
serves to support PRC agribusiness firms and research institutes while also establishing 
their presence abroad in markets that are less concentrated in terms of dominant global 
agribusiness firms. As stated in central policy documents in section 6.2., this permits 
nationally owned firms to expand their markets abroad with the aim of increasing their 
ability to compete in global markets and increasing competitiveness at home. In terms of 
Syngenta and other seed acquisitions, agribusiness form the PRC has secured control 
over a wider range of foreign germplasm and GM patents, including through SOEs that 
report to the Party-state. Second, control over a portion of global resources in the grain 
and seed industries means that imported commodities to China are not completely 
foreign-sourced. Rather, the value and supply chain of imported commodities are 
increasingly owned by actors from the PRC; an increasing share of the seed with which 
the grain is grown and the infrastructure used to transport it, are owned by the PRC. In 
this sense, self-sufficiency has been projected abroad. Over time, the foreign expansion 
of domestic seed may increase the quantity of grain produced using resources owned by 
actors from the PRC. Nevertheless, not all overseas seed ventures (particular 
exploratory test sites) will result in an increased foothold in international markets. 
Further, China continues to import significant quantities of grain through foreign-owned 
grain traders, including the ABCD firms (Hall, forthcoming; Oliveira, 2017). The global 
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orientation of self-reliance remains in its beginning state, though significant 
reorientation in market structure has taken place. 
For the Party-state, the importance of establishing broad networks through state-
owned agribusiness is not only to control the flow of resources. It enables greater 
structural power. As shown in the case of Agrisure Viptera, the volume of the PRC’s grain 
imports already provided an element of informal structural power. To an extent, being a 
large customer allows the PRC to set international variety approval standards, in the 
absence of formal rules, given that a significant share of grains will be shipped to the 
country, even at the expense of other powerful actors in the global food system. 
Expanded international networks in multiple links in the grain supply chain can offer 
greater ability to: 1) execute existing informal structural power, and 2) influence formal 
regulations at the national and international level. In fact, the Party-state has set 
objectives to affect this kind of structural power, seeking to “actively participate in the 
formulation and revision of international trade rules and international standards, and 
advance the mutual recognition of the results of agricultural product approvals” (CPC 
Central Committee, 2016b). The Party-state’s newfound power, and its ideational 
underpinnings, has shifted the dynamics of the global food system. The global food 
system’s geopolitical poles are now shifting (Belesky & Lawrence, 2018; Margulis, 
2014). By establishing positive power via agribusiness networks in the global food 
system the Party-state is increasingly positioned to shape the capacities of other actors 
in the global food system to act.  
However, this expansion has not gone unnoticed or unopposed. Resistance is 
seen in multiple corners, from the protests lodged due to the Agrisure Viptera rejections, 
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to the focus on China’s place in land grabs and opposition to seed extension projects, to 
the invocation of national security concerns in the United States regarding the Syngenta 
purchase. In the context of overseas seed extension, there is an ironic symmetry 
between hybrid rice expansion projects and the Cornell-Nanjing project that was once 
demonized in the early Mao period. The increasingly wide literature on specific overseas 
development projects of the PRC raises questions about displacement of both people 
and traditional crops, and the unevenness of these impacts (Brautigam & Zhang, 2013; 
Cotula, 2013; Lawther, 2017). Meanwhile in the context of broader global agribusiness 
acquisitions, and as indicated in critical statements from several U.S. state actors, it is 
clear that the U.S. does not have a distinct or structured approach to national food grain 
security in the way that the PRC does. While these questions remain pertinent, the 
motivations behind these extension activities and agribusiness acquisitions should be 
re-evaluated in the framework of securitized foodways. In addition to these 
international sources of opposition, there has also been resistance domestically within 




Chapter 7: National Food Security and 
People’s Food Sovereignty29 
7.1. Introduction 
In the context of global agribusiness concentration and the Party-state’s securitized 
foodways imperative, can local alternatives exist China? The previous chapters largely 
focus on commercial grain and grain seed in the PRC and globally. However, each 
chapter also introduced elements of opposition to the food system promoted by Party-
state policy relative to establishing a domestic commercial seed system and exerting 
control over elements of the global industrial food system. This chapter examines the 
dynamics of domestic PRC food movements linked to global advocacy for agricultural 
alternatives, and their relationship to the Party-state’s national food security imperative. 
I argue that the shared normative priority related to independence from foreign control 
provides critical food organizations with normative space to operate and develop 
nascent networks within the PRC. Some scholars argue that the Party-state’s quest for 
independence is akin to the goals of the food sovereignty movement (Zhang, 2018). 
However, the Party-state’s pursuit of securitized foodways through a globally 
competitive industrial food system sets limits on the ability of alternative food 
movements to scale up, even though these movements can exercise some negative 
power vis-à-vis actors supporting the industrial food system.  
                                                        




 There is a distinct overlap in the pro-autonomy arguments of Party-state actors 
and of alternative food movements in the PRC. Like the Chinese Party-state and 
agribusiness actors, global food sovereignty movements have emerged as critical or 
oppositional forces to concentration in global agribusiness (Wittman, 2011). The voices 
of such food movements are similar in the PRC where there is opposition in some 
corners to both the dominant global food system and to agricultural biotechnology 
(Zhang, 2018). Meanwhile, Party-state and corporate actors in the PRC have expressed 
concern over global agribusiness markets, using a stream of logic and supporting 
arguments that partially mirror food activists both in China and globally (see also Yan et 
al. 2016). This partial similarity in each group’s arguments creates both opportunities 
and challenges for potential food sovereignty activists in China. The overlap uniquely 
affects the normative space in which local food movements can successfully position 
their activities. 
I begin this chapter by reviewing the arguments made by Party-state and 
agribusiness actors in China relative to the global food system and corporate 
concentration in foreign-owned agribusiness. I then turn to the position of alternative 
food movements and food sovereignty activism in the PRC, focusing on global 
agribusiness concentration as a source of anti-neoliberal motivation. Next, I present a 
case example of the 2014/15 revisions to the PRC’s Seed Law, where both agribusiness 
and NGOs attempted to exert influence over the rules governing seed property rights 
and seed saving. Finally, I examine the interaction between the discourse of both groups 
to better understand opportunities and constraints presented both in relation to the PRC 
and critical food studies more broadly. 
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7.2. Corporate concentration and national food security 
As seen in Chapter 5, foreign-owned agribusiness firms (who retain 49% ownership) 
have not gained a majority share in PRC grain seed companies. Further, foreign 
agribusiness firms in China’s grain seed industry hold a minority position both in terms 
of market share, though they do have a presence in grain seed sales and research 
capacity, and dominate the vegetable seed market (Elgion & Zuo, 2014). The Party-
state’s national food security priority has specifically aimed to keep foreign agribusiness 
at bay within the PRC. This priority is reflected in striking discourse from Party-state 
and corporate PRC actors regarding concentration in global agribusiness, and the threat 
it poses for China’s food security.  
On one hand, there are many actors that promote a level of international partnership 
with major global agribusinesses. For instance, the deputy CEO of China’s largest state-
owned seed company, CNSGC, which has joint ventures with Monsanto, indicated that, 
“[a]t present, China still must cooperate with these transnational seed enterprises who 
have mastered advanced biotechnology, after all the foreign seed industry is more than 
ten years ahead of us” (Chen & Wu, 2009). Similarly, a high-ranking State Council 
representative indicated that in the context of increased foreign agribusiness presence 
in China, domestic seed firms will strive to develop their own breeds, and will learn from 
foreign partnerships (Chen & Wu, 2009). Of course, the joint ventures presented in 
chapters 5 and 6 also point to the established partnerships between domestic and 
international seed companies. Global agribusinesses, for their part, encourage 
partnership in China (see Fortune & DuPont, 2013).  
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On the other hand, there is a broader policy discourse among state, Party, and 
business officials that puts specific boundaries on the above statements. This discourse 
places the national economy at odds with incumbent global agribusiness actors. In 2010, 
Yin Chengjie, a Party member and rural economist, spoke out about global agribusiness 
power. As a member of the Agricultural and Rural Affairs Committee, a top state-political 
body working on agricultural subjects, he articulated the issue as follows, 
 
An important aspect of the [international] agricultural industry is that some MNCs 
control agricultural technology. There are currently about 9000 patents held on a 
number of crops, of which 45% are held by four MNCs. Many agricultural 
multinationals achieve influence and control over the industry by controlling 
production and supply of seeds of native plants through genetic resources and 
patent applications. (Yin, 2010, 7) 
 
For Yin, the issue is to avoid dependency on foreign agribusiness within China. The 
potential source of dependence is through the concentration of control over seed 
technology and germplasm resources, which presents a potential threat to China’s food 
and economic security (Yin, 2009, 2010). It is significant that Yin expressed these 
opinions while in the position of Deputy Director of the Agricultural and Rural Affairs 
Committee, as it demonstrates a stream of thought that is present in prominent state 
forums. In a similar vein, representatives of Shandong Denghai Seed Company (who 
have the majority share in a joint venture with DuPont Pioneer) wrote that,  
 
China’s seed industry does not have large companies. Small companies and 
research institutes alone, if confronting transnational corporations, would be 
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disastrous. Therefore, we should accelerate industry-research combinations, and 
establish industry leading innovation alliances, and cultivate an internationally 
competitive seed industry “aircraft carrier” enterprise to maintain national control 
of the seed industry, promote economic development, and ensure national food 
security. (Yang et al., 2010) 
 
These authors, who work for a major foreign-domestic joint venture, argue that China 
ought to protect against domestic take-over by scaling up to create a large, competitive, 
nationally owned firm. In fact, the authors directly invoke the term “national food 
security”, written in Chinese as “national food grain security”, in the context of the 
tension between global and national markets. Food security is thus employed to denote 
the necessity for China’s grain seed markets to be distinct from those controlled by 
multinational agribusiness. Importantly, though the problem identified is the 
concentrated structure of the global seed industry, their solution is to mimic this 
structure with a nationally owned “aircraft carrier” agribusiness able to compete against 
current power-holders. The beginnings of this process are seen in chapters 5 and 6. 
Other commentators express the issue of concentration in terms of national 
sovereignty. State and corporate representatives related to Shofine Seed Company argue 
that, “transnational corporations principally use technological lock-in to reinforce the 
technical dependence of the host country, reducing technological spill overs and 
maintaining the advantage of monopoly. With the continuous expansion of transnational 
seed companies’ R&D activities in China, our country has lost its ‘technological 
sovereignty’ in seed science and technology” (Zhang et al. 2014, 13). In this argument, 
the global seed industry has the ability to create dependency, which undermines 
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national sovereignty by disabling a nation’s capacity to reproduce its own agricultural 
inputs from domestic sources of technology. Given the expansive networks of the 
handful of foreign-owned MNCs, the authors see national capacity as threatened by 
concentration and foreign ownership. 
 Within both state and corporate discourse in the PRC, there is specific focus on 
the threat of global agribusiness concentration. This threat spurred the global 
acquisitions discussed in Chapter 6. In addition, the orientation of many Chinese 
academic studies focus on the need to protect and promote the domestic seed industry 
over foreign agribusiness, particularly as a result of the oligopolistic structure of the 
global seed industry (Huang & Liu, 2015; Jing & Li, 2010; Liu & Li, 2011; Zhang & Pan, 
2014). Such articles typically provide policy direction to address the place of Chinese 
industry within concentrated global agribusiness, whether at the level of patent rights, 
research promotion, or to provide broader theoretical context. Li et al. (2009) argue 
that,  
 
[t]he real reason [developed countries don’t end agricultural subsidies] is that 
since the Second World War, the ‘weaponization of agricultural products’ has 
become an important strategic means for the developed countries to control the 
food sovereignty of underdeveloped countries, comprehensively controlling their 
economy, politics and society. 
 
This view is parallel to the very processes discussed by food regime theory in the 
context of U.S. relationships with developing countries’ agricultural systems. Given that 
food security is expressed as a national security concern in the context of agribusiness 
concentration and dependency, alternative development policies are proposed. 
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Transnational control of corn seed has been argued to be a particularly sensitive area of 
food security requiring state intervention, given recent increases in corn planting 
throughout China, for example Xianyu335, and the entry of foreign MNCs in the seed 
market (Xiong, 2013). As discussed in Chapter 5, GM corn and rice seed have not been 
introduced commercially in China, thereby restricting varieties introduced by MNCs. 
Opinions are mixed on timelines for domestic commercialization of GM seeds. GM 
researchers in the PRC typically expect that it is inevitable, while hybrid grain breeders 
are more circumspect.30 However, given the preoccupation of state and corporate 
commentators, GM seed adoption in China would be acceptable given national 
ownership over the technology, thereby avoiding foreign dependence (see also Zhang, 
2018). 
 As seen in chapters 5 and 6, the Party-state’s response to the challenge of 
corporate concentration has been to at once expand and consolidate domestically 
owned networks of industrial grain seed while acquiring existing global agribusiness 
networks. The effect on domestic agriculture is to reinforce the PRC’s industrial food 
system, based on purchased seed and agrochemical inputs, and supported by subsidies 
to HYVs and financial support to dragonhead enterprises (Veeck, 2013). All the while, 
these policies are enacted using terms such as food security and sovereignty. However, 
these terms refer to national security and national sovereignty over agricultural inputs. 
This distinction is important in the context of alternative food movements and food 
sovereignty advocacy in the PRC. 
                                                        
30 Author interview, Yunnan Province, China, October 2015; Author interview, Beijing, China, November 2015 
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7.3. Food movements and the potential for food sovereignty 
in the PRC 
Food sovereignty is a perspective and practice advanced by indigenous peoples, small 
farmers, food activists, and scholars, among others. In light of current trends in global 
agribusiness, food sovereignty movements seek to offer a local solution to global food 
and environmental crises. The concept gained traction in the 1990s through the network 
of La Via Campesina with a strong presence among peasant and small farmers in 
developing countries. The organization indicates that its network reaches some 200 
million people in 73 countries (La Via Campesina, 2011). Though La Via Campesina is 
often the central focus in discussions of food sovereignty, many voices contribute to the 
activities of the movement (Edelman, 2014; Shilomboleni, 2017). Common among these 
voices is the articulation of struggle against a neoliberal food system, which prioritizes 
capital accumulation through such features as free trade and investment, industrial 
monoculture, and privately funded agricultural research (Clark, 2015). As a result, many 
participants in the movement have goals defined as “strongly oppos[ing] corporate 
driven agriculture and transnational companies that are destroying people and nature” 
(La Via Campesina, 2011). The proposed solution offered by food sovereignty advocates 
points to localized food systems largely divorced from global value chains as a means to 
create a more sustainable food system in opposition to the dynamics characterized by 
global agribusiness. 
In fact, food sovereignty advocates argue that global industrial agriculture is a driver 
of world hunger, and point to neoliberal state policy as an enabler of this dynamic 
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(Trauger, 2014). Trauger (2014) argues that the contemporary nation-state has to 
enable global agribusiness in order to reproduce its (neo)liberal sources of power. 
Similarly, the crystallization of a co-opted state, powerful agribusiness, and the advent of 
biotechnology, is seen as threatening the potential for food sovereignty (Otero, 2012). 
The place of the nation-state has been a point of contention within food sovereignty 
activism, playing both the role of host to global industrial agriculture and an important 
actor for food sovereignty (see Declaration of Nyéléni, n.d.; Edelman, 2014). For 
example, Clark (2015, 183) uses the case of Ecuador, whose state has partially 
institutionalized food sovereignty, to argue the necessity of state sovereignty to alter 
“the neoliberal global food system.” In its application across countries and communities, 
common resistance to neoliberalism takes differing shapes (Alkon & Mares, 2012; 
Shilomboleni, 2017). 
 Seeds are a crucial element of food sovereignty, prioritizing the use of local seed 
varieties and the independence of seeds from the agribusiness system described above 
(Wittman, 2011). Indeed, “seed sovereignty” is a necessary component of food 
sovereignty (Kloppenburg, 2010). Local seed saving and exchange independent from 
commercial systems is often carried out through kinship networks and peasant 
organizations, but these mechanisms can be put at risk through unfavourable state 
policies (Bezner Kerr, 2013). While property rights systems that give privilege to 
commercial seed varieties are seen by many food sovereignty scholars as the antithesis 
to seed sovereignty, some advocates have attempted to strengthen collective rights over 
seeds by engaging in “open-source” systems of property rights (Kloppenburg, 2010). 
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This approach continues to place seeds at the centre of the movement but attempts to 
reposition state legal authority to serve its needs. 
 In the PRC, while the industrial food system has expanded, alternative and local 
food movements have developed across the country over the last decade. A small but 
growing number of alternative food networks (AFNs) have emerged, including 
community supported agriculture organizations and other locally based food 
production/distribution groups, building primarily on concerns over food safety and 
quality (Scott et al., 2014). These types of organizations represent a form of autonomous 
power in terms of civil society participation in organic and sustainable production 
methods apart from the PRC’s mainstream industrial food system, though there is 
diversity in their motivations and their level of “alternativeness” to industrial food 
production (Si, 2015). This phenomenon is typically urban centred and consumer 
driven, which might limit the connection between these local food movements, peasant 
farmers, and ecological values (Si et al., 2015). Also, the emergence of rural cooperatives 
in China, closely related to the rise of AFNs, are critiqued for being incorporated into 
China’s domestic commercial production system (Yan & Chen, 2015). Discourse related 
to “peasant” forms of farming associated with many food movements, once celebrated in 
the PRC, is now used in a disparaging context of backwardness (Schneider, 2014b). 
These political-economic fluctuations in China’s food system point to a nascent, 
heterogeneous space for alternatives to agro-industrialization that might ally with the 
values espoused by food sovereignty. These ‘local’ dynamics help to provide a minimum 
of context for the possible diffusion of the global food sovereignty movement into China.  
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With these caveats in mind, AFNs in China can be considered key spaces of 
resistance to agro-industrialization, and potential partners in food sovereignty 
movements (Schumilas, 2014). Some scholars argue that China is still a country that has 
a unique continuation of peasant agriculture given the small scale of farms in the PRC 
(van der Ploeg & Ye, 2016b). Further, there is room for AFNs in China to create 
connections domestically and internationally in order to collaborate on issues such as 
food sovereignty (Si & Scott, 2015). However, it is not clear where food sovereignty fits 
into the dynamic and how it is defined in the context of the PRC. Though food 
sovereignty is often mentioned by scholars of Chinese agriculture, its meaning tends to 
shift with each use in its various contexts (see van der Ploeg and Ye 2016a). In fact, the 
last several years have seen a significant increase in the use and exploration of the term 
in Chinese language scholarship and practical applications. Liang (2014) notes that 
within China, the term food sovereignty was originally written as “grain sovereignty” 
(Liángshí zhǔquán, 粮食主权). This term was not used in the same manner as peasant 
organizations like La Via Campesina. Rather, the concept was used in the context of 
China’s accession to the WTO and the potential threat of higher grain prices, 
undermining national sovereignty. For Liang (2014), the issue was to re-frame the 
meaning of food sovereignty in China by introducing the work of the international 
peasant movement and encourage the adoption of its normative content.  
Local food movements have also engaged with the concept of food sovereignty, 
influenced by La Via Campesina. Partly in response to creating a term that reflects the 
peasant-led meanings, the latest translation of food sovereignty in Chinese is the term 
“people’s food sovereignty” (Rénmín shíwù zhǔquán, 人民食物主权). Though La Via 
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Campesina is referenced in works written in Chinese, and communication exists 
between activists, the peasant network has no official presence within Mainland China. 
Food sovereignty activists have reiterated that in translating the term for use in China, 
the intent is to modify the concept to suit local needs.31 One of the primary organizations 
promoting food sovereignty in Greater China is the People’s Food Sovereignty Network 
(Rénmín shíwù zhǔquán wǎng, 人民食物主权网), which has worked with peasant and 
alternative food organizations for several years. As part of its motivation for networking 
with local peasant organizations in China, the People’s Food Sovereignty Network 
highlights corporate control in global agribusiness and has shared translations of 
theoretical and practical works generated by the global food sovereignty movement, 
such as Vandana Shiva’s Stolen Harvest.  
Within Mainland China, the organization has also worked with others to actively 
oppose global agribusiness. For example, the organization reported that, “On May 23, 
2015, the Chinese people joined [global protests] for the first time, along with people of 
the world who took to the streets against Monsanto’s seed industry monopoly and the 
penetration of transgenic technologies, winning the support of millions of internet 
supporters” (People’s Food Sovereignty Forum, 2016). This activity was part of the 
broader global demonstration organized in part by La Via Campesina, which has a stated 
objective to “[bring] together those struggling against Monsanto specifically and those 
challenging agribusiness in general…”, in order to, “develop common goals and a shared 
vision with which we can transform our societies” (Via Campesina, 2012). Prominent 
food sovereignty scholars have also reached out to audiences within the PRC. In a widely 
                                                        
31 Author interview, Hong Kong, October 2015. 
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circulated Chinese language interview with Southern Reviews Magazine (Nán fēng 
chuāng zázhì, 南风窗杂志), Canada Research Chair in Human Rights, Social Justice and 
Food Sovereignty, Annette Desmarais, echoed these viewpoints to a readership in the 
PRC. When asked about the greatest challenge to reaching food sovereignty, Desmarais 
indicated that food sovereignty must rebel against those with the most power in the 
food system, including transnational corporations and the political elite of each country 
(Ye, 2013).  
Other scholars and rural development specialists have taken on similar tones, 
arguing that a particular threat to food sovereignty is the introduction of GMOs that 
serve, “rich countries to continue to create wealth and create resources for multinational 
companies" (Zhou, 2011). As noted in Chapter 6, ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta 
was met with a domestic petition to the Ministry of Health (and formal investigation by 
SASAC) in opposition to the potential introduction of GM crops to mainland China 
(Collier, 2018). Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 5, Greenpeace China has conducted 
campaigns and investigations against the illegal planting of GM rice varieties and the 
potential for foreign ownership over inputs into GM rice seeds developed by domestic 
research institutions (Greenpeace & TWN, 2009). Broader negative public opinion 
remains an obstacle to the Party-state’s advocacy for acceptance of GM foods (Yan et al., 
2016). However, the primary concern for the Party-sate (and many activists) is the role 
of global agribusiness firms in controlling ownerships over seeds, and the ability for 
small farmers to retain access to seeds for planting. 
Beyond GM seeds, food sovereignty advocates from the PRC argue that seed 
sovereignty is difficult to achieve as a result of drastically declined biodiversity given the 
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reach of commercial hybrid seeds (Zhang, 2014). In fact, organizations that work to 
build locally contained food systems are often stymied by the lack of traditional grain 
seed varieties available in the PRC.32 This dearth of farmer-saved grain varieties, which 
accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s, makes it very difficult to pursue this direction to its 
fullest intent. One organization based in Beijing, Liang Shuming Rural Reconstruction 
Center (LRRC) (Liángshùmíng xiāngcūn jiànshè zhōngxīn, 梁漱溟乡村建设中心), has 
worked to remedy this issue by promoting food sovereignty and seed sovereignty. The 
LRRC is named after the prominent rural organizer of the 1930s focused on domestically 
resourced agricultural development, as discussed in Chapter 4. The organization 
specifically argues that the concept of “food grain security” must change to an 
understanding of food sovereignty, with seed sovereignty at its base (LRRC, 2015). 
Though partner organizations have had some success in promoting local seed exchanges 
throughout the country, the network is consistently faced with the need to articulate its 
objectives in the face of state promotion of commercial seed companies.33 Rather than 
multinationals, it is typically domestically owned seed companies that are favoured by 
the state. The conflict between the Party-state promotion of a domestic commercial seed 
industry and AFN organizations in the PRC is illustrated below in the context of the new 
Seed Law. 
                                                        
32 Author interview, Hong Kong, October 2015. 
33 Author interview, Hong Kong, October 2015. 
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7.4. China’s Seed Law and alternative food networks 
Despite the rhetorical overlap related to opposing foreign agribusiness control, the 
ideational imperatives of each group begs for different solutions. One tangible arena in 
which these normative priorities have come up against each other is in the development 
of the PRC’s new Seed Law. Beginning in 2011, the State Council proposed that the 
existing Seed Law be revised based on the Party-state’s intention to develop a “modern 
crop seed industry”, initiating a review and modification process for the next three years 
(Ye & Liu, 2014). The National People’s Congress had several targets for the revision but 
focused on simplifying the introduction of new seed varieties to commercial markets 
(for certain crops) and strengthening property rights and registration regimes (CCM, 
2015f). The initial drafting process of the revised Seed Law in 2013 was based on input 
from state institutions as well as seed companies and breeding stations (Chen, 2014). In 
2014, the public consultation process began, involving wider input from research 
institutes, universities, seed companies, and localities (Ye & Liu, 2014).  
 With the momentum for the draft Seed Law focused on creating rules that were 
advantageous to the industrial seed system, some agribusiness actors and commercial 
breeders focused on extending the rules to farm-saved seed. As a representative in the 
National People’s Congress, Li Denghai of Shandong-Denghai made several proposals for 
amendments including further restrictions on the use of seeds. More specifically, he 
proposed to revise PRC law to include prison terms for the unauthorized production or 
sale of protected varieties, and also, that “[w]hoever produce[s] seeds without license or 
not in accordance with the license or produce[s] and sell[s] seeds of protected varieties 
without authorization and cause[s] serious harm to society or seriously disrupt[s] the 
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market order shall be deemed as having committed the crime of illegal operation" (Seed 
China News, 2015, March). A prominent seed breeder also indicated that it was 
necessary for the Seed Law to strengthen intellectual property on grains like wheat in 
order “to incentivize research and industry development”, given the continued practice 
of seed saving.34 In other words, in the name of extending the sphere of the commercial 
seed system, some actors were attempting to have the Seed Law expand control over 
farm-saved seeds, closing the space available for alternative food movements to operate. 
 However, oppositional voices from the PRC’s new AFNs also involved themselves 
in the consultation process. A group of organizations called the Farmer Seed Network 
(Nóngmín zhǒngzǐ wǎngluò, 农民种子网络) opposed the draft of the revised Seed Law 
during the public consultation period. Included among the organizations were three 
groups that work with AFNs, peasant farmers, and food sovereignty researchers: the 
LRRC, the Third World Network (TWN), and the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy 
Research (nóngyè zhèngcè yánjiū zhōngxīn, 农业政策研究中心) at CAAS (Wugu Net, 
2015). Each organization focuses on an aspect of farmer and peasant rights, and both the 
LRRC and the TWN were previously involved in food sovereignty and anti-GMO 
activities. The TWN, for example, co-authored the Greenpeace reports on GM rice seed. 
The organizations of the Farmer Seed Network made revising the draft Seed Law their 
primary short-term goal.35 
The network focused their efforts on those sub-sections of the draft Seed Law 
that presented the greatest significance to local saved seed. Prior to the consultative 
                                                        
34 Interview, Beijing, December 2015. 
35 Interview, Hong Kong, October 2015; Interview, Beijing, December 2015 
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draft being circulated there was pressure from industry to eliminate the farm-saved 
section that appeared in the original Seed Law. Section 27 of the 2000 Seed Law had 
stated that,  
 
The remainder of conventional seeds propagated by peasants themselves for their 
own use may be sold and exchanged at rural fairs without seed trading licenses, 
and measures in this respect shall be formulated by the people's governments of 
provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central 
Government. (NPC, 2004) 
 
In late 2014, members of the network drafted their own consultation letter and 
proposed amendments for submission to the National People’s Congress. The three 
groups of the Farmer Seed Network, and their affiliates, drew on each other’s experience 
in cooperative plant breeding as well as legal and policy review to outline a position. The 
priority was to ensure that farmers in the PRC could continue to save their seed for self-
planting, exchange, or sale.36 Further, the groups held several information sessions and 
events with other NGOs and small farmers to discuss the Seed Law revisions and 
potential issues it presented (Wugu Net, 2015). 
The overall changes to the Seed Law reflect a tension between Party-state control 
over the domestic seed market: encouraging commercial seed markets and maintaining 
local spaces. In terms of Party-state control the new Seed Law asserts that the state has 
“sovereignty over germplasm resources” (Guójiā duì zhǒngzhí zīyuán xiǎngyǒu zhǔquán, 
国家对种质资源享有主权) and that any foreign germplasm cooperation must have state 
                                                        
36 Interview, Beijing, December 15 
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approval (NPC, 2015a, 2.11.). Further, in terms of the variety approval process, though 
the number of varieties that require a more stringent approval process was reduced 
from 28 to 5 crops - rice, wheat, corn, cotton and soybean - all remain under strict 
regulation (CCM, 2015f). In terms of maintaining local spaces, the concerns of the Seed 
Network were well founded. Prior to the adoption of the new Seed Law, additional 
amendments were introduced by agribusiness-friendly representatives in an attempt to 
significantly diminish the ability for farmers to save and exchange seed (NPC, 2015b). 
These attempted amendments did not reach the final text of the new Seed Law, and the 
wording largely retained the language promoted by the Farmer Seed Network groups 
that permitted local seed exchange. However a modification was made to the previous 
Seed Law, where the new text’s section 37 (section 27 of the old Seed Law), now states 
that, 
 
Farmers’ own surplus conventional seeds for their own use can be sold and 
exchanged in local bazaars, and no seed production and operation license is 
required. (NPC, 2015a; emphasis added) 
 
The significant change that was made was to add the word “local” (Dāngdì, 当地) and 
remove sub-national jurisdiction for formulating respective administrative measures 
(NPC, 2015b). However, as the TWN indicates, “local” is not defined and may be difficult 
to enforce (Zhu, 2016). 
This struggle over the rules governing farm-saved seed is an example of the 
power of ideational autonomy, and the mobilization of norms through networks. The 
new AFNs that have emerged within the PRC, from urban centres to rural areas, have 
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established autonomous food and agricultural practices beyond the reach of the 
domestic industrial food system. Through a common commitment to goals outside of the 
Party-state’s promotion of national seed industry, these organizations have developed 
networks and are capable of mobilizing these goals to influence the formulation of rules 
that govern the domestic seed industry.  
7.5. Discussion and conclusion 
In China, discourses related to food sovereignty take on distinct characteristics where 
the language of state and business actors mirror key aspects of language associated with 
local and peasant food movements. Within the broader literature on global agribusiness 
and local food alternatives, there is a focus on issues of corporate power and the often 
complacent or facilitative role of the state. The sections above point to an overlap in 
language used by each camp, in addition to a common line of argumentation: the need to 
protect national agriculture from the power of foreign-owned global agribusiness. This 
overlap reveals a distinct dynamic found in the interaction between state and corporate 
actors within the PRC, and potential Chinese partners for the global food sovereignty 
movement. Where many critical scholars argue that states are often captured by norms 
of economic globalization in the agribusiness sector, in part through the power of MNCs, 
the PRC presents a different case in some important respects. For the PRC, the Party-
state’s priorities come before agribusiness actors. 
 Both state-corporate and AFNs summon very similar facts regarding global 
agribusiness concentration, putting them to use as a call to attention for audiences 
within the PRC. It is interesting to note that some Party-state actors actually draw the 
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work of food sovereignty activists to support their claims regarding corporate 
concentration. For example, state and academic commentators in support of domestic 
industry often use data on agribusiness concentration from the ETC group, an 
organization that favours peasant agriculture. The common reference point of global 
agribusiness concentration as a rallying cry for their respective causes creates a point of 
similarity between both groups in the PRC, a similarity that does not commonly exist. At 
least on the surface of the argument, each group is pointing to the need to overcome the 
structural influence of the major seed companies in order to avoid dependence on the 
technologies they promote and intellectual property that comes with it.  
Meanwhile there are terms that complicate the differentiation between each 
group. The common referents of food security (understood as food grain security) and 
food sovereignty are imbued with ties to the national security and national economic 
development (Boland, 2000). Some supporters of food sovereignty in China use the 
government’s language of food grain security as a means to appeal to government 
sensibilities. Liang (2014, 50) writes that,  
 
Our government has a full understanding of the importance of food sovereignty for 
food security, and has repeatedly stressed that the Chinese people's rice bowls 
should be firmly held in their own hands at all times; our rice bowls should be 
mainly loaded with Chinese food. This is certainly the idea of food sovereignty, the 
idea of Chinese-style food sovereignty. 
 
In this appeal, advocates have an avenue to communicate their goals in an atmosphere 
where state priority of national food security and self-reliance in terms of ownership 
over food grain production has an overlap with the localized and independent language 
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of food sovereignty. Similarly, others, referencing La Via Campesina, argue that food 
sovereignty in China means moving to a perspective of national security that takes into 
account both global dynamics and local sustainability (Zhou, Pan, & Dong, 2012). In 
essence, there is an attempt by food sovereignty activists and scholars within the PRC to 
use the common frame of reference regarding independence from foreign control while 
employing similar state-centric terms with the goal of promoting their own end-vision of 
sustainable food systems. 
What is crucially at odds in harmonizing the Party-state view of national food and 
seed security with that of People’s Food Sovereignty is that the dominant norms of the 
former are predicated on the continued development of a nationally based commercial 
seed industry. As seen in the development of securitized foodways, the Party-state seeks 
to address the issue of corporate concentration by developing an independently 
(nationally) owned domestic seed industry that can compete with global MNCs both at 
home and abroad. Though China’s domestic seed market remains fractured, the 
replacement of conventional farmer-saved seed varieties with hybrid corn and rice 
varieties in an effort to build this commercial sector is already widespread. The 
prominence of commercial grain seed makes it much more difficult to move forward 
with the seed sovereignty that underlies food sovereignty. However, the discursive 
dependence of the Party-state on agriculture, despite recent negativity towards the 
peasantry (Schneider, 2014b), still lends legitimacy to arguments for continued and 
renewed independent forms of production. This struggle over the meaning of food 
sovereignty, and ultimately the mechanisms of choice for self-reliance, is emblematic of 
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a potential internal challenge to the ideational power of the Party-state’s national food 
security norms. 
The example of the new Seed Law points to this struggle. While the Seed Law is 
generally focused on creating the rules that govern the domestic commercial seed 
market, the Party-state set parameters that exert national control and limit foreign 
acquisition of germplasm resources. Further, despite the attempts of prominent 
representatives of the commercial seed industry to extend the depth of commodified 
seeds, AFNs were able to make a successful normative case to retain space for peasant 
seed exchange outside of the commercial system. The inherent contradiction in this 
dynamic is that the Party-state is at once seeking to develop a domestic seed industry 
that competes commercially with foreign agribusiness, while simultaneously limiting 
foreign interaction on one hand, and preserving non-commercial (peasant) space on the 
other. Though the state-centric debates of the securitization of food are long standing, 
the contemporary parameters in the PRC have the potential to further evolve with the 
introduction of global activist discourses and local food movements. The term People’s 
Food Sovereignty is a re-appropriation of the term food sovereignty in the context of 
long-standing state policy that discursively reinforces the need to be self-sufficient in 
production, despite recent changes. It destabilizes the focus of the nation-state’s 
“sovereignty” to highlight sovereignty in food systems at a lower scale of organization, 
while piggybacking on the concerns reflected in Party-state policy.  
Within this ideational struggle there are both opportunities and constraints. Space 
for alternatives exists in the PRC and is articulated in a way that is not often found in 
other places. The space allows an element of legitimacy to local food movements who 
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can frame their activities as aligning with state policy. However, while the overlap 
provides opportunity to express food sovereignty in the language of the state, it also acts 
as a constraint in the opposite direction; this close association with national food 
security is a double-edged sword. Food sovereignty is problematic given the term’s 
frequent usage to reflect the need to protect the economic nation (see Tong, 2015). The 
global orientation of many state/industry actors in China displays a priority to compete 
internationally, rather than scale-up alternative local food systems (see Si & Scott, 
2015). In other words, while food sovereignty movements seek to offer local solutions 
that address the problems associated with industrial food systems, the Party-state holds 
these goals as subservient to the need to develop national agribusiness players that can 
both serve domestic needs and navigate global markets. 
In many ways, these opportunities and constraints are distinct to China. A significant 
difference in the PRC is that multinational agribusiness control is much less strong, and 
the state is active in articulating an element of autonomy from flows of global 
agricultural capital. The PRC’s policy of national food security presents a barrier to food 
sovereignty, though one that offers a modicum of legitimacy for local alternatives. 
Rather than adopting a strictly neoliberal vision of food security by promoting 
unrestricted economic integration, the PRC is differentiated by the promotion of 





Chapter 8. The Future of China in the Global 
Food System 
8.1. China’s securitized foodways 
8.1.1. The PRC’s grain seed market and the global food system 
What explains the low concentration of the dominant agribusiness multinationals in the 
PRC’s commercial grain seed market? The contemporary place of the PRC in the global 
food system began on the fringes of the U.S. food regime. Republican China had strong 
agricultural partnerships with the U.S. agricultural actors that became leading 
proponents of the green revolution. However, rather than following the path of the U.S.-
led green revolution and food aid architecture in the mid-20th century, the Party-state of 
the PRC developed a distinct conception of national food security based in self-reliance 
outside of U.S. ambit.  
At the time, national food security was to be achieved through self-sufficiency in 
both grain production and seed breeding technologies. Despite U.S. efforts to gain access 
to agricultural markets in developing countries in the post-war period, the Party-state 
was able to exercise negative power by “go[ing] it alone” rather than establishing 
connections to the food regime of the period. Self-reliance under Mao was reached 
through a focus largely on the use of within-country resources in the context of a U.S. 
embargo. This included, at first, seed varieties left by agricultural exchanges with the 
U.S. and Europe, and later transformed to a more insular focus on domestic germplasm 
and breeding programs. In both cases, the pursuit of self-reliance through self-
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sufficiency in production, agricultural inputs, and capital, created a divorce from the 
developing agricultural networks of the U.S. food regime in terms of food aid, 
technologies of the green revolution, and development finance. This path created the 
conditions for the development of a domestic seed breeding and extension system, 
initially autonomous from the developing structural power of the U.S. state and 
agribusinesses.  
This historical experience would go on to shape the current structure of the 
commercial grain seed market in China. Alongside the U.S. food regime, the PRC’s 
negative power in the global food system translated to an immense structural power 
within its own borders. As the corporate food regime unfolded, beginning in the 1980s, 
the PRC’s diffuse domestic extension system transformed into thousands of commercial 
seed companies. The Party-state’s emphasis on national food security remained, but the 
mechanisms to achieve self-reliance shifted. Foreign germplasm and international 
agribusiness investment were gradually permitted, but tightly controlled by domestic 
rules governing investment, the diffusion of foreign technology, and access to the loose 
network of domestic seed companies. As a result, the PRC’s home-grown seed industry 
expanded mostly in the absence of agribusiness MNCs. Self-reliance in grain seed 
varieties was maintained through rules governing the domestic economy, made possible 
by the disconnection from the previous U.S.-led food regime. The exercise of negative 
power during the U.S. food regime led to the creation of a significantly different industry 
structure in the PRC vis-à-vis the global seed industry.  
Within China, state-owned and private seed business multiplied in the 1980s and 
1990s, building on the seed research and extension networks of the Mao era, and 
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developing newfound agribusiness enterprises. Though the number of seed enterprises 
expanded to over 10,000 after the turn of 21st century, recent consolidation has left the 
seed industry with 5,000 seed companies at the local, provincial, and national level. 
Several dozen are leading consolidation as mandated by government policy, with a 
handful of top firms partnered in majority-owned joint ventures with global 
agribusiness MNCs. The Party-state maintains control over these MNCs through 
restrictions on joint venture shares, on the type of technology eligible for investment, 
and on the type of technologies allowed in the grain market. National food security 
through self-reliance no longer includes strict separation from foreign technologies and 
investment; domestically, it focuses on industry development and the ability for national 
firms to control and compete with MNCs.  
8.1.2. Securitized foodways and its challenges 
What is the relationship between the PRC’s grain seed industry structure and the overall 
place of China in the global food system? Over time, the Party-state’s power shifted from 
negative to positive forms in the context of its interaction with powerful state and 
corporate actors in the global food system. Within this shift, the core of the Party-state’s 
normative focus on national food grain security remained constant. However, the 
mechanisms to retain self-reliance changed over time. Currently self-reliance is pursued 
through expanded Party-state ownership of increasingly integrated domestic and 
international agribusiness networks. The Party-state’s true imperative, beyond 
maintaining domestic grain production, is to retain national authority over its sources of 
grain, whether inside China or abroad.  
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The structure of the domestic grain seed industry, and the pursuit of self-reliance, 
is intimately related to global food system dynamics. There are two important 
connections: competition with concentrated global agribusiness MNCs on world markets 
and increased reliance on grain imports. Given that agribusiness from the PRC is faced 
with a degree of MNC competition on domestic markets, the Party-state seeks to ensure 
that its own companies can compete, not just domestically, but internationally as well. 
As a result, various grain seed companies have expanded abroad, particularly in South 
and Southeast Asia as well as SSA. Companies like LPHT and Chongqing Seed Company, 
among many others, have an increasingly significant presence abroad and are extending 
their domestically developed seed varieties. Examples of these regional footprints were 
shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. Further, the Party-state has acquired multinational seed 
companies, including Syngenta and others, offering not only foreign market presence 
and resource networks (see Figure 6.5), but also germplasm resources and technology 
that may be used to compete in home markets.  
In terms of grain imports, the volume of soy and corn imported to the PRC rapidly 
increased around the turn of the 21st century. At the time, the imported soy and corn 
were principally derived from the seeds of major agribusiness MNCs, sourced from only 
a few countries, and handled by the trade/processing networks of the ABCD firms. 
Though the PRC’s self-reliance was threatened by dependence on global agribusiness 
and foreign states, the country’s position as a significant importer offered a first glimpse 
of structural power through influencing supply chains and business practices, as seen in 
the case of Agrisure Viptera corn rejections. The domestic change regarding import 
requirements ushered a reframing of outward self-reliance, embodied by COFCO’s 
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purchase of Noble and Nidera to expand its network of trade infrastructure (see also 
Zhang, 2018). As COFCO itself stated, these investments secure “stable food corridors” 
for grain to enter the PRC (COFCO, 2017). Combined, the international focus on seed and 
grain trade businesses are evidence of a shift in the concept of national food security 
through self-reliance to a focus on authority over the wider supply chain, specifically 
seed and trade, as a supplement for domestic production. The purchase of global 
agribusiness firms and foreign extension of domestic seed companies reflects a newly 
formed positive power in the global food system. 
While it is clear that the Party-state has developed positive power in agricultural 
markets, it has not usurped the dominant global food system nor has it facilitated the 
emergence of alternative food systems. Also, it is not a certainty that the Party-state will 
maintain control over the networks that national agribusinesses have developed, or that 
these networks will advance its structural power. Central to the power dynamics 
between the PRC and the dominant global food system is property rights and 
agribusiness concentration in the context of GM crops, particularly rice, corn, and soy. 
Given the level of state and corporate investment in GM crops in the PRC, it is clear that 
the Party-state intends to pursue commercial planting of GM grains. However, the lens of 
securitized foodways helps to assess the parameters of this pursuit. The Party-state will 
only open domestic commercial planting when it is certain that: 1) it can control the 
rules of planting GM crops within its domestic agricultural system; and 2) the vast 
majority of planted GM grain seeds can be produced by domestically owned 
agribusinesses primarily using germplasm and genetic traits that are owned by 
domestic actors. In the meantime, imported GM soy (and corn) will largely be sourced 
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from the global networks established by State-owned agribusinesses: Syngenta and 
Longping Hi-Tech will sell seed and the grain will be imported increasingly by COFCO.  
The Party-state faces significant obstacles to developing a controlled domestic GM 
grain seed market. Already, domestically engineered GM rice seed has been planted 
illegally and its harvests sold at retail. This rice potentially contains patented traits 
owned outside of the PRC, increasing the risk of a lawsuit from foreign MNCs once 
commercialized. Foreign owned global agribusinesses have also become even more 
concentrated over the last years, with the primary holders of commercial GM grain 
patents consolidating into two enormous firms: Monsanto-Bayer and Dow-DuPont. 
Upon commercialization, the competition for control over the PRC’s GM seed market 
would increase significantly. The expiry of GM soy and corn patents will allow for 
domestic seed companies to produce generic varieties for sale on the domestic market, 
but the issue remains for newer patents and for GM rice. 
 It is unclear as to whether Party-state actors can use current mechanisms to 
continue to control the domestic grain seed market (see also Kerr, 2007). When it comes 
to the regional dispersion of seed approvals within China, the current strategy is mixed. 
For corn and rice seed, it is possible for the PRC to segment foreign GM seed joint 
ventures by region given that production of these grains is scattered throughout many 
provinces and in different parts of the country. However, the situation is rather different 
for soybean, as only two provincial level areas (Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia) are 
responsible for more than 50% of national acreage planted to the crop (see Appendix II). 
As a result, any entry of foreign-owned GM soy would be narrowly focused in 
concentrated production areas. Further, the interests of national firms focused on 
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agricultural biotechnology versus those focused on non-GM varieties diverge on this 
issue, as do the opinions of different state and civil society advocates. Nevertheless, 
Party-state policy continues to focus on the eventual adoption of GM grain seeds. 
Given the global concentration in patents over GM grain seed products, existing joint 
ventures in the PRC’s grain seed market are of particular importance. Dow-DuPont 
Pioneer’s existing minority partnerships with Shandong Denghai and Gansu Dunhuang 
provide key paths into the PRC’s corn seed market in eastern and central China. 
However, like the delay to approve Syngenta’s MIR162 trait for import, the government 
will likely retain control over the domestic commercial planting approval processes. 
Authority over these rules could allow preferential approval if the Party-state perceives 
a risk that market share is entering the hands of foreign-owned agribusiness. Similar 
questions exist for Monsanto and Bayer’s joint ventures, particularly given Monsanto’s 
partnership with CNSGC. With CNSGC’s parent company, Sinochem, now the de facto 
owner of Syngenta, there are conflicting interests in terms of managing the domestic 
market.  
The acquisition of Syngenta and the foreign expansion of agribusiness from China 
have extended the geographic area planted to seed owned by actors from China. 
Syngenta comes with intellectual property rights over GM grain seeds currently planted 
in many countries outside of the PRC, and potentially within the country if Party-state 
policy shifts to allow commercial planting. Similarly, national agribusiness companies, 
both biotech and not, have sought to expand presence in foreign markets in an effort to 
gain a competitive edge. In doing so, the Party-state and seed companies are adopting a 
remarkably similar approach to the U.S.-led extension of seeds under the green 
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revolution, an event escaped by China at the time (Brautigam, 1998). This principle 
holds for grain trade and processing as well, where Noble and Nidera now provide 
COFCO with access to markets and trade networks across the globe. However, despite 
this rapid expansion, PRC-owned networks of seed companies and grain traders remain 
small in comparison to the largest agribusiness MNCs.  
There are additional factors that challenge the PRC’s pursuit of securitized foodways. 
More specifically, domestic movements promoting alternative food systems have grown 
within China. National food security, along with rural development, is a priority of the 
Party-state. The oppositional discourse of state and corporate actors in the PRC towards 
global market concentration and foreign MNCs allows for some common targets with 
both local activists and food sovereignty advocates. Though the Party-state’s national 
food security priority takes precedence within the PRC’s domestic grain seed markets, 
there remain spaces with a degree of independence from commercial seed markets and 
industrial production methods.  
However there are limits to this space given differences in prescription between 
national food security and people’s food sovereignty. Where Liang (2014) points to the 
government’s statements that the “the Chinese people’s rice bowls should be firmly held 
in their own hand at all times” and mostly with Chinese food, the Party-state has slowly 
begun to redefine the meaning of holding the bowl in one’s own hands. In this case a 
bowl of noodles is a more apropos metaphor. Whereas the edge of the bowl used to be 
national borders, the noodles have now spilled beyond borders to stretch across the 
globe.   
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8.1.3. Insights for critical food studies, GPE, and AFNs 
What insight does the concept of securitized foodways provide for scholars of critical 
food studies and GPE? Currently, critical food studies scholars have described the 
contemporary PRC’s food system engagement as mercantilist (Belesky & Lawrence, 
2018; McMichael, 2013) and a form of state-capitalism (Belesky & Lawrence, 2018; 
Schneider, 2017). Further, scholars have pointed to the primarily domestic networks of 
Chinese agribusiness (Schneider, 2017). This work provides excellent analysis of the 
material relationship between the Party-state and agribusiness both within China and 
abroad.  
However, food regimes’ underlying explanation as to why Party-state policy has 
directed material resources to these ends is implicitly rooted in the logic of capitalist 
expansion rather than in the subjective self-interest of the CPC. Though the food regime 
heuristic specifically accounts for geopolitical configurations, the underlying motivation 
of the states and other actors at the centre of these configurations tend to fly under the 
radar. This is an important shortcoming in the context of China given the country’s long 
history of state security concerns with respect to grain, and the long rule (and memory) 
of the CPC. Scholars from international relations and GPE regularly point to the 
importance of normative food security drivers that shape the Party-state’s actions 
(McBeath & McBeath, 2010; Wong & Huang, 2012; Zha & Zhang, 2013). However, these 
scholars often employ a narrow conceptualization of Party-state food security, focusing 
solely on production rather than on entire supply chain. An exception is Zhang (2018), 
who places significant emphasis on the Party-state’s recent national food security 
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priorities in a global context. The study of food regimes could benefit substantially by 
taking these normative drivers further into account.  
Scholarship that seeks to understand or explain China’s place in the global food 
system must account for important historical and normative differences that distinguish 
the PRC from traditionally dominant actors in the global food system. The PRC did not 
simply encounter the global food system free of context and history. Rather, the country 
has interacted with previous configurations of the global food system, and these 
interactions have shaped the normative priorities of the Party-state over time. The CPC 
as an institution observed food regime dynamics since the beginning of the second food 
regime. This begs scholars to assess the ideas and principles that drive the Party-state’s 
engagement in the global political economy, their relationship to the material and 
ideational structures of the global food system, and the impact on food system 
alternatives. 
Similarly, recent framing of the PRC’s place in the global food system in terms of land 
grabs is much too narrow a focus in terms of the PRC’s relationship to land and 
production. While land grabs remain part of the story, the PRC’s off-land investments 
have far broader impact on the planting choices and land management practices 
available to farmers across the world. In the same vein, many recorded land grabs 
include test sites for hybrid seed development in the host country. In some cases the 
intent may be to build large-scale production farms, but as seen in Chapter 6 many cases 
will likely aim to diffuse domestic technology in order to build markets in the seed 
industries of Southern countries. The expansion of the PRC’s grain trade infrastructure 
also establishes a more direct connection between a large number of farmers and 
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businesses controlled by the Party-state. These relationships may not be best 
investigated using the lens of land grabs, but will create similar power relationships 
with peasants and farmers that come in contact with these dynamics (Hall, Hirsch, & Li, 
2011). 
The study of alternative food movements both within China and globally is also 
implicated in China’s food grain security. Whereas Zhang (2018) is optimistic that the 
PRC is making links between a reconfigured corporate food regime and a food 
sovereignty movement, I argue that the overlap in goals between the PRC and food 
sovereignty advocates is largely limited to shared foreign opposition (Gaudreau, 2018). 
The creation of a domestic grain seed market has largely conflicted with food 
sovereignty principles, relying on chemical inputs and the wide extension of hybrid 
seeds. Farmers interested in using saved grain seed often have difficulty accessing 
traditional varieties due to the long-term saturation of commercial seeds. However, the 
overlap in goals does provide China’s AFNs with space to operate, despite industry 
pressures to further limit AFN activities like seed saving. Given that the study of AFNs in 
the PRC is interested in “scaling-up” the activities of alternative food movements (Si & 
Scott, 2015), the concept of securitized foodways helps to establish the parameters 
within which AFNs must operate in China. The insights of securitized foodways can also 
help AFNs to articulate alternative food systems strategically and map the agribusiness 
landscape that AFNs must navigate. 
More generally, the emergence of China in the global food system has triggered 
significant change in the structure of global grain markets. A large Southern state now 
has significant global reach largely built on a domestic market relatively independent of 
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ownership by agribusiness MNCs. A new food regime is in development, though not yet 
fully formed. Given that previous food regimes have a significant relationship to U.S. 
agriculture, it is important to recall that the PRC’s place in the contemporary food 
regime involves resistance to U.S. ownership and a small extension into U.S. seed and 
grain trade. While this dynamic in the U.S. market represents a significant change from 
one or two decades ago (let alone 40 years ago) it is by no means a complete retraction 
of U.S. agrifood power. 
Nevertheless, securitized foodways provides an example of how power dynamics can 
change in the global political economy, and the global food system more specifically. 
Negative power proves to be a key concept to account for change. Power frameworks 
are often most interested in the powerful, those who can exercise influence and shape 
capacities to act. For example in food regimes, change is to occur based on the internal 
contradictions among the powerful food regime actors and not through external force 
(McMichael, 2005). In contrast, the inclusion of negative power via autonomy provides 
analytical space to account for those that the powerful cannot reach. In the PRC, this 
negative power vis-à-vis U.S. state and corporate actors was employed for decades, 
allowing for distance between food regimes and the PRC’s domestic system. In other 
words, the roots of change can be found at the limits of positive power rather than in 
their contradictions. This concept is equally useful for advocates of alternative food 
systems, which often seek space to escape the encroachment of powerful industrial 
agribusiness. 
However, negative power alone is not sufficient to affect the power dynamics of the 
dominant global food system. In sum, three factors contribute to the PRC’s current place 
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in the global food system: the Party-state’s long-standing normative priority regarding 
self-reliance and national grain security, the historical autonomy of the PRC from the 
U.S. and early corporate food regimes, and the more recent exercise of material power 
through the expansion of domestically owned agrifood networks within China and 
abroad. 
8.2. Securitized foodways and trajectories of the global food 
system 
What is the future for China’s securitized foodways? The Party-state’s principle of self-
reliance through ownership and control of the grain and grain seed market actors has 
endured for more than half a century. Though this control is not absolute, the normative 
priority is clear. As such, it is reasonable to assume that this principle will apply in the 
foreseeable future, and that it will guide the actions of the Party-state in both domestic 
and international markets. 
As consolidation among foreign-owned seed and grain trade companies 
continues, the perceived threat to the PRC’s national food security will remain. Future 
trajectories will likely see Chinese seed companies continue overseas expansion and 
acquisition, particularly in key crops where domestic firms may not be able to compete 
with Bayer-Monsanto and Dow-DuPont. In terms of grain trade, COFCO will likely 
continue the acquisition of grain trade infrastructure to serve both PRC and global 
markets. Some of this infrastructure will likely be in traditional exporting countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, and possibly the U.S. However, given recent focus on seed extension in 
Africa, South/Southeast Asia, there will likely be further investment in key grain 
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procurement ports for example in rice exporting countries in South and South East Asia. 
Further, Ukraine will likely be a continued source of corn, soy, and potentially other 
grains. 
 With increased interaction between still-dominant global agribusiness and PRC-
owned agribusiness, there is also the potential for further conflict between firms. The 
potential for Syngenta to receive preferential treatment in terms of approval for grain 
imports, domestic investment regulations, and for commercial planting approvals stands 
out as a potential fault line, as expressed by Chuck Grassley. Further, if COFCO begins to 
handle a significant share of grain destined for the PRC, this would increase competition 
between grain traders headquartered in the U.S., Europe, and Japan. For example, Hall 
argues that Japanese grain traders are explicitly serving the Chinese market in order to 
remain competitive and able to supply Japan (Hall, forthcoming). If the Chinese market 
is to be served mostly by Chinese-owned agribusiness, the gamble on economies of scale 
may falter. However, unlike rules regarding foreign investment in the grain seed 
industry, the Party-state has not publicly established a target threshold in terms of 
overseas market control that would satisfy its security concerns in the global grain seed 
and trade sectors.  
Currently, the PRC’s structural power is limited given its minority position in 
global agribusiness and infrastructure networks, and its limited role in creating 
international trade rules as they pertain to agriculture. However, the PRC remains a key 
importer, allowing the Party-state to shape some informal rules in relation to the 
markets that serve its import demand. As also noted by Zhang (2018), the Party-state is 
seeking to increase future engagement in shaping formal rules through international 
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institutions. This has certainly begun at the regional level through initiating or 
participating in multilateral initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Bank and the 
ASEAN +3’s Emergency Rice Reserve System. Similarly, the PRC’s agricultural 
demonstration centres in SSA and SEA may result in deeper connections in the regions. 
These initiatives, however, are still young. 
In the near future, if the Party-state expands its structural power over the 
networks and rules of the global food system, it has the potential to create a unique food 
regime shaped on elements of the U.S. and corporate food regimes. A PRC food regime 
would be constructed on the Party-state’s national food security priority and 
characterized by the export of domestically owned (and developed) grain seed 
technology and the import of world grain through domestically owned channels. This 
configuration would closely resemble the U.S. food-regime, though resolving its central 
conflict between the export of technology and grain. It would also resemble the 
corporate food regime in its reliance on a trade and investment enabled global 
governance architecture and widespread agribusiness networks.  
8.3. Future research 
The subject matter and corresponding arguments of this thesis are broad by design. 
Similarly, this thesis is designed to open doors for a broad research agenda related to 
the PRC’s place in the global food system and the global political economy. Having 
explained why China’s grain seed sector is so different and how this difference has been 
maintained and expanded abroad, an emerging area of research is opened wider. 
Scholars of critical food studies, GPE, and political power can see China’s nascent 
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transnational grain and seed industry as a new terrain in the study of global food and 
economic systems. The research agenda includes, but is not limited, to the following 
subjects.  
• China’s interaction with previous food regimes: while this dissertation focused 
on grain and began in the second food regime, empirical study of China’s place in 
the first food regime is particularly intriguing. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Imperial 
and early Republican China interacted with the dynamics of the first food regime in 
surprising ways. However, much more can be done to understand how the Qing 
Dynasty understood the relationship between the United States and Britain, as well 
as its own relationship to British agrifood power. This type of study can be linked in 
to additional research, along with this dissertation, to establish links and breaks in 
Greater China’s interaction with the global food system over time. 
• Case studies or case comparisons of specific businesses or sets of business 
from the PRC: concentrated studies on specific agribusiness actors from the PRC 
can better examine and test their activities and networks in terms of foreign and 
domestic grain seed extension, normative commitment to the Party-state and 
national food security, and their historical development in the context of the 
domestic political economy. Such studies would also allow for closer examination of 
bureaucratic politics regarding the relationship between agribusinesses and 
specific Party-state entities. Agribusinesses that might be targeted for such study 
include: LPHT, COFCO, Sinochem/ChemChina, CNGSC, Shandong Denghai, and 
Origin Agritech. This type of research has already begun, but the landscape is vast. 
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• Negative power and change: given that most power frameworks seek to explain 
the actions of the powerful, they do not account for negative forms of power (for an 
exception, see Cohen & Chiu, 2013). However, negative power, or conscious 
autonomy from the powerful, is a key concept to theorize changes in power 
dynamics. On one hand, this concept and its application in the context of food 
politics will be of interest to scholars of GPE seeking to interpret the place of not 
only the PRC but also other emerging powers. While it may not contribute to an 
explanation in all cases, its applicability is worth examining to account for shifting 
global power structures. On the other hand, the concept may be useful on a lower 
scale for critical food studies scholars and alternative food movements seeking to 
change power dynamics in the face of powerful actors. 
• China’s AFNs and the industrial food system: on the topic of AFNs in the PRC, 
current research has concentrated on establishing the existence, practices, and 
motivations of these organizations. However, the expansive industrial grain seed 
system and supporting state policies in the PRC might constrain the expansion of 
AFNs into key grain crops. As such, determining the intersection between China’s 
alternative food systems and China’s industrial food system, particularly in the seed 
sector, is an area of research that may provide insights into both limitations and 
opportunities for AFNs to scale-up. 
• China’s place in global food governance: as mentioned above, the PRC has 
engaged regional institutions to establish food and grain related organizations and 
rules. Other scholars have already begun to examine the PRC in global food and 
trade governance institutions (Falkner, 2006; Hopewell, 2016; Trethewie, 2013). 
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However a more concentrated focus on in the PRC’s involvement in upholding or 
changing global food governance institutions would be fruitful. Such studies could 
focus on current activities in GMO governance, in formal institutions, private 
governance arrangements, and informal rules related to product launch and 
approval processes. 
 
The topics mentioned above are by no means an exhaustive list and scholars across the 
globe have already begun to undertake these tasks. However, too often the research is 
occurring with a specific disciplinary focus in mind, and the studies that exist speak at 
cross-purposes. In developing a research agenda, it is my hope that a broader discussion 
is stimulated, bringing together a range of perspectives and expertise to better situate 
the changing place of China in the global food system. Further, in carrying out this 
research agenda it is important for (inter)disciplinary scholars embedded in academic 
communities outside of Asia to collaborate with colleagues and researchers specialized 
in Chinese area studies, as well scholars based in Greater China and in Asia more 
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